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The eighteenth century marks the emergence of a genuine English banking system. 
However it is a period that has received comparatively little historical attention. This thesis 
seeks to provide an analysis of some of the key features of this system, especially the 
London banks that stood at its core. It also seeks to show how banking related to the 
contemporary economy. While banking is usually linked to the growth of industry, 
especially outside of the provinces, this thesis argues that a new approach is required, 
which takes into account the banks’ close relationship with England’s important 
commercial sector. 
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Introduction: The paradox of the eighteenth century financial system 
 
The performance of the eighteenth century English economy is known to have been 
remarkable.1 English commerce was transformed, while in the latter decades of the century 
innovations in manufacturing were beginning to transform the industrial sector. 
Theoretically one might anticipate that this success was linked with developments in the 
financial system that would help successfully to mobilise the financial resources needed for 
these changes. Yet while the work undertaken on the English financial system in this period 
tends to highlight its success in financing the English state, it has, at best, a mixed verdict 
on its influence on commercial and industrial ventures. This has led to suggestions that the 
Financial Revolution and the Industrial Revolution had nothing to do with one another. In 
particular the newly created banking system is often regarded as fragile and by some 
authors as unfit for purpose. This presents a paradox, where economic progress was 
achieved via a financial system, which despite clearly becoming more advanced is still 
considered as inadequate. Given that the evidence in favour of economic and commercial 
success is overwhelming, one needs to question traditional assessments of the 18th century 
financial system in order to resolve this apparent contradiction. This introduction will begin 
with a brief indication of the scope of change in English finance and economic performance 
in the eighteenth century and then highlight the evidence indicating that finance has a 
significant impact on economic growth. This will be followed by an analysis specifically of 
the current understanding of the eighteenth century banking system. This will indicate that 
there are significant gaps in our knowledge and a narrowness of approach to this topic that 
bring into question many of the conclusions that have been reached. 
I 
At the onset of the eighteenth century, the English credit system was highly personal and 
diffuse.2 Craig Muldrew has argued that the period from 1694 to 1720 witnessed changes 
that led to the acceleration of a process, stretching over three centuries, that saw credit 
‘becoming concentrated in the hands of fewer individuals’.3 The English financial system at 
the end of the eighteenth century possessed a version of the five key elements that are 
associated with specialised and sophisticated financial systems: sound public finances and 
debt management; stable monetary arrangements; a variety of banks, both domestic and 
international; a central bank; and a well-functioning securities market.4 The dynamism of 
the banking sector over the course of the century is also not really in doubt. The eighteenth 
century saw Britain become a more financial society, as can be seen in Table 1, most 
                                                             
1 I refer to England here, although technically this should read as England and Wales. Scotland and 
Ireland are deliberately excluded from this analysis, as they operated different financial systems in 
this period. 
2 Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early 
Modern England (Basingstoke, 1998) has become the standard work for the credit economy of the 
seventeenth century and the very early part of the eighteenth. 
3
 Muldrew, Economy of Obligation, pp. 328-9.  
4
 Peter L. Rousseau and Richard Sylla, ‘Financial systems, economic growth and globalisation’, NBER 
Working Paper 8323 (2001), pp. 2-3 and 9-11. The only other nation with such all five elements was 
the Netherlands. 
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noticeably in the Financial Intermediation Ratio (financial assets as a share of tangible 
assets).  
National Balance sheet of Great Britain 
  1688 1760 1800 
Land 55% 41% 30% 
Reproducible tangible assets 30% 31% 34% 
Tangible assets 85% 72% 64% 
Monetary metals 4% 2% 1% 
Financial Assets 11% 27% 35% 
Foreign Assets (net) - -2% 0% 
Total Financial Assets 15% 27% 36% 
  
   Total National Assets 100% 100% 100% 
National assets (£ bn) 0.35 1.05 2.73 
GNP (£ bn) 0.05 0.09 0.23 
Financial Intermediation Ratio 17% 37% 57% 
Table 1: National Balance sheet of Great Britain (Source: Raymond W. Goldsmith, Comparative National 
Balance Sheets, A study of Twenty Countries, 1688-1978, pp. 232-33) 
Much of this growth in financial assets was driven by the expansion of the national debt, 
which by 1800 accounted for about 17% of the nation’s assets. Banks also played a role in 
the eighteenth century, claiming 3% of the nation’s assets, from a position of 
insignificance.5 By the turn of the nineteenth century, commonly used figures suggest there 
were around 230 Country Banks in England, from being virtually non-existent in 1750. Over 
50 private banks operated in London, again showing considerable growth over the course 
of the century.6 It is believed that in 1775 bank assets totalled £20.5 million pounds, or 15% 
of national income. By 1800 this grew to £54.8 million, or 28% of national income.7 This 
growth in banking can also be seen in the changing role of other long-standing traditional 
financial intermediaries, such as the provincial attorney.8  
The banking system in this context refers to four specialised types of firm that emerged in 
this period: London banks, which were either West End or City (and of course the Bank of 
England); provincial banks; and towards the end of the century merchant banks.9 These 
                                                             
5 Raymond W. Goldsmith, Comparative National Balance Sheets, A study of Twenty Countries, 1688-
1978 (London, 1985), pp. 232-3. One should note that these national balance sheet figures are 
imprecise and likely understate the share of financial assets, see ibid., pp. 227-30.  
6 Edward Nevin and E.W. Davis, The London Clearing Banks (London, 1970), p. 36; D.M. Joslin, 
‘London Private Bankers, 1720-1785’, EcHR 7:2 (1954), p. 173. These figures understate the number 
of banks. 
7 R. Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, A Comparative Study (London, 1967), 
pp. 34-5. Once again these figures should be regarded as illustrative. 
8 M. Miles, ‘The money market in the early industrial revolution: the evidence from West riding 
attorneys, c.1750-1800’, Business History 23.2 (1981), pp. 127-46.  
9
 For a general introduction to the structure of English banking, see L.S. Pressnell, Country Banking in 
the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956), pp. 75-84; Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England, A 
History, vol. 1 1694-1797 (Cambridge, 1944), pp. 157-172; Nicholas Lane, ‘The Fathers of English 
Banking’ History Today 3.3 (1953), pp. 190-99; Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, An 
Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914 (London, 2001), pp. 148-59. 
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banks were defined by the type of business and their customers, rather than their 
organisational structure, as all except the Bank of England were private partnerships.10 
Most of the historical literature considers any one part of this collection of different types 
of business in isolation. A recent exception has been James’s article on English banking, but 
that is still limited in scope, being focused on the period 1793 to 1826.11 For many 
historians the key distinction of these firms was their ability to mobilise new sources of 
capital. Melton defines banking as ‘a system of money lending beyond an ordinary source 
of capital’. Simply lending money or discounting bills and notes is not sufficient: banking 
requires a capital based upon deposits.12 Pressnell adopts a similar approach to address this 
question, writing that:  
a banker’s distinctive function is not to lend his own capital, for then he would be 
merely a species of money lender; nor is he a mere intermediary, between lender 
and borrower, for that would make him a money scrivener, or a broker: an agent 
not a principal. What makes a man a banker, and not some other kind of financial 
specialist, is the use of claims upon him to settle debts.13 
Bankers kept client accounts and used this money as loan brokers to lend it out in their own 
names. The techniques of trading on note issues and customer deposits had been 
pioneered in the seventeenth century, but the activity became much more common in the 
eighteenth. Yet defining banking on the basis of deposits has become somewhat old-
fashioned.14 Modern banking studies acknowledge the importance of taking deposits and 
issuing loans, but argue that this is not the sole purpose of a bank, and might not even be 
its main function.15 The focus has shifted from the source of a bank’s funds towards its role 
in lending, as an assessor of projects and a monitor of the recipients of loans.16 Others see 
commercial banks’ significance in their provision of liquidity to the economy, or short-term 
credit; an ability to remit money; and the provision of a means of payment. Such a broader 
approach to banking is appropriate to the purposes of this thesis. While a focus on deposits 
captures a key feature of a clearing banker, it excludes the merchant banker, who normally 
traded on his own capital. Merchant banks are relevant however because their acceptance 
business was important in enhancing liquidity by making commercial bills discountable, 
while it also encompassed the monitoring function emphasised in modern literature.  
                                                             
10 I.S. Black, ‘Private Banking in London’s West End, 1750-1830’, London Journal 28:1 (2003), pp. 53-
4; Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, pp. 170-1.  
11 John A. James, ‘English Banking and Payments before 1826’, Research in Economic History 28 
(2012), pp. 117-49. 
12 Frank T. Melton, Sir Robert Clayton and the origins of English deposit banking, 1658-1685 
(Cambridge, 2002) pp. 8-11; idem, ‘Robert and Sir Francis Gosling: Eighteenth-Century Bankers and 
Stationers’, in Robin Myers and Michael Harris (eds.), Economics of the British Booktrade 1605-1939 
(Cambridge/Alexandria, VA, 1985), pp. 67-8.  
13 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 225-6. 
14
 See for example the New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance under ‘Banking firm’. 
15
 Kent Matthews and John Thompson, The Economics of Banking (Chichester, 2005), p.1, citing Boyd 
and Gertler (1994) ‘Are banks dead?’. 
16
 See for example Eugene F. Fama, ‘What’s different about banks?’, Journal of Monetary Economics 
15.1 (1985), pp. 35-9. Fama argues that it is the banks’ inside knowledge of their borrowers business 
that makes banking viable. 
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As apparent as the emergence of a banking sector is the change that took place in the 
eighteenth century economy. The period of the later eighteenth century has become 
synonymous in the economic literature with the Industrial Revolution. A part of the current 
understanding of the Industrial Revolution is acceleration in the measured growth rates of 
the English economy, pioneered initially by Phyllis Deane and W.A. Cole. They suggested 
that the most remarkable pick-up in growth occurred in the 1780s, with growth in industry 
and commerce reaching 3.43% per annum. Revisions made to the data by Crafts and Harley 
however substantially revised these estimates downwards. The difference in 
measurements amounts to a change from a six-fold increase in industrial production 
between 1780 and 1830 under Deane and Cole, to a fourfold increase under Crafts and 
Harley. For the economy as a whole, this translated to a difference between an expansion 
of three and a half times and two and a half times (2.5% p.a. and 1.7% p.a. respectively).17 
The substantial differences in the growth rates between 1780 and 1830 however mask 
agreement on many issues. Both sets of authors argued that a general revolution in 
industry did not occur, rather rapid productivity gains were only seen in textiles.18 Notably 
Deane and Cole had also identified an earlier, more gradual increase between 1740 and 
1770, which then petered out in that decade.19 Crafts also argued that the size of the 
economy in 1780 had been underestimated.20 Both these points suggest that greater 
attention to the earlier part of the century is warranted.  
A narrow focus on growth rates is not entirely appropriate. The Industrial Revolution was 
originally used to coin a perceived social catastrophe, where the masses of destitute poor 
sat side-by-side with a very wealthy elite.21 Crafts himself argued that the industrial 
revolution was less about advances in industry, but more about a ‘structural shift’ from 
agriculture to industry, a process that occurred at a sedate pace.22 Hudson and Berg in 
particular provide strong arguments against the use of national income statistics in 
assessing the Industrial Revolution.23 For many authors, despite Crafts’ revisions to British 
growth estimates and changes in our understanding of when the acceleration in British 
growth took place, the core idea of an Industrial Revolution remains intact. The British 
economy led a Europe-wide process of change between 1700 and 1850 that meant for the 
first time that negative feedback barriers constraining economies were broken through. 
This was driven both by advances in technology and institutions that encouraged 
progress.24  
                                                             
17 For an overview of these changes, see Emma Griffin, A short History of the British Industrial 
Revolution (Basingstoke, 2010), chapter 2, especially pp. 15-8. 
18 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
19 Ibid., p. 16. 
20 Ibid., p. 20. 
21 D.C. Coleman, Myth, History and the Industrial Revolution (London, 1992), pp. 3-15. 
22 Griffin, Short History of the Industrial Revolution, pp. 27-8. 
23
 Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson, ‘Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution’, EcHR 45.1 (1992) pp. 26-
30. 
24
 Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850 (Padstow, 2009), 
pp. 10-12; E.A. Wrigley, ‘The Divergence of England: The Growth of the English Economy in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: The Prothero Lecture’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, Sixth Series, Vol. 10 (2000), pp. 129-34. 
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A key point in this regard is that by 1700, England was already one of the richest countries 
in the world on a per capita GDP basis.25 This wealth was generated through an efficient 
agricultural sector, a relatively urban, middle-class society and a strong commercial 
sector.26 Throughout the eighteenth century the country consolidated its position and 
moved towards becoming the leading economy in the world. This was a relatively 
sophisticated economy and sophisticated economies require better organisation. In the 
context of this study, it is perhaps the commercial aspect of this wealth that is particularly 
interesting. The importance of trade as an explanatory factor in the Industrial Revolution is 
a contentious topic.27 However the commercial nature of English society, even in 1700, is 
not to be doubted. The commercial revolution is perhaps one of the most clear-cut 
features of the eighteenth century English economy. On current values, the compound 
annual growth rate of English exports as seen in Figure 1 was 2.87%. 
 
Figure 1: Official and current values of English exports in the eighteenth century (Source: John J. McCusker, 
'The Current Value of English Exports, 1697 to 1800' The William and Mary Quarterly, 28.4 (1971) pp. 620-2) 
That there ought to have been some connection between the economic changes and the 
eighteenth century financial system occurred to the earliest of observers. Joplin, who was a 
major critic of the structure of the English banking system of the time, did not doubt the 
importance of solid banks to economic growth.28 Adam Smith also saw the advantages of 
an efficient modern banking system, even if some of his thoughts on the matter were 
slightly confused.29 In particular he saw their worth in ‘rendering a greater part of that [a 
country’s] capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the most 
                                                             
25 Angus Maddison, The World Economy, Historical Statistics (Paris, 2003), pp. 58-9.  
26 Mokyr, Enlightened Economy, pp. 13-20. 
27
 For a recent, sceptical assessment of trade’s importance, see Deirdre McCloskey, Bourgeois 
dignity: why economics can’t explain the modern world (Chicago, 2010), chapters 23-25. 
28
 Thomas Joplin, An Essay on the General Principles and Present Practice of Banking in England and 
Scotland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1822), pp. 1-6. 
29
 Edwin G. West, ‘Adam Smith's Support for Money and Banking Regulation: A Case of 
Inconsistency’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29.1 (1997) pp. 127-34. 
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judicious operations of banking can increase the industry of the country’.30 In particular 
banks’ paper money allowed for the mobilisation of dead stock of traders, and was in 
Smith’s mind especially appropriate for use in transactions between dealers (i.e. not with 
customers). However Smith also recognised the importance of discounting and lending 
upon cash accounts by banks in helping customers run their businesses more efficiently.31 
Not all economic thinking at the time agreed with this assessment of course. Turgot, for 
example, could not see how banking and paper money might facilitate capital formation.32 
Modern economic literature similarly suggests that finance is important in driving 
economic growth. The banking system is expected to be fully integrated with the rest of the 
financial system, with the explicit aim of better utilising ‘society’s scarce resources, 
increas[ing] productive efficiency and ultimately rais[ing] the standard of living’.33 The 
evidence from modern economic theory, while still not completely conclusive on the 
matter, suggests that economic growth is stimulated by an efficient financial system.34 This 
idea dates back to Bagehot’s Lombard Street and Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic 
Development. Schumpeter in particular suggested that entrepreneurs were key to 
development and that the only way their activities could be accommodated in the 
economy was by an extension of the means of payment which was affected through the 
money markets, with bankers being critical to the supply of these funds.35 The earliest 
empirical studies in support of this position date to the 1960s. The work of Raymond 
Goldsmith features prominently, although he could not draw a firm conclusion on the 
direction of causality from either economic theory or economic history.36 Cameron’s 
important work, published at about the same time, sought to address the connection 
between banking and industrialisation through comparative historical studies. His 
conclusions were similarly ambiguous, as the variations in historical experience across 
countries were substantial, but did tend to suggest that in countries such as Scotland and 
Japan, the strength of the banking system was of direct benefit to industrial development.37 
Over the last two decades, there has been a considerable volume of scholarship devoted to 
this topic, much of which suggests that the causality runs from financial development to 
                                                             
30 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III (1776), ed. Andrew S. Skinner (London, 1999), p. 
419. 
31 Ibid., pp. 420-3. 
32 See Antoin E. Murphy, The Genesis of Macroeconomics: New Ideas from Sir William Petty to Henry 
Thornton (Oxford, 2009), p. 134. Turgot was probably unduly influenced by France’s experience of a 
paper currency under John Law, a man who had indeed appreciated its advantages.  
33 Alan Griffiths and Stuart Wall, Applied Economics, 9th edition (Harlow, 2001), p. 524. 
34 For a short overview of the literature, and an opinion on the inconclusive nature of the evidence, 
see Richard S. Grossman, Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the Industrialised World 
Since 1800 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 5-10. 
35 Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, An Inquiry into Profits, Capital Credit, 
Interest, and the Business Cycle (London, 1934 edition, 13th printing, 2007), chapter III; Walter 
Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, 10
th
 edition (London, 1896), chapter 1. 
The early importance of Bagehot and Schumpeter is widely acknowledged, including by Grossman, 
Levine, and Rajan and Zingales.  
36
 Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development (New Haven and London, 1969), 
chapter 9. The problems deriving from the historical literature at the time are covered on pp. 401-8. 
37 Cameron, Banking in the early stages of industrialisation, passim. 
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economic growth.38 Particularly significant in this regard has been the work of Ross 
Levine.39 He argues that, despite some remaining ambiguity in the nature of this link, the 
preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence ‘suggests a positive, first-
order relationship between financial development and economic growth’.40 Both banks and 
stock exchanges are important in this development, although the regression models 
suggest that they perform slightly different functions.41 Central to the explanation of this 
argument is the ‘transmission’ mechanism by which greater financial development 
increases economic growth. Four principal ways are identified in which this can happen: 
through the pooling of capital; through screening/monitoring potential/actual recipients of 
capital (Levine treats these two functions separately); through diversification; and through 
the lowering of transaction costs.42 
Other approaches within the economic literature have yielded similar conclusions. Rajan 
and Zingales have addressed some of the problems with Levine’s evidence, the most 
important being whether finance was simply a leading indicator rather than a cause of 
economic growth. By examining the financial sector’s role in bringing external funds to 
firms, they offer an alternative approach at the micro-economic level, which again suggests 
that better financial services reduce the cost of external finance to firms and thus are 
supportive of industrial growth.43 Rousseau and Sylla have attempted to combine some of 
the economic and economic history approaches, incorporating historical data into the 
framework pioneered by Levine.44 Their analysis, incorporating cross-country comparisons, 
also effectively builds on Cameron’s work. Indeed these authors argue that some of the 
historical approach to the finance-growth nexus is more compelling than studies based on 
large datasets of the more modern era.45 Other contributions have begun to refine earlier 
conclusions. Thus Jaremski and Rousseau’s work suggests for example that in the USA, 
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chartered banks were more effective at driving economic growth than the free banks.46 
While financial development is then generally important in encouraging economic growth, 
the question that arises is whether this analysis is relevant to the eighteenth century 
economy in England.   
In the context of this question, Rousseau’s ‘Historical Perspectives on Financial 
Development and Economic Growth’ is notable. In this paper, he suggests that in their early 
stages, the resource mobilisation that well-developed financial systems facilitate is as 
significant as the direction of these resources towards productive enterprise. He argues 
that from a macro-economic perspective, the cases of the Netherlands, England and the US 
all indicate that ‘banks and financial markets did  promote investment and commercial 
activities by generating information, pooling funds, facilitating payments, and providing  
working capital for the largest companies that traded on the world’s earliest “stock 
exchanges”’.47 Specifically on England, he argues that between 1720 and 1850 there were 
improvements to both its banking system and its commercial and industrial performance. 
The time series indicate ‘the initial development of a commercial sector that later nurtured 
and was complemented by a growing manufacturing sector’.48 The results of his analysis 
suggest that monetization of the economy (as measured by Bank of England liabilities) 
caused industrial development (but not trade), and this industrial development drove 
further growth in trade.49 Equally the Bank of England’s lending drove the expansion of 
trade in its own right.50 While the author readily acknowledges the suggestive nature of the 
conclusions, he notes that they are consistent with results from other countries and the 
more modern era where better datasets are available. The financial sector mattered not 
just for the direct investments it made, but also provided an incentivisation effect for 
invention as it was known that attractive ideas could receive financing. Crucially the 
financial sector’s significance should not solely be measured through the effectiveness of 
its resource allocation, which Rousseau argues was a later development in financial 
capability.51 The relevance of these results is two-fold. Firstly, there is the overall insight 
they offer on the significance of the banking sector in this period from a quantitative 
perspective. Further qualitative work on this link thus appears justified, in order better to 
answer the questions of how this link worked in practice. Secondly it highlights the 
importance of considering the impact of finance beyond its ability to allocate resources to 
industry, which is a question that the historical literature addresses poorly. 
A difficulty arises however because while the theoretical and empirical links between 
economic growth and a strong financial and banking system are apparent, economic and 
financial historians of eighteenth century England have struggled to elucidate a clear 
                                                             
46 Matthew Jaremski and Peter L. Rousseau, ‘Banks, Free Banks and U.S. Economic Growth’, NBER 
Working Paper 18021 (2012), pp.19-21. 
47 Peter L. Rousseau, ‘Historical Perspectives on Financial Development and Economic Growth’, NBER 
Working Paper 9333 (2002), p. 2. This paper has been subsequently published in the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review 84.4 (2003), pp. 81-105. 
48
 Rousseau, ‘Historical Perspectives on Financial Development and Economic Growth’, pp. 13-16. 
49
 Ibid., pp. 19-21. 
50
 Ibid., p. 20. The latter result is at the statistical 15% level, which is not conventionally regarded as 
significant. 
51 Ibid., pp. 38-40. 
16 
 
connection between the financial system and economic growth. Indeed much of the history 
of banks in particular has regarded them as sub-optimal. Despite a few historians’ attempts 
to challenge this point, the prevalent view is that the Financial Revolution and Industrial 
Revolution were disconnected. The question raised is whether the absence of a connection 
in the literature reflects the fact that the link genuinely did not exist or whether it is the 
result of a flawed approach to the study of banks in this period. The following section on 
the historiography of eighteenth century English banks shows a number of reasons why it 
may well be a result of a lack of adequate understanding of the purposes and functions of 
banks in this period.  
II 
The greatest strength of the financial system of the time is readily acknowledged: it is 
applauded for its ability to finance the English state, as originally shown in P.G.M. Dickson’s 
pioneering Financial Revolution.52 Dickson demonstrated how the finances of the state 
were re-organised from 1688 to the mid-eighteenth century to allow Britain to finance 
increasingly expensive wars through unprecedented use of debt. As a work of history, this 
book has been hugely significant as other historians have examined the fuller implications 
of this pioneering work.53 However the work, with its emphasis on capital markets, has 
served to deflect recent historical attention away from other parts of the financial system, 
in particular the private banks. It is in the area of private finance that the effectiveness of 
the financial system has been particularly questioned. One can identify two broad lines of 
criticism. The first is that the banking system was structurally unsound, especially because 
of the prohibition on joint-stock banking resulting from the monopoly granted to the Bank 
of England. The second was that the banks that did emerge were not as efficient as they 
should have been in making capital available to the wider economy, especially to industry. 
It is necessary to consider these criticisms in more detail.  
Both of these criticisms are readily identifiable in the most recent significant contribution 
to English banking history of this period, Cameron’s Banking in the Early Stages of 
Industrialization.54 Largely a work of comparative history, it added little to the knowledge 
or understanding of the English banking system in its own right. Its significance instead was 
in pioneering the comparative approach to banking history and, more importantly in the 
current context, emphasising the role of banks as vehicles for industrial development. On 
the latter point, it underscored a shift that had been taking place throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. Cameron’s work then clearly reflected a school of historical thought that wanted to 
understand the role of banking in facilitating industrialisation. His conclusions were based 
on its success in this particular area. He regarded English banking from 1750 to 1844 as ‘far 
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from ideal in its contribution to either stability or growth of the economy’ but believed it 
had a ‘positive and significant contribution to industrialisation’.55 Here one can see the 
early criticism of English banking neatly summarised: while it was not ineffective, other 
countries, most obviously Scotland, had developed systems more effective at encouraging 
industrial development. 
The criticism of the structure of English banking dates back to at least the 1820s and is 
based around the prohibition of joint-stock banks that was encapsulated in the Bank of 
England’s charter of 1708.56 All bank partnerships from that point forward were limited to a 
maximum of six partners. A prominent critic of this arrangement was Thomas Joplin, who 
was integral to the restriction’s removal in 1826. Joplin was in favour of a ‘Scottish’ model 
of banking, based around joint-stock banks, as opposed to the unitary system that had 
developed in England.57 This was broadly a matter of stability: Scottish banks were thought 
better able to withstand extraordinary pressures than those that emerged in England. 
Modern historians have not tended to disagree with his assessment. Thus Crick and 
Wadsworth clearly believed that the private banking structure was not as effective as the 
joint-stock model.58 Pressnell summed the position up by arguing that ‘common to all 
banks was a wholly unnecessary weakness, imposed by the retention, until 1826, of the 
monopoly of joint-stock banking by the Bank of England’.59 Given Pressnell’s contribution to 
the study of country banking, his opinion carries significant weight. Others to follow this 
argument have been Scottish historians: Munn, for example, argues that the English private 
bankers were a source of instability by 1826, in explicit contrast to those of Scotland (and 
Ireland).60 
That the English banking system suffered periodic shocks prior to 1826 cannot be doubted. 
However there are reasons to be cautious about the criticisms of the English system. These 
assessments have been heavily influenced by the period from 1800 to 1826, an 
economically exceptional period when the decision to suspend the convertibility of bank 
notes fundamentally changed the rules of banking.61 It is not altogether clear that the 
system was any more vulnerable than that of Scotland through to 1797. An actual statistical 
analysis in this early period has not been forthcoming. Equally indicative of a potential flaw 
in this argument is the fact that for the north east of England, it has been shown that the 
joint-stock banks were actually less stable than the early private banks.62 Obviously this 
reflects the experience of one region, which may have been atypical, but it indicates the 
                                                             
55 Ibid., p. 58. 
56 J. Lawrence Broz and Richard S. Grossman, ‘Paying for privilege: the political economy of Bank of 
England charters, 1694-1844’, Explorations in Economic History 41.1 (2004), pp.49-52, 56-8. 
57 Thomas Joplin, An Essay on the General Principles and Present Practice of Banking in England and 
Scotland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1822), pp. 16-17.   
58 W.F. Crick and J.E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint-Stock Banking (London, 1936), chapter 1, 
especially pp. 9-43. 
59 L.S. Pressnell, ‘Public Monies and the Development of English Banking’, EcHR 5:3 (1953), pp. 396-7.  
60
 Charles W. Munn, ‘The Emergence of Joint-Stock Banking in the British Isles, A Comparative 
Approach’, Business History 30:1 (Jan, 1988), pp. 69-72; idem, The Scottish Provincial Banking 
Companies 1747-1864 (Edinburgh, 1981), pp. 233-7. 
61
 Ian P.H. Duffy, ‘The Discount Policy of the Bank of England During the Suspension of Cash 
Payment, 1797-1821’, EcHR 35.1 (1982). 
62 James, ‘English Banking and Payments before 1826’, pp. 120-4. 
18 
 
requirement for further research on this topic. Others studies not directly related to the 
English experience also show the need for greater analysis of this question. Theoretical 
studies on the relative performance of unitary and joint-stock banking systems equally 
have tended to show ambiguous results on their relative strengths. Early theoretical studies 
suggested that branch banking should be more stable, as such structures create more 
diverse loan portfolios, have more geographically diverse deposit bases, which protect 
against local bank runs, and provide seasonal diversification. Grossman cautiously agrees 
with this point, arguing that a straight comparison of the US and Canadian banking 
performance in 1930 suggests that the strength of branch banking was real. However some 
recent studies find the evidence for this to be less clear-cut.63 A study of the problems in 
the US in the 1980s argued that, although the inter-state banking restrictions were not 
desirable, the greatest problems had stemmed from the largest banks in the system and 
that small, local banks did not suffer disproportionate loan losses.64   
There is a second strand to this debate on the relative strengths of unitary and joint-stock 
banks, which relates to client relationships rather than financial stability. Carnevali has 
argued for example that unitary, or at least locally orientated banks, are more effective at 
meeting the needs of their customers, largely because they can deal more effectively with 
information asymmetries inherent in bank lending.65 Thus English small firms in the 
twentieth century have been systematically disadvantaged by the intensively consolidated 
joint-stock banking system.66 This can be related to a more long-standing criticism of 
English banking: that it was not ideal, or outright ineffective, in the provision of finance for 
industry. This debate stretches back before the twentieth century and is therefore not just 
about banking structure. Rather it is also one of banking practice and culture. Systematic 
studies of the topic based on nineteenth century bank records are not as comprehensive as 
they might be, but do tend to suggest that banks were flexible and supportive of industry. 
Business histories, if they address the issue at all, deliver more mixed results, with 
breweries for example gaining ready access to bank facilities, while collieries were more 
likely to be privately financed.67 Collins and Baker themselves argued that banks focused on 
the provision of short-term loans, a trend that increased over time. Banks had a ‘strong 
aversion to risk taking’ in their industrial lending.68 This debate has been linked to a 
supposed overall industrial decline in the later nineteenth century. Some attempts to 
extend the analysis of bank industrial finance backwards to the eighteenth century have 
been made, with ambiguous results. Most noticeably, both Cottrell and Mathias argue that 
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the very limited surviving evidence suggests that banks would engage in lending to 
industrial clients.69 
Cottrell and Mathias’ conclusions intuitively feel more plausible than extreme weaknesses 
in industrial finance, which would appear paradoxical in light of England’s economic success 
in the eighteenth century. Indeed there are objections that can be made to this analysis, 
based around three main concerns. There are serious defects with the broad evidence. This 
is true for both historians and economists. The economists are largely reliant on macro-
level data on which regression models are run; data which is not always as good as it might 
be. Addressing this defect lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Where it can hope to make 
some contribution is in improving the understanding of how the transmission mechanisms 
between banking and the economy worked in practice. This would in itself help drive 
further quantitative analysis in the future. Much of the historical literature has focused on 
the relationship between banking and industry. In this respect, it is possible that the 
questions that these authors were seeking to answer were misconceived, or at least too 
narrow. 
On the question of evidence, the narrowness of the knowledge base on which these 
conclusions have been drawn is readily apparent. Most studies of the significance of 
banking are enormously dependent on the work of Pressnell, the only existing work to 
provide an in-depth analysis of (one part of) the banking industry.70 As the first attempt to 
study country banks, this is an impressive piece of historical writing. Horsefield suggested 
upon its publication that ‘seldom can a pioneer effort have produced so solidly established 
a standard work’.71 Maybe it is a tribute to the rigour of the study that additional attempts 
to conduct original research on country banking are comparatively rare. This is best seen in 
James’ statement in 2012: ‘I must acknowledge that I stand on the shoulders ... of 
Pressnell’s Country Banking’.72 The most significant addition to the study of country 
banking has been made by Iain Black, who focused on their role as agents of national 
economic integration.73 Local historians also continue to pursue the subject, Banham’s 
work on banking in the North East being one of the more successful attempts of this type.74 
As will be argued later, more work of this nature would enhance our understanding of the 
topic. Other contributions are more minor, Liam Brunt’s work on provincial bankers as 
venture capitalists providing an interesting example, but the significance of his conclusions 
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are not fully developed.75 Fundamentally, Pressnell’s conclusions remain unaltered and his 
work the best study of the subject. Aside from Pressnell, the other work to achieve 
impressive longevity has been Clapham’s work on the Bank of England. Although clearly an 
institutional history, this work stands out because Clapham could provide important 
context thanks to broad research carried out from 1900 to 1930. This means that he 
managed to write what is still probably the best all-encompassing overview of the 
eighteenth century banking.76 Despite new publications emerging, it remains the most 
important study of the Bank.77 
The problem is that beyond these two works, the existing literature is inconsistent both in 
terms of its coverage and quality. The four pioneering banking histories are considered to 
be Martin's History of the Grasshopper, followed by Hilton Price's London Bankers, 
Maberley Phillips' Banking in the North of England and Cave's Banking in Bristol, all 
published in the 1890s.78 These often originated from partners and former employees of 
banks, along with members of banking families, writing histories of organisations they were 
a part of or associated with. Thus Cave was descended from the banking family in Bristol 
and his interest is unsurprising.79 Phillips worked for the Bank of England in Newcastle and 
subsequently proceeded to produce his work on banking in the North of England, partly 
due to genuine antiquarian interest and the desire to fill an apparent knowledge gap.80 
Their interest was also a response to the amalgamation movement that was gathering pace 
and consuming in particular the private banks, whose identity they subsequently wished to 
preserve. 
These older works do have clear limitations, but are still of great significance. There is a 
strong emphasis on the history of the partners of these banks, rather than the banks 
themselves, although this does capture the personal nature of these businesses in their 
early stages. This focus also reflects the difficulty of early historians in accessing 
information on these private institutions. As one reviewer of the subject pointed out, as 
private enterprises there were no public statistics to draw upon to form a ‘scientific 
account’ of them.81 Indeed the secrecy of eighteenth century banks remains a constraint on 
modern analysis.82 An advantage of these early accounts is that they were produced by 
people who worked in an era when private bankers were still active, and often had access 
to generations who could remember some of the early histories of the firms from which 
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they emanated, even if their memory may not have been perfect.83 Even if some of the 
information may have been scratchy, these works provide us in many instances with the 
most reliable source of basic facts about these banks, for example the date of their 
formation. As Banham says of Philips’ work, it is significant both nationally and regionally, 
and although limited, contains important implicit analysis of networks in particular.84 
Similar sentiments could be expressed about many of the other publications of that era.  
Gradually, sufficient information was revealed through these histories to allow a more 
considered opinion of the banking industry to be formed. A consistent theme of the 1910-
30 period was the publication of more systematic studies of banking and finance. The most 
comprehensive effort in this direction was carried out in the 1920s by R.D. Richards which 
remains the only explicitly general, long-term history of early banking. Even in this case, 
although purportedly a comprehensive survey, the relevant section on the eighteenth 
century is dominated by the development of the Bank of England.85 However this literature 
did serve to draw out key points. Above all, it fundamentally shifted the study of the 
emergence of banking in England from a narrow focus on the goldsmiths of the Civil War 
and the Restoration period and considered the role of the state, the law and the mercantile 
classes, especially in London. The ‘village usurers’ and ‘pawnbrokers to the wealthy’ of 
earlier histories were comparatively minor sideshows.86 This approach had the merit of 
placing the development of the banker within a longer-term trend, rather than seeing it as 
an aberration resulting from the Civil War. Indeed the subject of the origins and early 
activities of banking has remained a popular field of study into the modern period.87 
Others were also managing to think of finance in a more conjoined way and were 
publishing high quality work. W.T.C King and W.R. Bisschop carried out important work on 
the London discount markets.88 Bisschop in particular emphasised that his history of the 
English money market studies the themes surrounding the creation of ‘the English banking 
system’.89 Their greatest contribution is that they allowed a glimpse into the operation of 
finance beyond the direct provision of the finance to the state. They are also important for 
providing insights into the links that held the system together and developments in 
London. Banks did not operate in isolation, but formed part of a wider group of financial 
intermediaries that were intimately linked. In the context of these types of work, Clapham 
and Pressnell’s works can be seen as the culmination of a generation’s efforts to 
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understand the English financial system in its own right, before the focus on banking and 
industrialisation became entrenched in the post-war period. 
This leads to the major problem of the banking historiography covering this period. In the 
post war period, the older banking histories have been augmented by a plethora of 
histories of individual banking companies, often commissioned by the banks themselves, 
and offering a mixed standard of work. All too often, as Cottrell and Anderson suggest, they 
are excessively anecdotal in their nature and do not examine the wider implications of their 
evidence.90 This criticism is particularly justified for some of the more modern offerings, 
including the histories of Coutts’, Hoare’s and Drummond’s banks.91 Leighton-Boyce’s 
history of the Smiths’ Bank in contrast provides a template of an effective study.92 Other 
historians have provided effective institutional histories, but have concentrated on the 
more recent past of the banks. Sayers’ history of Lloyds is essentially a history of 
nineteenth century English banking, with an emphasis towards the Birmingham end of the 
bank. Ackrill and Hannah’s history of Barclays also does better than most, but the 
eighteenth century history of the bank is the weakest section of the book.93 Yet the most 
obvious deficiency is the absence of a proper consideration of eighteenth century banking 
in London. A handful of articles have been written on the subject, but one generally finds 
that these focus more on a relatively small number of ‘West End’ banks.94 Other more 
recent studies have made extensive use of Hoare’s important archives.95 Although 
providing some interesting ideas, their narrow evidence base makes it difficult to judge 
their wider significance. What is evidently lacking is an extended study of the London 
banks, in particular the City banks, which are known to have been closer to the commercial 
world. Thus the conclusions on the subject of eighteenth century banking are based on 
judgements that have been made without a proper understanding of perhaps the most 
important link in the system. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that critics of eighteenth century banks were asking the most 
appropriate questions. Although banks were clearly involved in the finance of industry, it is 
not obvious that this was their primary purpose at the time. Cameron believed that ‘each 
generation revisits and restudies history in the light of its own problems and pre-
occupations’ and these works are equally interesting for illustrating the changing 
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approaches to writing banking history over the last century.96 Industry and finance was a 
dominant topic of economic history in the 1950s and 1960s. It ignores that commerce and 
investments in land were equally significant opportunities for the banks; banking ‘is liable 
to be misunderstood if it is approached primarily from the angle of industrial finance’.97 
Historical work has again turned its attention to the commercial world. Chapman argues 
convincingly that writing about parts of the economy solely in relation to the staple 
industries of the Industrial Revolution became untenable when growth figures for these 
staple interests were revised. This encouraged a ‘traditional British interest in trade and 
finance’.98 Another impetus for re-engagement with Britain’s commercial past can be found 
in the work of Rubinstein, who argued that Britain had always been a commercial nation in 
response to the ‘cultural critiques’ of British economic performance that emerged from the 
1960s to the mid-1980s that bemoaned a loss of industrial spirit. Thus: 
Britain’s was never fundamentally an industrial and manufacturing economy; 
rather, it was always, even at the height of the industrial revolution, essentially a 
commercial, financial, and service-based economy whose comparative advantage 
always lay with commerce and finance.99  
This interpretation is built upon the work of Crafts and Cain and Hopkins, and focused on 
the haphazard nature of industrialisation and the significance of London and provincial 
entrepôts to the economy. He goes so far as to accuse historians and others of having 
developed a ‘manufacturing fetishism’, which was unjustified.100 This work is however 
focused on the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries and further information 
confirming the nature of this commercial society in the eighteenth century would be 
desirable. 
While historians have reconsidered some aspects of the eighteenth century, such a 
‘commercial’ revision of the history of English banking at that time has failed to take place. 
Cottrell and Bowen in 1997 still bemoaned the impact of ‘the temporal and conceptual 
strait-jacket’ of industrialisation on banking history.101 They argue that banking instead 
grew as ‘a cornerstone of the gentlemanly order which by no means excluded industrial 
activity but which regarded it as only a part of a broad interrelated series of economic 
activities’.102 Yet our understanding of banking in this period continues to be dependent 
upon the three seminal works of Clapham, Pressnell and Cameron, together with 
contributions from Checkland and Munn on Scotland.103 Both Pressnell and Cameron’s 
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work are explicitly tied to industrialisation, although Pressnell’s work does consider 
broader themes as well. In a nation that was overwhelmingly commercial and where 
growth in trade volumes are known to have been significant, as indicated above, it is 
remarkable how little emphasis has been placed on commercial finance. The finance of 
these activities was clearly dominated by the provision of credit, normally via the bill of 
exchange.104 A full consideration of this topic will follow in due course. However it should 
be noted here that the only really successful attempt at discussing the links between 
banking and commerce was made by Jacob Price.105 
That the banking system of the time was not ideal in fostering industrialisation (or 
economic growth) also sits uncomfortably with the opinions found in the earliest banking 
histories, which date back to the Victorian era. The first historian of Smiths’ Bank suggested 
that the ‘recent amalgamation of private banks with joint-stock institutions tends to 
remove the identity of banking houses which have contributed to some degree towards 
building up the nation’s prosperity’.106 Crucially for this discussion, the belief in the 
inherent utility of the banks and their contribution to economic and commercial growth are 
quite clear from this statement. This sentiment was not particularly unique. In 1867, Baron 
Benas could write that ‘of all present institutions for the assistance and development of 
trade and commerce, none have attained so prominent an importance as banking’.107 Some 
regional studies on banking have a better opinion on the significance of provincial banks 
than is implied in the more mainstream literature.108 A few authors have also continued to 
see the system that emerged in a more positive light. Thus Lane focuses on the generally 
good character and capabilities of the early private bankers. Despite the financial crises and 
bank failures, the eighteenth century to his mind was ‘well adapted to the needs of the 
time’.109  
III 
While the contribution of banking to economic growth is an important topic, it is not the 
only way to approach banking history. R.O. Roberts noted that it is also useful to examine 
banking systems to allow historical comparisons, both between regions and internationally: 
the nature of the system is hence of interest in its own right.110 The most important recent 
contribution of this type has been Grossman’s study of commercial banking, examining the 
development of joint-stock banks in different countries over a period of 200 years. While it 
is interested in the links between banking and economic development, it is primarily 
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seeking to understand the evolution of banking systems over time.111 A second function of 
this thesis is to provide an analysis similar to that of Grossman’s work but devoted to the 
understanding of a private banking system in England. This will allow a consideration of the 
differences in the development of joint-stock and private banking systems and hence 
address the question of whether different types of ownership influence the development 
of the system as a whole. At the heart of Grossman’s argument stands a stylised curve of 
bank development over time, which he argues represents a fairly standard pattern of 
commercial banking development. His work seeks to explore the reasons behind the shape 
of the curve, in particular the reasons for the shrinking of the number of banks, especially 
through financial crises and mergers.112 In contrast this work focuses on the upward part of 
the curve, as a new banking system emerges. The context for the evolution of English 
banking can be identified with the financialisation of the economy, a development that 
went beyond just banking and was visible in aggregate in the rough national statistics 
previously presented in Table 1. Financialisation has a number of different meanings, but in 
this context is used to encompass ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’.113 There is no standardised path and the difference to emerge 
between the Anglo-Saxon market-based model compared to the traditional view of the 
German bank-based model is noteworthy.114 
The increasing prominence of financial institutions within eighteenth century England is 
undeniable. One can see this for example in Supple’s opinion that the creation of large 
insurers such as the Royal Exchange was dependent upon the appearance of ‘specialists 
and of more sophisticated procedures in the London money and capital markets’, while 
acknowledging that these new corporations also encouraged further specialisation.115 It has 
already been noted that one of the major features of the eighteenth century was the 
growing capital market, based around British government debt. These capital markets have 
tended to be studied from the perspective of joint-stock companies or governments that 
used them for access to capital, or the broking and exchange institutions that formed the 
physical market itself.116 But bankers could assist in the formation and expansion of these 
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markets; or alternatively benefit from them. According to Karl Marx ‘the national debt has 
given rise to joint-stock companies, to dealings in negotiable effects of all kinds, and to 
agiotage, in a word to stock-exchange gambling and the modern bankocracy’.117 While not 
entirely accurate, dealings in negotiable instruments for example pre-dating the national 
debt, the broader point that banking can be linked to developments in state finance is not 
unreasonable. Most obviously bankers were investors in this debt, both in their own right 
and on behalf of their clients.118 The extent of these links will form a key point of the 
subsequent work. 
One can equally point to an increasingly important money market, which in England was 
centred on the discounting of bills.119 Money markets are in essence a source of short-term 
lending, and intimately linked to banking and credit networks. The price of this credit is 
determined through the interaction of a number of actors within a system or network. In a 
modern financial system, one expects banks to stand at the heart of the money markets. 
Some progress had been made in this direction by the end of the seventeenth century as 
some interbank clearing (and short-term lending) was taking place.120 In due course banks 
would feature ever more closely in this environment and fluctuations in the money market 
would become more important to business in general. A substantial proportion of the 
discounting business in London was internalised within the private banks.121 At the end of 
the century, specialised dealers in the discounting of bills were beginning to operate, the 
most famous of whom being Thomas Richardson. This business seems to have originated 
within the banks, Richardson having spent his early years as the clerk of Smith & Holt, 
bankers of London who were also bill brokers of the Gurneys in Norwich.122 However for 
now it is sufficient to note that these developments are indicative of the growing volume of 
financial transactions and the greater specialisation within the financial sector that this 
permitted. 
It is not altogether clear when this process of financialisation started. Some authors have 
claimed a degree of financial integration had already begun to take shape in the 
seventeenth century, which amounted to an actual national system of credit and maybe 
even banking. This nationwide English banking system identified by the mid-seventeenth 
century consisted of a network based upon the inland bill that encompassed London, 
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Ipswich, Hull, Halifax, Newcastle, Portsmouth and Manchester, to name but a few. This 
then was indeed a national network, but whether it was really a genuine banking network 
is more debatable. Importantly these networks of credit had been based on trading 
networks – the goldsmith-bankers of London were in this argument a later addition.123 This 
reflects the fact that the financialisation of the economy was dependent upon the 
development of a degree of expertise in managing financial businesses and institutions. 
Banks for example needed to deliver an adequate return to their owners without taking 
undue risk. This involved a learning process, an aspect of their emergence that has been 
explicitly emphasised in some of the recent literature.124 
Equally it is possible to argue quite how far advanced this process of financialisation was by 
the end of the eighteenth century. With regards to banking, Scammell has claimed that 
‘when the nineteenth century opened the banking system in Britain could scarcely be 
described as a system at all’.125 This economist’s opinion was that banks were prevalent 
throughout most of the country, but that in their activities they were small and essentially 
localised, simply conducting ‘day-to-day monetary transactions’.126 Bowen and Cottrell are 
similarly sceptical that the collection of businesses at the end of the eighteenth century 
amounted to a genuine banking system.127 John Rule paints the picture of a disjointed and 
fragmented industry by describing the existence of such a ‘national banking system’ as 
‘debatable’.128 On the other hand the work of Iain Black tends to suggest that this 
financialisation had been significant, for it helped to create a genuinely national banking 
system and an integrated national economy.129 A looser definition of a financial system is 
that ‘no single institution or group of institutions worked in isolation from others’.130 If this 
is what is meant, then the developments of the eighteenth century were indeed substantial 
and studies of financial crises would tend to suggest that they were no longer isolated by 
the end of the century.131 
This of course highlights an issue where care is required. Financialisation was a process, and 
outright modernity is not required for the process to hold true. On a basis such as 
Scammell suggested, it is clear that eighteenth century banking falls short of being a 
‘system’, as few of the features he expects were extant, such as a clearly defined lender of 
last resort or a monopolised note-issue. However his conclusions maybe reflect an 
anachronistic understanding of what the purpose of a banking system originally was. The 
uses of the financial system for managing macro-economic fluctuations or for improving 
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the access of firms to finance may not have been the prime purpose of the system, or even 
the most pressing need of the economy at the time. To criticise it for simply carrying out 
basic monetary transactions, would be unduly harsh if this is was the most pressing service 
that customers required of their bankers. An effective payment system is surely a key part 
of a financial system, although it can sometimes be taken for granted. This emphasises the 
fact that any assessment of the system must be based on a clearer understanding of the 
purposes of eighteenth century bankers.  
The advancement of the influence of finance can perhaps best be seen in the fortunes of 
London. The later stages of the eighteenth century witnessed the growth of the City of 
London as a major financial centre that was capable of challenging Amsterdam in terms of 
global leadership.132 It is hard to believe that a disjointed and underperforming banking 
system could co-exist with a leading international financial centre. To understand fully the 
increasing importance of London it is surely essential to understand the individual parts 
that made up the City of London. This tends to reinforce the need to undertake a more 
detailed analysis of the City banks and, equally importantly, to understand the role of early 
merchant banks and merchant financiers. 
IV 
In conclusion it has been argued that academic studies of financial systems, and banking 
specifically, suggest that both are important drivers of economic growth. However 
definitively proving this link is difficult even for periods where the data sources are good. 
Equally it is not always clear that the transmission mechanisms between banking and the 
economy are properly understood. These general points are even more applicable to the 
specific instance of England in the eighteenth century, where the English banking system 
has been particularly poorly studied. Generalisations about the role of the banks and the 
overall stability of the system that might not be entirely justified have become accepted 
and are thus worthy of re-examination. The study of eighteenth century banking in the 
modern literature has become too closely connected with industrialisation, at the expense 
of banking’s links to the commercial world and that some rebalancing in the emphasis of 
the impact of banking is required. Particular shortcomings arise on the subject of London 
bankers, in particular those operating from Lombard Street and serving the commercial 
interest. The criticisms of the structure of the eighteenth century banking system also 
require more rigorous analysis. It should be understood that this is not a direct study of the 
link between economic growth and banking, although some of its conclusions will be 
relevant to this question. Instead it is an attempt to understand aspects of the 
financialisation of the eighteenth century economy, and how this relates to the shape of 
banking development. To answer fully these questions within the scope of this thesis is 
probably unrealistic, however it is hoped that it will provide a picture and suggestive 
answers that will contribute towards further work in the field. 
This thesis seeks to address these problems over the period from the formation of the Bank 
of England in 1694 to the Suspension of Cash Payments in 1797. The Bank was crucial in 
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influencing the shape of the banking industry, through the constraints contained in the 
Bank’s charter, particularly through its restrictions the size of banking partnerships to a 
maximum of six individuals. The prohibition on joint-stock banking meant that provincial 
banks were run alongside the other business interests of their partners, and this has been 
argued to have influenced the subsequent tradition of English banking.133 However it was 
by no means the sole influence on the banking industry, and as such, some consideration of 
the developments during the Restoration period are required. It can be argued however 
that for one hundred years or so following 1694, the banking industry had been evolving 
under one other consistent principle: paper money had to be convertible to gold if the user 
required this. The suspension in 1797 therefore represented a decisive break in continuity, 
requiring an adjustment in the banks’ modus operandi, explaining the decision to end the 
study at this point. Despite the restoration of the gold standard in 1819, it can be argued 
that the system had been fundamentally changed and the approach therefore reflects the 
fact that banking is shaped to a significant degree by the regulatory environment.  
All studies have some sort of inspiration and overall ambitions. The closest one could come 
to a model for this work is maybe Chapman’s Merchant Capitalism.134 In some respects this 
thesis is a work of ‘historical synthesis’, drawing together many loose ends of historical 
analysis to form a larger whole. This partly reflects the nature of the existing historical 
literature, much of which was written from an institutional perspective. Aside from trying 
to draw together a sometimes diffuse literature, there is of course the need for a research 
element. The main focus of the primary research has been upon London bankers, who form 
probably the least well-documented sub-component of the eighteenth century banking 
system. More specifically this included work on the early records of Drummond’s, Child’s, 
Barclays, Goslings, Lubbock’s and Baring. The mixed quality of the numerous histories of 
individual banks has been alluded to; they do however all offer important sources of 
evidence and it would have been impossible to write this thesis without reference to them. 
This ultimately reflects the nature of theses, which seek to build upon the work of others to 
generate original contributions. 
This study is also guided by a statement written by Eric Hobsbawn, who maintained that 
historians should write for an audience beyond other historians, given the finance received 
from outside sources. To some extent there is an attempt to set ‘the roots of the present 
world back to that period, in so far as it is reasonable to do so’.135 This is not to describe 
some triumphant march of progress, but a simple recognition of the continuity and gradual 
evolution of society and culture. The modern financial system has directly evolved from the 
eighteenth century, and understanding its origins can help add to our understanding of the 
modern system. 
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Chapter 1: The origins of English banking, c. 1660-1700: Revolution or Evolution? 
 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the eighteenth century, it is necessary first to 
consider the positioning of English banking both in its own right and within the broader 
financial system at the onset the century. The publication of Dickson’s important Financial 
Revolution has generated a substantial body of historical work that has focused on the 
discontinuity in English financial development at the end of the seventeenth century. This 
in turn has generated a response in works that have focused on the longer-term 
continuities in British financial development.1 Running alongside this broad debate are 
questions over the precise origins of English banking. This chapter aims to provide an 
overview of these important historical debates and then addresses the question of whether 
the two debates are related. It seeks therefore to provide an answer to the question of 
whether the financial revolution of the 1690s matters in the context of English banking. In 
seeking to engage with this broader question, this chapter will not extensively use primary 
material. This reflects two principal points: firstly, the significance of the historical debate 
on the wider implications of the financial revolution, which justifies the consideration of 
this topic in some detail. Secondly, it reflects the fact that the history of seventeenth 
century banking, thanks in part to recent American research, is better studied than that of 
the eighteenth century.2 The secondary literature on the developments in English state 
finance and the securities market is even more extensive.3 
I 
To understand early banking, it is essential to have some grasp of the nature of England’s 
credit economy. Throughout the seventeenth century economic transactions had been 
governed by personal credit relationships. Finn argues that the literature shows a credit 
economy, ‘shaped by both dense networks of social relations and intrinsically unstable 
conceptualisations of the individual self’, rather than markets based on an anonymous cash 
nexus as conceived by economists from Smith to Marx.4 Credit was determined by 
character, which itself was an ‘unstable construct[s] contingent upon dress, manner, verbal 
facility and connection’, drawing ‘upon the perceived verities of social capital rather than 
upon the monetary values of the cash nexus alone’.5 This encouraged the use of a specific 
language of honour and reason in commercial transactions that was designed to show ones 
creditworthiness, which can be traced through both the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centuries.6 Although Finn’s work tended to understate the familiarity of the population 
with cash, with some of her reading regarded as ‘careless, ill-informed or inept’, the 
importance of credit should not be underestimated.7 In practice, cash and credit were 
linked, and the growth of a paper medium of exchange was related to both, given that 
paper money relies on the credit of the issuer to gain currency. Indeed, Muldrew’s work 
argues that most transactions were carried out only on paper and cleared centrally.8  
Muldrew has argued that it was only from 1720 onwards that a shift in the economy, 
where producer and consumer were increasingly separated, began the decline in the 
culture of credit. The shift can be attributed to developments during the period from 1694 
to 1720, including the formation of the Bank of England and the broader investment 
opportunities that it facilitated, as well as changes in the patterns of legislation and the 
development of small banks and corporate institutions. This did not reduce the incidence of 
credit transactions, but changed their nature.9 These changes were linked to fundamental 
structural changes that were taking place as obligations were contracted over longer 
distances and markets became more national and were reflected by writers like Adam 
Smith, who increasingly emphasised the significance of the individual rather than the 
community in the market place.10 It led to a more abstract approach to credit, which can be 
linked for example to the growing understanding of the importance of probability in 
determining default.11 However if the culture of credit was changing, and its use was being 
somewhat institutionalised, then it should be acknowledged that it continued to be an 
essential part of economic life throughout the eighteenth century. In particular, credit 
instruments, as well as the ability judge someone’s credit accurately, remained an 
important feature of commercial and financial life.12  
While the English economy was highly dependent upon personal credit, the second half of 
the seventeenth century did see some formal financial intermediaries emerge, including 
the first English deposit banks during the Protectorate. Some goldsmiths, merchants and 
scriveners, such as Robert Vyner, were carrying out some banking functions, including the 
acceptance of deposits, discounting bills and acting as factors for provincial merchants  
before the Civil War, making the goldsmith-banker ‘a reality by at least the reign of James 
I’. However it was in the 1650s that banking really emerged as a specialised trade.13 The 
infamous raid on the Mint at the Tower of London, which resulted in £130,000 of bullion 
deposited there by merchants being confiscated by the King, is often cited as a catalyst for 
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this growth.14 While the reasoning is plausible, evidence supporting a direct connection is 
not clear. Indeed, it took a decade for an alternative, private solution to the storage of 
bullion to emerge. More broadly, the origins of banking can be linked to general economic 
change in this period. Richards for example argues that ‘the genesis of modern capitalism 
made the monetary specialist indispensible and there emerged as pioneers of a new 
financial regime the merchant, the broker, the scrivener and the goldsmith, pioneers of a 
credit technique which developed so rapidly under the aegis of the goldsmith in the age of 
the later Stuart’.15  
After the Restoration, the number of early goldsmith-bankers grew rapidly, an indication of 
their increasing significance. A number of prominent goldsmith-banking houses emerged, 
with Edward Blackwell and Sir Robert Vyner foremost amongst them. Melton’s research for 
the period 1670-1700 provides indicative data for the number for deposit bankers in 
London. He argues that at least 93 goldsmith-bankers can be accounted for  during this 30 
year period. However achieving longer-term continuity appears to have been a challenge, 
for of the list of 1670, only four survived through to 1700, of which one failed in 1701.16 Of 
the thirty nine establishments existing in 1700, he argues that only five would achieve 
lasting permanence: Hoare’s, Martin’s, Child’s, Coutts’ and Hankey’s.17 Churn rates were 
high, as can be seen in Table 2.  
 
1670 1677 1687 1700 
Total Banks 29 50 37 39 
Banks surviving from previous list 
 
18 25 18 
Survival rate 
 
62% 50% 49% 
Total new banks 
 
32 12 21 
Table 2: Banking in seventeenth century London (Source: Melton, Sir Robert Clayton, pp. 233-42) 
It would be incorrect to attribute this solely to business failure. Although there were 
obviously failures, such as Edward Backwell, retirement and voluntary exits also played a 
role, as many of these banks appear to have been owned only by one proprietor. Even 
when a bank was structured as a partnership, succession could prove problematic, as can 
be seen in the example of Clayton’s bank, where the planned successors to the 
management of the firm predeceased Clayton and no other suitable candidates emerged.18 
Banking in this period was based around three instruments all of which pre-dated formal 
banking, deriving instead from personal credit transactions: the bill (either a foreign bill of 
exchange or an inland bill); the order, early precursor of the cheque; and notes (either 
bankers’s notes or promissory notes). Both the bill and the note were a contract, while the 
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cheque was not.19 Of these, the most important was probably the bill, which had initially 
been developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to finance trade, but the use of 
which by the end of the seventeenth century had become ubiquitous throughout England. 
The bill of exchange originated in international trade because of the inconvenience and risk 
of loss of shipping bullion over longer distances. Although it originated in 13th century 
Venice, its use was originally most common in the major fairs of Europe.20 The advantage of 
the bill was that it was transferable through time and distance. Bills also became 
negotiable, allowing the transfer of the amount due to another party by endorsement. 
Underlying this concept was a gradual realisation that it was possible that written 
acknowledgements of debts might be both transferred and sold.21 The bill simplified the 
conduct of long-distance trade, although the potential for fraud and loss was not 
completely negated and the system depended on an effective network of people to accept 
the bills.22 The requirements for credit in English commercial life were expanding 
substantially throughout the seventeenth century. In London alone, the total value of 
imports increased from about £1.5 million in the 1621 to £3.5 million in the 1660s and £4.7 
million in 1700.23 Not only did imports increase in value, but also in nature, with an 
increasingly large proportion focused on colonies located in the New World, which required 
credit to be extended over a longer period of time. 
Eventually the bill of exchange was also adopted for internal payments in commercial 
transactions. These inland bills could be found in many parts of the country, including 
Chester, Liverpool, Newcastle, Bristol and Norwich. London became the key city for the 
network of bills in circulation internally. Due to the fact that bills essentially involved 
suppliers receiving credit from purchasers, and the largest single purchasers were found in 
London, credit balances tended to accumulate there.24 By the end of the seventeenth 
century the bill on London was not only the principal means of payment between London 
and the provinces, but also between towns in different regions.25 Domestically, the inland 
bill was not a completely legally secure contract until, in 1698, the Payment of Bills Act 
allowed the protest of inland bills in order to recover debts. Finally inland bills and 
promissory notes received definite legal protection from the state in 1704, made perpetual 
in 1708, when the Promissory Notes Act confirmed their legal transferability.26 However 
their significance can be seen in their common usage well before this point. From a 
banker’s perspective their crucial quality was that they were discountable, offering the 
means of employing money and making a profit. While the bill of exchange might be the 
most notable financial instrument, two others were also developed. Firstly there was the 
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cheque or draft. The cheque was (and remains) a request to transfer money or future 
income to someone else; it is in its simplest form ‘so natural it hardly requires an official 
pedigree’.27 The final important innovation in paper currency was the development of the 
banker’s note. Initially this was a promise by the banker to repay a deposit made to him to 
a given individual, i.e. a promissory note. However, its nature changed in the second half of 
the seventeenth century, so that rather than being identified on a one-to-one basis with 
the depositor, bank notes became a generic claim upon the banker: ‘deposits became fully 
the banker’s’.28 The consequence was to allow more flexibility on the part of both banker 
and depositor. This development was incredibly important as it marks the development of 
the banker into a specialist intermediary, rather than a simple moneylender. For example, 
the government financier Sir Stephen Fox gathered deposits at interest (roughly £150,000), 
which he then lent out as private advances, often to members of the court. From 1686, the 
minimum value of such lending totalled £130,000.29 However this activity was not that of 
banker, but rather that of a broker or moneylender, given that the deposits remained tied 
to individuals and there was no issuance of notes. 
Deposits consequently mattered, and the shift of some of the London goldsmiths into the 
profitable niche of banking was based partly upon the realisation that they could lend out 
not only their own capital, but also other people’s capital that had been placed in trust in 
their hands. Some commentators and modern economists have argued that such use of 
customer deposits was an act of theft or fraud by the bankers, and that fractional reserve 
banking was carried out without the customer’s knowledge or approval. The evidence 
however tends to indicate this not to have been the case.30 In any event, by the time of the 
Stop on the Exchequer, these goldsmith-bankers had developed a notable base of 
depositors. The goldsmith-banker John Lindsay’s list of people who lost money through the 
‘Stop’ totalled 201 with combined losses of £91,000, equating to an average customer 
balance of £453. Using Lindsay’s average across all the goldsmith-bankers impacted by the 
crisis would imply that there were around 2,500 people with bank accounts at 
organisations affected by the ‘Stop’.31 Backwells ledgers for 1664-5 show average deposits 
across 1,374 clients of £520, while Vyner’s clients in the 1670s averaged deposits of £536.32 
Indeed Backwell’s client numbers suggest that the overall estimate of 2,500 depositors 
looks too low. This lends substance to Richards’ claim that bankers in this period were 
‘patronised by many thousands of provincial and metropolitan customers’.33 Nor were 
these customers confined to London; about one third of Vyner’s customers were from the 
provinces, with strong representation from more distant counties, including, Wiltshire, 
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. These deposits tended to be slightly larger than those of 
London based customers. Customers were socially diverse, including the titled aristocracy 
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(7.5%), merchants (7%), spinsters and widows (12%), tradesmen (24%) and the more 
simple gentry (43%).34  
Banking gained prominence in this period because it provided solutions to a number of 
problems. Aside from providing a safe store for individuals to keep their money, they could 
also address one of the foremost challenges of the period, namely the inadequacies of the 
English coinage. To the economist, money is simply a means of simplifying the process of 
bartering in a market economy. Money can take any form, such as wood or shells, but 
generally precious metals such as gold or silver were used. Britain in the seventeenth 
century possessed a silver-based currency, controlled by the Royal Mint and the King-in-
parliament. It faced two major challenges which encouraged the development of paper 
mediums of exchange: the inability to deal with fluctuations in the market price for silver 
and also the problems caused by frequent clipping of coin. These two factors combined to 
cause a persistent shortage of silver coins throughout the second half of the seventeenth 
century and the eighteenth century.35 This was despite the attempts in the 1690s to solve 
the issues through a major recoinage. This had originated  from the seventeenth century 
‘crisis over money’ when people observed that although the value of a coin was supposedly 
determined by its silver content, it would tend to trade at face value even if it had been 
clipped and had hence lost up to 50% of its silver content. In turn this had prompted 
considerable intellectual debates over the coinage.36 The recoinage was ultimately 
undermined because it was implemented on the basis of flawed thinking on the part of 
John Locke, who insisted on carrying out the recoinage at an inflated silver price. This 
contrasted with William Lowndes, who took the view that the current official value of the 
coin was too high and that its silver content should be reduced to 80%.37 Undertaking the 
recoinage on a flawed principle meant that none of the problems were satisfactorily 
resolved, and as expected under Gresham’s law, the undervalued coinage disappeared 
from circulation. 
The consequent shortage of official coin for internal payments meant that it was necessary 
to supplement the official coinage from private sources.38 Mayhew’s estimates suggest that 
there were some £2 million worth of inland bills in circulation as de facto currency in 1700, 
alongside some £2 million worth of banknotes and £6 million of government tallies, a 
particularly expensive form of currency instrument. This compares with £9 million of silver 
and £8 million of gold coin.39 The situation surrounding the coinage did not improve in the 
eighteenth century, a failure which has prompted the accusation that the English state was 
‘somnolent’ over one of its most important functions.40 Paper money thus became ever 
more significant, creating a complete transformation of the ‘monetary character of the 
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country’. Bank notes in particular became increasingly important as the eighteenth century 
continued: by 1750 bank notes and deposits are thought to be have grown to £10 million, 
subsequently reaching £17 million by 1775 and £30 million by 1800. Coin went from 
forming 80% of England’s money in the 1690s to less than half by 1800, ‘even if we exclude 
inland bills from our concept of money’, which one should in most likelihood not.41 The 
growth of credit and banking has led to the description of Britain in 1777, not unjustifiably, 
as a ‘Paperwealth’.42 This advancement in paper credit was furthermore largely a matter of 
private enterprise in which bankers, both in London and the provinces, played an important 
part.   
While deposits appear to have been relatively readily available, a more problematic point 
from the bankers’ perspective was finding suitable investment opportunities. Gold and 
silver were secure, but provided no return. The only body with a chronic shortage of funds 
in the Restoration period was the king. It was to him that early goldsmiths made most of 
their advances. For example Backwell’s ledgers show that in 1664, 63% of the loans were 
made to the king on the security of the customs revenues.43 Participation in government 
lending was potentially attractive, given that loans were often linked to tax revenues and 
should therefore have been relatively secure. On the other hand it was an inherently risky 
investment opportunity, given the historical fact of royal default, which was witnessed 
again during the Stop of the Exchequer, a defining economic moment of the Restoration 
period. Richards believed that the impact of the Stop was confined to the failure of a 
number of prominent banking firms as late as the 1680s.44 Total losses are estimated to 
have been £1.3 million, of which just less than 75% was due to the three largest goldsmith- 
bankers (Vyner, Backwell and Whitehall).45 Although the financial impact may have been 
manageable, it did mean that the state’s ability to issue paper money or securities was 
impaired, especially if they were not interest bearing.46 Inadvertently, the Stop also led to 
the creation of the nation’s first funded perpetual securities, in the shape of annuities 
created for restitution of the banks’ customers in 1677.47 The episode highlights one of the 
major problems that faced restoration bankers: there was no dependable, ‘risk-free’ asset 
with sufficient liquidity. Part of the significance of the Financial Revolution of the 1690s to 
the development of banking lay in providing a solution to this problem. Equally, although 
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the Stop ended the banking careers of a number of prominent practitioners, it did not 
undermine the population’s general appreciation of the advantages of banking.48 
Opportunities for other forms of investment were expanding, as economic activity 
increased and new assets became available during the Restoration period. One area of 
particular significance was the changes in the land market during the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, which saw an increased turnover in the sales of land.49 D.C. Coleman 
suggests that the changes in the estate market in the Interregnum and the Restoration 
periods – sequestration, fines, sales of crown land, royalist lands encumbered with huge 
debts after the restoration, burdens of land taxation, etc. - provide an answer to the 
question of explaining the increased work of ‘the intermediaries of capital mobility - 
lawyers, scriveners, bankers and the like’.50 This was an area in which scrivener banks, such 
as Sir Robert Clayton’s, could excel. Scriveners’ specialisation in petty legal contracts and 
expertise in conveyancing persuaded landed gentry to deposit money with them which was 
let out at interest.51 Clayton’s business was driven by the partners’ knowledge of 
conveyancing and the technicalities of mortgages, as well as their insight into their 
customers’ financial requirements.52 For those desiring greater security, the mortgage deed 
was the preferable security on which to lend. Loans would be provided based upon 
detailed surveys of a customer’s estate to assess its value and the verification of the deeds, 
ensuring it was free of other encumbrances that might damage the asset for the lender.53 
Clayton’s bank successfully blended this specialisation in mortgages with the deposit taking 
function of a goldsmith-banker; it was not merely that of a brokerage. It was also a bank of 
substantial scale: by the 1650s, it had deposits of over £1 million, which continued to grow 
to a peak of over £1.8 million in 1675-7. The volume of loans granted increased from 
£27,700 in 1652-6 to over £332,000 by 1677-80.54   
Other London scriveners of this period have been identified as proto-bankers. Mr Tuckey 
certainly acted as a financial agent in London for his clients, paying and receiving money, as 
well as making investments on their behalf. Despite the absence of information on the 
precise size of his business, it has been argued Tuckey may have been closer to the 
representative size of a scrivener business than Clayton, given that ‘the scrivener did not 
normally operate on the grand scale’.55 Yet it is not clear that he fully established himself as 
a banker, the evidence suggesting rather a role as a broker. Coleman’s analysis suggests 
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that the scrivener was an exceptionally specialised type of moneylender on the security of 
land, whose role has subsequently been subsumed by that of the banker and conveyancer. 
The scrivener’s specialisation normally led to a career other than banking, such as an estate 
agent, stockbroker, accountant or solicitor.56  
Although all pioneering businesses are likely to be atypical to a degree, it does seem that 
Clayton’s bank was truly exceptional. While some historians, most notably Richard Tawney, 
have seen scriveners as an important source of bankers, it should be noted that this 
profession failed to develop as a source of sustainable, multi-generational banks, leading 
other historians to claim that they were not so central in this respect.57 Clayton was 
unlucky in that the potential heirs to his business predeceased him.58 However the bank 
also faced other issues with Melton noting that ‘mortgage finance swamped the scrivener’s 
affairs with paperwork’, particularly the business of writing conveyances in the 1670s. 
Another reason that the scrivener perhaps never really managed to fully shift into the 
banking business is the relative decline of the Scriveners’ Company. This meant that people 
in general were not likely to join as apprentices due to the limited likelihood of a return on 
the investment in their own training. Clayton had no apprentices after the 1660s.59 Given 
that a complete shift into the banking business appears to have happened over multiple 
generations of goldsmiths, the absence of an influx of new talent into the scriveners’ 
businesses hindered the long-term role of this group in the development of the English 
banking industry. In contrast the goldsmiths received a steady stream of new recruits and 
the company itself could act as a type of regulator.60 While the goldsmiths were then the 
more important profession in pioneering English banking, the importance of the legal 
profession should not be understated.  They continued to maintain an interest in finance 
more generally, especially in the provinces, but also in London. An example of the latter 
was Robert Andrews, who aside from his normal activities as an attorney, financed house 
building, through his own resources and through trusts he administered on behalf of 
others. It is argued that he was not an isolated case.61 
Aside from lending upon mortgage, which offered good security, but was also illiquid, and 
lending to the government, bankers had two other types of security in this period.62 In their 
early stages bankers also acted like pawnbrokers, lending on the security of jewellery, plate 
or other valuable items that could be sold in the case of failure to repay the loan.63 Gold 
and silver was a safe store of value, particularly given the fixed price set at the mint, which 
                                                             
56 Ibid., p. 222. 
57 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 7. For Tawney, see Thomas Wilson, A discourse upon usury (1572), 
ed. R.H. Tawney (London, 1925), pp. 98-100. 
58 See above, p. 32.  
59 Melton, Sir Robert Clayton, p. 76-7. 
60 Quinn, ‘Goldsmith-banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing’, pp. 424-27.   
61 Victor Belcher, ‘A London Attorney of the Eighteenth Century: Robert Andrews’ The London 
Journal 12.1 (1986) pp. 41-7 
62
 For the general importance of the mortgage as a security, see B.L. Anderson, ‘Provincial Aspects of 
the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century’, Business History 11.1 (1969), pp. 12-16. 
63
 There are clear instances of this in the case of both Drummond’s and Child’s banks, see below, p. 
157. Hoare’s history references similar activity, although it was considered risky; see Hutching, 
Messrs Hoare bankers, p. 20. 
39 
 
meant that there was effectively a base minimum value. The other security was the penal 
bond, which imposed fines of double the loan made upon the borrower in case of non-
payment, and gradually fell out of favour in Chancery. In practice they were personal 
securities that were ‘vague’.64 This seems to be borne out by surviving bank records, where 
instances of lending upon bonds can be found, but are comparatively rare. An example can 
be seen in the case of a loan between Mr Douglas in Covent Garden and the banker 
Andrew Drummond, for £2,000 guaranteeing the repayment of £1,000.65 In all these forms 
of personal lending, a key advantage of bankers in this period was that their backgrounds, 
either as goldsmiths or scriveners, provided them with the knowledge of people needing to 
borrow money.  
While the demand for banking services may then be seen to have been increasing, the 
actual reason for the shift into banking from a supply perspective must be linked to the 
opportunity for profit. That the Restoration period witnessed a growing desire to find new 
sources of higher returns is suggested by Davies, who argues that the shareholders of the 
large monied companies in the seventeenth century were City merchants who were acting 
as venture capitalists, in that they were looking for above average profits, rather than a 
‘safe’ investment for their savings.66 For banking more specifically, Quinn has suggested 
that Child’s shift towards the higher margin business of lending to the government in the 
1680s and 1690s can be understood in terms of profit maximisation: internal rates of 
return on tallies were estimated at 8.3% against 5.5% for a loan to private individuals.67 
Increasing exposure to such tallies meant the bankers were taking on additional risk, such 
as exposure to potential default, so achieving an optimal mix of assets was a question of 
achieving an appropriate balance of risk and reward. Any analysis of the performance of 
Restoration bankers is complicated by the usual problems surrounding the loss of records. 
One firm for which some indications are available is the business of the goldsmith-banker 
Fowle, who operated in Fleet Street in this period. In the five months to April 1674, he 
made profits from interest earned of £108 (or approximately £260 on an annualised basis). 
For the year to August 1679, this figure had risen to £1,296, in the year to August 1687 it 
reached £2,627, and £3,854 by the year to September 1690.68 Despite the rise of the bank, 
he did not abandon his ‘proper’ goldsmith business, partly maybe to keep customers happy 
by providing the services of jeweller and banker in one place.69 Mitchell suggests that the 
increased profitability indicates that the Stop on the Exchequer of 1672 played a 
substantial role in raising the significance of goldsmith-bankers, despite the immediate 
difficulties it may have caused.70 The argument in favour of the Stop being a medium term 
positive does appear compelling and is further supported by the fact that it appears to have 
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allowed a new generation of goldsmith-bankers, who were less dependent on government 
investments, to emerge.  
It is also clear that from an early point these banks were interconnected, having developed 
a process for balancing out payments between themselves.71 Quinn’s examination of the 
ledgers of Backwell shows that the goldsmiths who were issuing notes were also bi-laterally 
clearing their own balances between each other (perhaps unsurprisingly) and also notes 
how the apprenticeship system allowed them to have some sort of faith in each other’s 
character and ability, as they were generally acquainted with each other.72 As well as 
enjoying this system of mutual support domestically, they also formed part of a wider 
international network of bankers and merchants that allowed for the growth of a relatively 
stable international financial system in this period. The nature of this system was 
characterised by ‘the lack of a singular institution to co-ordinate information’ and was a 
‘payment system’ based around an ‘active market in bills of foreign exchange’. This was in 
contrast to other centres, such as Amsterdam, where payments were routed through a 
national bank and meant that the Bank of England could take on a different character to 
other ‘national’ banks of the time.73  
II 
By the last decade of the seventeenth century, a dynamic, integrated banking sector had 
emerged in London. However the environment in which it operated was subject to 
substantial changes in the 1690s. These changes, including the important step of the 
formation of the Bank of England, are referred to by Dickson as a Financial Revolution.74 
The Revolution has come to be seen as ‘one of the age’s most remarkable and enduring 
achievements’.75 At its core, Dickson sought to explain the significant change in the interest 
rates the English government paid on its debt. Over the period 1693-1755 it succeeded in 
reducing the interest rates paid upon its debts from a 7% to 14% range to 3%, despite 
raising an unprecedented £75 million to fund the various wars that Britain became 
entangled in. This fall in interest rates was mirrored in the rates of interest on East India 
Company stocks and bonds. Overall, ‘a series of relatively separate and imperfect money-
markets were becoming unified as technique improved and financial stability increased’, as 
can be seen in the convergence of long and short-term interest rates. As important as the 
absolute fall in interest rates was the closing of the premium that the English government 
was paying relative to the Dutch: by the 1730s, the English government could borrow at the 
same rate as the Dutch government.76 More recent research on this credit premium has 
also highlighted the convergence of British government borrowing rates with those of 
leading merchants, who in reality enjoyed the best credit worthiness in the early modern 
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economy. Flandereau et al have shown that government borrowing lagged the 
developments in commercial credit: 
Long before the British government reformed itself to take advantage of the 
possibilities of the capital market, a deep transformation of this capital market had 
already taken place. Commercial interest rates were very low quite early... 
There was thus no sovereign ceiling on interest rates in the eighteenth century.77 The 
Financial Revolution however narrowed this spread between English government 
borrowing rates and commercial credit by the second quarter of the eighteenth century, 
and the English government began to enjoy interest rates that suggested it was amongst 
the best credit risks in the market.  
In the process of achieving this reduction in interest rates, there were major advances in 
financial market development. Over time four distinct types of government securities 
emerged that were regularly bought and sold in the London capital market in the 
eighteenth century: the long-term debt (government perpetual debt, as well as Bank of 
England and South Sea stock); short-dated securities (India bonds and Exchequer bills); the 
short-term paper used to finance the armed forces (especially Navy bills); and more equity-
like, non-interest paying securities, including ‘the Omnium’.78 Each satisfied slightly 
different purposes and therefore was attractive to different investors. Although it took 
time for these groups of securities fully to mature, studies of personal investment habits 
for the end of the seventeenth century suggest that investors were quick to make use of 
the new opportunities that became available. For example Whyman has shown that the 
Verneys’ investment habits changed with the Financial Revolution. She argued that this 
change indicated the revolution’s broad impact upon English society.79 However it does 
appear that of total domestic proprietors of stock, only 7% were held outside of London, 
although this figure will obviously not reflect the impact of holdings made via bankers for 
example.80 As the eighteenth century progressed, the number of holders of government 
related stock increased, and the dominance of Londoners declined somewhat. In 1694, 
there were 1,509 subscribers to the Bank of England’s capital, contributing on average 
£795 each. By 1726 Bank investors numbered 4,837.81 Around the time of the consolidation 
of the national debt in 1749 by Henry Pelham, which created the 3% Consols, the total 
number of domestic holders of government securities has been estimated at 50,000 to 
60,000 people.82 By 1760, the number of holders of the national debt, which totalled 
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£101.7 million, has been estimated at 60,400, of whom the majority were Londoners. 
Londoners were also most active in the market, with about 69% of all transfers of 
government and Bank of England stock in 1755 carried out on their behalf, with a further 
10% being carried out for residents in the vicinity of the capital.83 Despite the issuance of 
securities by turnpikes, livery companies and canals in the later eighteenth century, the 
securities market in London continued to be dominated by government-related debt until 
the mid-nineteenth century. The holders of the debt also continued to be concentrated in 
the London and the south east, with 87% located in London and the Home Counties 
between 1780 and 1793.84  
The reasons for this reduction in interest rates and the emergence of a deep, liquid 
securities market are complex, resting upon longer term influences, technical reforms and 
financial innovations in the 1690s, as well as political considerations. The outlines of the 
longer term development narrative can be seen in a document from the eighteenth century 
in the Barings archive. This documents one of the partner’s (probably Sir Francis, around 
1800) thoughts on the history of England’s financial system. A number of key events in the 
financial history of Britain up to that point are recorded and suggest a perspective of long-
term continuity within English financial history, which also had a European context. Firstly 
in the twelfth century the Venetians established the first payments by bank bills and bills of 
exchange. In Britain, the most important event was the foundation of the Bank of England 
in 1694. Comments on the preceding period are limited, but two important themes are 
highlighted: firstly, ‘The mint in ye Towers formerly a Bank but the cash being seized by 
Chas 1st in 1640 it was ruined’. Secondly, from 1645 onwards, the role of the goldsmiths 
is highlighted, but it is argued that their credit was eroded in 1667 by a run on them 
caused by the Dutch attack upon the Medway and then in 1672 by Charles II’s Stop on 
the Exchequer. In the eighteenth century it highlights only the establishment of three 
funds: the Aggregate Fund, the South Sea Fund and the Sinking Fund respectively.85 In 
this narrative, the events of the 1690s formed part of a longer-term evolution, a view 
that may appear like a ‘Whiggish’ interpretation of history. Yet much of the recent 
historical research has tended to re-emphasise the idea that the Financial Revolution was 
not a sharp discontinuity, but instead focuses on longer term trends in English financial 
development.  
From a purely English perspective, the importance of continuity and evolution has been 
highlighted in a number of instances. On the securities market, Anne Murphy has argued 
that the changes in state finance drew upon a wealth of knowledge and technical expertise 
that had already been established in London in the period 1685-95. In particular this 
created a network of jobbers and brokers that could trade securities and also allowed 
investors to develop a knowledge base of risk management.86 By 1694, there were already 
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25 joint stock companies with shares traded in London.87 In this sense the Bank was not a 
novelty, although it did operate on a larger scale than most other contemporary 
establishments. Ashworth has also argued that many of the key innovations of the Financial 
Revolution, especially those relating to revenue generation, had already been put in place 
during the Dutch Wars of the 1660s and 1670s, based largely on Dutch experience.88 Such 
analyses emphasise that the Financial Revolution was not an historical rupture based upon 
the wholesale importation of Dutch financial techniques. Instead the financial system was 
already steadily evolving through the regular interaction amongst merchant and political 
communities, both within England and internationally. 
Indeed, an international perspective does serve to temper the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the 
financial developments in England, certainly in terms of the financial techniques that were 
introduced. Italian historians especially highlight that most of the techniques that came to 
the fore in England after 1688 had been pioneered much earlier in Italy, particularly in 
Genoa and Venice. To them, the term financial revolution has been ‘abused’, finding that in 
many cases, not just within the context of England, there was a lack of a clean break with 
the past. In many cases change was a series of rolling events that in many ways was 
spreading technical knowledge throughout Europe.89 In the sphere of securities and public 
banking, the predecessors of most financial changes in both the Netherlands and England 
were to be found in Genoa, Venice and Florence.90 Other historians, including Michie and 
Spufford, argue in favour of the gradual diffusion of financial techniques throughout 
Europe from Italy through Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam, thus eventually reaching 
London.91 Along this path, incremental improvements in financial techniques were made to 
suit the requirements of the local environments. One of the major changes occurred in the 
sixteenth century, when finance was separated from physical trade, as seen especially in 
the decline of the fairs and the real emergence of the bill of exchange as a financial 
instrument. This was accompanied by a shift in the trading centre of Europe northwards 
towards the Netherlands.92 Thus it is true that within a European context, the English 
Financial Revolution does indeed appear far from revolutionary, although some of its 
domestic impacts undoubtedly carried longer-term significance. It is perhaps more useful 
to think of the English financial revolution as one of a series of European financial 
revolutions.93 There was a process of long-term evolution across Europe, as financial 
services adapted to meet the needs of their users, which meant that the exact end-result 
was locally distinct. 
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Taking a longer term perspective need not automatically alter the ultimate verdict on the 
significance of the changes that took place between 1685 and 1697. Roseveare for example 
takes a longer term approach and argues that the changes in their totality, with a shift from 
a royal debt to a national debt, despite underlying longer-term influences, still amounted to 
a Financial Revolution.94 More specifically he argued of the period 1685-1714: 
The adoption of long-term borrowing, the foundation of a great bank, the 
recoinage of the metallic currency and the circulation of a paper one – any one of 
these would make their decade [the 1690s] significant in financial history: together 
they unquestionably add up to a revolution.95 
This highlights that the Financial Revolution can be judged in two ways: on the one hand, 
there is an implementation angle, which was built on longer-term influences. In this sense 
the Financial Revolution was not a complete break with the past, but was instead built on 
both domestic and foreign knowledge and expertise. However there is also an impact side, 
and in this sense it does appear that the 1690s were a revolutionary period. Furthermore, 
even if one accepts the longer term underlying influences, the timing of the change still 
requires an explanation. 
Part of this explanation can be found in the roughly contemporaneous changes in the 
constitutional and institutional set-up. This reasoning was developed by North and 
Weingast, who elaborated upon Dickson’s initial argument in favour of a transformation of 
the government’s credit. Political changes were instituted that constituted ‘an explicit 
attempt to make credible the government's ability to honor its commitment’.96 North and 
Weingast’s theory has proved contentious.97 However it is difficult to envisage how the 
equivalent financial changes would have occurred under the Stuart monarchy. This is 
particularly true because the significance of the financial revolution derived in part from a 
change in foreign policy which involved England more extensively in the European wars, 
with the accompanying substantial financial burden. Under Charles II, struggles between 
king and parliament ‘had reduced English foreign policy to virtual impotence’. The Glorious 
Revolution marked the triumph of the trading and colonial interest and the institution of a 
foreign policy to match this, financed by increased taxation of the gentry. 1688 saw the end 
of the old-style commercial monopolies and the creation through the Bank of England of a 
method of government finance that identified the moneyed classes with the revolution 
settlement, by making lending to the government profitable.98  
However while the constitutional and political environment was important, the 
introduction of financial innovations combined with technical and administrative 
improvements was vital. Dickson himself placed significant emphasis on this area.  As an 
example of this type of change, one could look to the improved transfer mechanisms for 
securities introduced by the monied companies, which saw the use of separate indexes for 
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recording the owners of stock, or the widespread adoption of the use of power of 
attorneys, which meant that transfers were made by brokers in larger volumes. This 
improved the transferability of government securities and thus the liquidity of the wider 
market.99 However the two most important changes were the creation of the first 
permanent funded debt in 1693, and then the formation of the Bank of England in 1694. 
The latter is particularly important in the context of this study. Seventeenth century 
thinking on the operation of the economy and money had led to suggestions for banking 
schemes to expand the supply of credit, assist economic growth and strengthen the state, 
resulting in proposals for a national bank as early as the 1650.100 Many schemes were 
advanced, especially for Land Banks, while banks based on ‘Lumbards’ (merchants’ 
warehoused, non-perishable goods) were also suggested, largely because of the perception 
of a gap between England and its Continental rivals, ‘lacking as it did cheap credit, 
universally negotiable paper and a national banking system’.101 Some of these schemes to 
stabilise the London banking system after the collapse of major goldsmith-bankers in the 
second half of the 1670s did come to fruition. These included the creation of the City of 
London Bank and the National Bank of Credit, for loans to merchants, in 1682 and 1683 
respectively, both of which failed as they gained insufficient traction.102 This was followed 
by an attempt to engraft a bank onto the charter of the defunct Royal Fisheries Company, 
which would have had a capital of £200-£300,000.103 These schemes were fatally 
undermined by the politics of the mid-1680s, which saw the Fisheries Company lose its 
Royal Charter and the City Corporation attacked by Charles II and its leadership replaced by 
Tory supporters. However the changed circumstances of the 1690s ultimately led to the 
formation of the Bank of England, as the significant need of the government for extra 
money was matched to the lenders’ need for greater security.104 
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The Bank itself incorporated elements of some foreign banks, but its combination of the 
roles of note issuer and lender to the government was genuinely unique.105 Most ‘national’ 
banks at the time operated as banks of exchange, including the Dutch Wisselbank, which 
stood at the heart of the much-admired Dutch financial system, and the early Stockholms 
Banco.106 In contrast, the principal area of the Bank of England’s business was loaning 
money to the government and the circulation of notes. It was this latter line of business 
that distinguished the Bank from other state banks of the period: ‘Issue was the last of the 
classical functions to evolve spontaneously in England, and it was England’s main 
contribution to the evolution of European banking.’107 The Bank then was modelled along a 
fractional reserve line much more like the early banks of London in this period than the 
foreign corporate institutions. It was an innovation that was greeted with a degree of 
scepticism in some corners, but was soon understood to be essential to the existence of 
the Bank. This is not the place to enter an in-depth analysis of the Bank. It is sufficient to 
note that despite some early difficulties, by the 1760s its position was well established. This 
was formally acknowledged by the financially well informed Prime Minister North, who 
famously declared that the Bank was “from long habit and the usage of many years, a part 
of the constitution”. Through attentive management of its own credit, it had certainly 
improved the credit of the English state and thus become crucial to the public 
exchequer.108  
While the improvements that together formed the Financial Revolution were then 
significant, it is noticeable that they have been discussed almost exclusively from the 
perspective of the state and the capital markets. It becomes apparent on closer 
consideration that Dickson’s work suffers from one major short-coming: it reflected 
developments only in one part of the English financial system. This reflected his significant 
political interest: he wanted to explain the ‘practical and successful character of English 
government’.109 The formation of the Bank of England and the creation of a funded debt 
were clearly significant from the perspective of the securities market. There were however 
limitations to the reach of both into the wider economy. Thus Dickson’s conclusions of a 
wholesale financial revolution in England, while valid in the context of government finance 
and the securities market, may well not hold for the financial system as a whole. The 
question of the Bank’s impact on the credit economy is of some scope, and a tentative 
answer will become more apparent over the course of later chapters. More immediately, 
however, it is possible to make some comments on the impact of the formation of the Bank 
on the existing private banks of London.  
The creation of the Bank of England was originally understood to have been a significant 
competitive threat to the goldsmith-bankers of London. Macaulay believed this to be the 
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case, famously writing in his history of England that its formation occasioned howls of rage 
from the goldsmiths.110 The evidence in support of such a view is however limited. The 
Bank did carry out some private business in its early stages, including discounting bills of 
exchange and loaning money to individuals and larger corporate bodies, especially the East 
India Company. It made loans of ‘all sizes, to all sorts of people and on a considerable 
variety of securities’, upon which in March 1695 it had received interest of just over 
£15,800. However this secondary business declined and by 1753, the receipt of such 
interest on loans had dropped to £3,620, the bulk of which was from loans to corporate 
bodies, principally the East India Company.111 The discount business of the Bank prior to 
1760 was also limited, with an implied average bill portfolio of only £63,500 even in 
1744.112 The limited involvement of the Bank in ‘private’ business is perhaps not surprising 
given the resources it needed to devote to financing the state and supporting its note issue. 
Equally the Bank at first was not obviously of any significant advantage to the private 
bankers. There is some indication of distrust in the drawing ledgers of the Bank. Although 
some recognisable goldsmith-bankers did have accounts with the Bank, they did not use 
them regularly and many were closed by May 1695. Exceptions included Sir John Sweetaple 
and Freame & Gould. The latter had a fairly large account until 1709, when it was closed. It 
re-opened in 1716 and was very large after 1738. Hankey and Richard Hoare also had 
reasonably active accounts.113 In terms of deposits, very few private bankers made use of 
the Bank as a store of cash: as late as 1741, the only notable English banking firm with a 
cash account at the Bank was Freame and Barclay, who had £24,753 on deposit.114 
Ultimately, in the short to medium term, the initial impact of the formation of the Bank on 
private bankers appears to have been benign. Where the impact of the Bank was more 
clearly visible was in the displacement of the private bank notes in London. For a relatively 
brief period, London banks used both Bank of England and their own bank notes 
extensively, however private note issues soon declined. This does not appear to have been 
a cause of concern, indicating perhaps that issuance was not necessarily private banks’ 
most important function. The numbers of goldsmith-bankers continued to increase 
between 1687 and 1700, hardly indicative of a trade under threat, and evidence of 
deliberate ‘attacks’ by goldsmiths upon the Bank are equally hard to find in the account 
books of that company.115 This is in striking contrast to the situation in Scotland, where the 
rivalries and struggles between the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank are well 
documented. 
Another approach to analysing the impact of the formation of the Bank on London’s private 
bankers, used by Steven Quinn, is whether the Bank of England was drawing loanable funds 
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away from private bankers, thus crowding them out.116 One might expect this to have had a 
negative impact upon the development of private bankers in general, especially their ability 
to grow, as they obviously depended to a degree on such loans for profits (although 
interest rates might be raised to compensate for this and maintain overall profitability). His 
conclusion is important, for he suggests that ‘bankers and their customers began to use the 
improved financial instruments of the government to facilitate private lending’, an 
indication that the financial changes that accompanied the Glorious Revolution, including 
the Bank, may actually have helped to improve the position of the goldsmith-banker by 
stimulating demand for loanable funds.117  
 
III 
In conclusion, although the foundation of the Bank of England was the most prominent 
financial event of the seventeenth century, the evolution of the practice of banking was in 
reality dominated by private partnerships. While not strictly confined to goldsmith-banking 
firms, with some scriveners contributing positively, it seems implausible to deny that in 
both the City and the West End, goldsmiths were the single most important trade in 
developing banking practices. The Stop on the Exchequer damaged the original leading 
firms irreparably, leaving a second rank to take their place. These were fluid in 
composition, leaving only five lasting institutions of the thirty or so establishments 
between 1677 and 1700.118 Nonetheless, London’s banking system was firmly established 
over this period. These developments were not significantly affected by the Financial 
Revolution. The early role of the Bank of England was that of a government funding vehicle 
and its early interaction with private banks very limited. The Revolution’s impacts were 
more likely indirect, via the benefits of liquid investments that could be purchased as assets 
by the banks. In the long-term, the shape of the English banking system in the eighteenth 
century was clearly influenced by the creation of the Bank of England in 1694. However the 
impact was slow and the dominant theme is one of continuity in the development of 
banking. The consequence was that Britain’s banking system was left to develop more or 
less organically with minimal government interference throughout the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter 2: London’s growth as a financial centre in the eighteenth century 
 
Burke’s famous comment on provincial banks and subsequent historical research has made 
it clear that for the first half of the century, banks were essentially only to be found in 
London.1 The previous chapter has indicated how the development of banking did not 
occur in isolation in London, but was one of a number of advances in finance that were 
taking place in the capital. Before proceeding to an analysis of how banking developed 
during the eighteenth century, it is worth placing it in its proper context of London’s 
economy and the broader activities of the City in this period. London’s position as a central 
location for financial transactions, and as the nation’s payment centre, meant that 
developments there had the potential to affect banks all over the country. England’s largest 
city had a very diverse economy, encompassing substantial trade, manufacturing and 
services sectors, all requiring the provision of financial services, which the City was 
increasingly better placed to provide. The arrival of banks in the City of London, and of 
merchants increasingly assuming functions associated with banking and finance, was an 
essential and underappreciated reason for London assuming its position as a leading 
European centre for finance. However this relationship was symbiotic – the growth of other 
parts of the financial cluster encouraged the emergence of bankers.2 A failure to 
incorporate an analysis of the growth of English banking within the context of the 
acknowledged emergence of London as a financial centre would be to provide an 
incomplete analysis of both the causes and implications of that same growth.  
The literature on financial centres places London’s initial emergence as a leading centre 
firmly in the eighteenth century, but few comprehensive attempts have been made at 
understanding the process behind or the reasons for this. As an example, the first volume 
of The Development of London as a Financial Centre, despite arguing that the City of 
London remained predominantly a commercial centre in this period, commences its 
analysis in 1700 and 11 of the 16 articles cover separate aspects of London’s growing 
financial sophistication in the eighteenth century.3 Similarly Peter Spufford has argued that 
the emergence of London as an international financial centre was a feature of the 1760s 
and 1770s, although the seeds that drove it had been laid earlier.4 Most long-term studies 
of the City’s growth provide a similar starting point, although the early years consistently 
receive the least attention. For example Cassis maintains that London’s financial 
architecture was ‘essentially in place by the second third of the eighteenth century’, but 
begins his core analysis in 1780.5 David Kynaston equally acknowledges that London’s 
position as the leading financial centre originated in the eighteenth century, with a chapter 
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touching on the emergence of what he regarded as the centre’s four key pillars: the 
merchants, the insurance market, the bankers (especially the Bank of England) and the 
Stock Exchange.6 However in both instances the majority of the work then focuses on 
nineteenth century developments. Such long-term studies have been complemented by 
more targeted research on the eighteenth century as well, most notably by Larry Neal.7 In 
an article building on Neal’s initial work, Carlos and Neal argue that ‘London had no 
problem maintaining its pre-eminence as a financial centre’ after 1815 and argue that this 
position was established during the eighteenth century.8 It might be suggested that there 
was a transition from a centre that was largely focused on its domestic role to one that 
became increasingly internationally focused.9  
Most of the historical literature addresses the position of London relative to other financial 
centres. Amsterdam’s leading position for the majority the eighteenth century is widely 
acknowledged. Michie claims that the City remained less important ‘than Amsterdam’s 
financial markets, institutions and firms’ and as an international payments centre until the 
French Revolutionary wars.10 However over the last two decades of the century, a shift in 
this balance clearly occurred and London assumed the position of ‘first-amongst-equals’ of 
European financial centres. Cities such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Brussels, Geneva and Paris 
all remained important in an era when markets remained regional or local given the 
limitations that technology placed on communications.11 Explanations for this shift are 
however often vague. Obviously the reasons behind a centre gaining or losing influence are 
inherently complex, combining economic, political and social factors.12 Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the ultimate failure or rise of a financial centre is determined by politics 
rather than economics.13 The most common narrative usually attributes London’s rise to a 
combination of a gradual weakening of Amsterdam’s significance from 1760 under political 
and economic pressures and London’s growing importance, driven at least in part by its 
dominance of the growing Atlantic economy.14  
The most recent discussion of the changing balance between the two centres can be found 
in Neal and Carlos’ recent article, which updates some of the points made in Neal’s 
Financial Capitalism. They focus on the symbiotic relationship between Europe’s two most 
important financial centres for most of the century. Between 1690 and 1780, London 
developed the continent’s leading capital market, while Amsterdam developed the 
knowledge to provide internationally focused merchant banking services for the rest of the 
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continent. Amsterdam’s bankers’ speciality was in developing high-returning, reasonably 
risk-free investment portfolios.15  The international importance of Amsterdam can be seen 
through the fact that by 1772 it traded 57 Dutch and 39 foreign securities. However 
although foreign issues continued to do well in Amsterdam post-1772, financial crises in 
1763, 1772-3 and civil war in the 1780s began the process by which Amsterdam’s 
significance would be eroded.16 Dutch involvement in the listing of foreign securities was 
not entirely voluntary: it also reflected constraints in the Dutch economy, where 
merchants’ surpluses found insufficient domestic outlets. Amsterdam’s domestic market 
was supply constrained, as the total debt of Holland remained effectively unchanged 
between 1713 and 1794, partly because the country had reached the limit of what their tax 
system could service.17 In London by comparison, domestic demand for capital was still 
growing, as seen most clearly in the debt issued by the government over the course of the 
century. Secondly Amsterdam’s international business arose partly from that city’s 
declining importance as a commercial and industrial centre, because it encouraged 
merchants to specialise more in financial services. This in particular encouraged the growth 
of the Handelshuizen in the Atlantic trade, which started to specialise in floating foreign 
loans.18 
Neal and Carlos argue that after 1780 this symbiotic relationship broke down, as difficulties 
within the Dutch economy became ever more acute.19 The persistent provincialism of the 
Netherlands impeded trade and added transaction costs to business, in an era where other 
European states were breaking down internal barriers.20 Furthermore, the difficulties in the 
Dutch economy were not confined to the non-financial sector. De Vries and Van der Woude 
believe that Dutch finance was over-reliant on the government bond market and did not 
develop a banking institution that could restore confidence and liquidity to the system. 
There was no equivalent central bank to the Bank of England in the Netherlands until 1814. 
21 Alongside this shortcoming, they also argue that the lower branches of finance were not 
sufficiently developed. As in England, much lending remained localised in a ‘tangle of debt 
and credit’. Notaries were involved as financial intermediaries, although their precise role is 
unclear. In short these authors argue that ‘financial intermediation left much to be 
desired’.22 Noticeably there was no equivalent to English deposit banking in the Dutch 
system. These difficulties did not emerge out of the blue: signs of weakness can be 
identified before 1780, particularly amongst the prominent Dutch merchant bankers. 
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Systematic failures occurred in 1763, while 1772/3 brought the failure of Clifford & Sons, 
the fallout from which was severe enough to encourage a co-ordinated, albeit temporary, 
response to restore confidence. Others voluntarily left Amsterdam for London at an early 
date, such Gerard van Neck and Abraham Ricardo.23 In short it can be argued that the 
Dutch financial system itself had structural weaknesses, which combined with the 
difficulties of the rest of the economy, offered an opportunity from which London was 
eventually able to benefit. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to challenge the importance of Amsterdam as a financial 
centre during this period, for in certain respects it is self-evident. In certain areas, such as 
merchant banking, London arguably only matched Amsterdam by the end of the century, at 
which point London based houses did start to feature more prominently.24 However in its 
entirety, London was equally obviously developing into a broader, deeper financial cluster 
and the question of how and why this happened in the eighteenth century still remains 
inadequately explored. Youssef Cassis suggests a true history of a financial centre needs to 
encompass ‘the history of all financial activities without being that of any of its constituents 
in particular… [in] a way that helps us group both its global nature and its intimate 
association with its environment.’25 However such a comprehensive account of London’s 
financial centre does not really exist. The remainder of this chapter therefore seeks to 
improve understanding as to how London established its own infrastructure that allowed it 
to exploit Dutch problems between 1760 and 1796. It will focus in particular on core areas 
of development and specialisation: international finance, government finance, and 
banking. 
I – London’s economy 
Any explanation of London’s significance as a financial centre within England and 
internationally has to be linked partly to the fact that it was by some considerable distance 
the largest and wealthiest city in the country. A strong underlying economy is essential for 
the successful emergence of a financial centre, although eventually the centre may develop 
an independent momentum of its own. This point is often neglected in the financial 
literature on London in this period, partly because London’s eighteenth century economy 
has been largely by-passed by economic historians, who have instead tended to focus on 
the late seventeenth century or on the nineteenth century. As Schwarz observed over 
fifteen years ago, this was not just a feature of London’s economy as a whole, but also of 
various economic interest groups, such as the bourgeoisie and merchants.26 Some general 
relevant points can however be made. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, London was the most important part of the 
English economy. For most of the seventeenth century, it had been developments in the 
capital that had served to drive economic growth in the whole of the country. This position 
has been accounted for in two ways. Firstly, London’s population was growing faster than 
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that in the provinces, which drove investment and the division of labour. This also had a 
significant impact in encouraging economic development in the Home Counties.27  The 
second point, more interesting in the context of this study, was that the capital had 
benefited from a shifting trading pattern that had become dominated by imported goods, 
where the merchant became the dynamic element in trade and which was centred on 
London, partly for geographic reasons.28 During the seventeenth century, London had 
already assumed a crucial role in the British financial economy, as has already been shown 
for example in the case of the English land market. In this sense it is not surprising that 
Clayton was able to develop his business into a ‘brokerage house specialising in mortgage 
loans’, able to procure loans from a wide variety of counties.29 London benefitted because 
it had a wider potential market for loans than the provinces and because all transfers of 
land ownership needed to be registered in London courts: this made it almost inevitable 
that the capital would come to sit at the heart of the English banking industry.30 
Although the impact of some of these driving forces diminished in the eighteenth century, 
and London’s economy became relatively less significant, it remained the largest single 
centre of consumption and an important industrial centre. London remained at the heart of 
the English economy, being its chief port and manufacturing centre.31 The population 
continued to grow rising from an estimated 575,000 in 1700, to 600,000 by 1750 and 
900,000 in 1801.32 This consistently represented about 10% of the total population of 
England and Wales.33 London’s dominance of the urban hierarchy is obvious: in 1700 its 
population was much bigger than that of the next largest town (Norwich with 30,000), and 
indeed its population was comfortably larger than all the towns with a population in excess 
of 2,500 put together.34 Similarly in 1801, the next largest English town was Liverpool, 
which had a population of 82,000, while Manchester had 75,000 people and Birmingham 
71,000.35 Thus although other towns were closing the gap between them and London, it 
remained considerable. London’s economy behaved differently to that of provincial cities, 
and the eighteenth century saw a divergence in the secular growth patterns of London and 
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the provinces, with London witnessing a prolonged depression between 1720 and 1760.36 
Equally bankruptcy data for the eighteenth century suggests that the links in the cyclical 
economic trends between London and the provinces were weak.37 Thus London’s 
emergence as the world’s leading financial centre actually corresponded with a period of 
relative domestic weakness. 
Despite London’s economic troubles during the mid-eighteenth century, the city still 
dominated the English economy of the century to a remarkable extent. Specific GDP figures 
for London are not available; however other assessments do illustrate this dominance. 
Rubinstein suggested that 39% of all British income taxes paid in 1806 were paid in 
London.38 Although supposedly based on data from the 1815/16 Parliamentary papers, 
these estimates appear too high. The gross estimates and gross assessments for 1806 
available in a parliamentary report of 1813 suggest that a figure of around 20% of total 
taxes is more appropriate. The dominance is significant and is reinforced when one 
examines schedule D more closely. Schedule D represents the tax paid on industrial and 
commercial profit and the 1806 net assessment shows that London accounted for 43% of 
total value assessed (Schedule D itself represented about a third of all income taxes paid). 
The City accounted for about half of London’s total net assessment (or 22% of the total 
value payable).39 
As an industrial centre, London continued to feature prominently in the eighteenth century 
economy. In the mid-1770s, it has been estimated that there were about 10,000 
manufacturing and construction firms (or about one third of all businesses in London).40 
London’s greatest advantage remained its proximity to consumers, its low transport costs 
and its ‘downstream’ production (finishing).41 Although much of this activity was at the 
higher end of the value chain, other labour-intensive activities, such as shipbuilding, also 
retained their importance. As an example of the industrial strength of the city, it was the 
fifth or sixth largest user of steam engines at the end of the eighteenth century, with 136 
steam engines, in an era where their principal use was still in mining.42 In all it has been 
suggested that London was a growing manufacturing centre in the period 1775-1825, in 
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terms of the number of activities undertaken, as well as the specialization and size of the 
firms.43 
As a service centre, London was if anything even more important. The service sector, which 
included bankers, merchants, lawyers, drapers and mercers was exceptionally prominent in 
London.44 Something of London’s dominance of the service sector of the economy can be 
seen when one considers that about 25% of the country’s solicitors lived there in 1729.45 If 
anything the proportion of attorneys living in London increased thereafter: figures for 1775 
show that almost 35% of all registered attorneys were based in London.46 In other areas 
London’s dominance was even more pronounced: of the 16 insurance companies in Britain 
at that stage, three quarters were based in London.47 Another important element of 
London’s service economy was its role as a transport and communication hub, which 
supported an extensive infrastructure. It was the focal point of the country’s mail-coach 
services, while its coffee houses and inns were important sources of information and 
communication throughout the century.48 Then there was of course the port itself, with 
extensive national and international links, which also created a domestic requirement for 
extensive financial services.49  
 
II – International trade 
 
Although the capital market is the most studied part of London’s financial cluster, the city’s 
strength was in reality based on the breadth and depth of the financial services that it 
could offer, including capital market activity, insurance and banking. One of London’s clear 
strengths was its position as an international trading centre. International trade through 
the port had grown rapidly in the seventeenth century. Exports in 1662-3 were about £2 
million, growing to about £3.5 million per annum in 1698-1701 period.50 In 1700 the city 
accounted for 80% of England’s imports, 70% of the country’s exports and 86% of its re-
exports. By 1800, 66% of all English exports were still routed through the port, as were 62% 
of combined exports and re-exports.51 London was the prime beneficiary of a ‘commercial 
revolution’  which saw the volume of British overseas trade double between 1700 and 
1780. This commercial success in turn encouraged the formation in London of commodity 
markets and a deep shipping and marine insurance market.52 London met a growing 
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domestic demand for American and Asian consumer goods and North European raw 
materials; it supplied Europe with re-exports of these same American and Asian goods; and 
it provided America and Africa with British manufactures. Trade was controlled from the 
Royal Exchange, with only the Corn Exchange (1749) and Coal Exchange (1770) emerging as 
specialist exchanges at this point. Information could be gained and businesses run from the 
nearby coffee houses.53 Mortimer’s directory of 1763 listed some 1,365 merchants, the 
1774 directory 1,220. These were large firms by the standard of the day: on average they 
were insuring £4,059 worth of goods. By 1786 the starting capital needed for a merchant 
house was thought to be £30,000.54   
One of the most commonly used measures to show London’s importance as a trading port 
is the volume of shipping owned by merchants in the city. Although London was growing 
more slowly than most of the outports over the course of the eighteenth century (only 
Bristol grew slower), in 1788 the tonnage of ships owned in London was nonetheless three 
times that of the nearest port (Newcastle). To put it another way, London owned 30% of 
total English tonnage at that point.55 London’s position as a trading centre benefited from 
its position in the economically buoyant North Sea region and the gradual undermining of 
Amsterdam as a commercial hub, which had started by 1700. Initially the benefits of 
Amsterdam’s decline did not accrue directly to London, but were shared with Hamburg 
from 1690 to 1730. It was ultimately ‘through the creation of a national entrepôt within an 
imperial trading network’ that London came to dominate its continental rivals as a trading 
centre.56 Hope & Co’s scheme in 1782 to corner the European market in cochineal, a 
product used in the dyeing industry, provides an example of London’s growing relative 
importance in international trade. When the plan was devised by Hope’s broker Voute, it 
was believed that the largest share of the purchases would occur in the Amsterdam 
market. However in reality, the chief centre for purchases and sales was found to be 
London. Purchases had been 40% greater, and sales at 1,222 seroons had outnumbered 
those in Amsterdam by 659. This illustrates the shifting balance between London and its 
chief competitor in commerce by the late 1780s, but also indicates that some of the leading 
commercial figures in Europe were not fully aware of these changes. 57 
However it was not just the volume of English trade that was growing. As trade was carried 
out over greater distances, so English merchants began to organise that trade more 
effectively. To exploit successfully the colonial natural resources it was necessary to 
develop better techniques and commercial best practices. The period 1660-1700 had 
witnessed:  
the accumulation and improvement of capabilities which made London the leading 
commercial centre in Europe; the expansion, diversification, and technological 
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improvement of manufacturing capacity in the capital and beyond; the extension 
and enhancement of transport networks to create an increasingly integrated and 
commercialized national economy; and a major investment in the mathematical 
and mechanical skills which raised England to technological leadership in Europe.58 
This included the development of commercial networks, often with strong kin or religious 
elements, that could bring goods effectively to market; a shift to commission trading and 
the use of longer usuance bills of exchange; and better planning of voyages, which reduced 
shipping costs.59 Distribution of colonial goods abroad and within England also 
strengthened London’s role within the domestic economy. Together with better, more 
relevant education and training, this created over time a genuinely commercial society.60 
The growth of London’s trading function also encouraged an increasing specialisation in 
financial activity. For, as has already been noted, at the heart of merchanting stood the 
need to provide credit. Merchants were constantly giving and receiving credit. 
Unfortunately getting a really satisfactory understanding of this is hampered by the loss of 
the records of many of these merchant firms. Those examples that do survive universally 
point to substantial merchants being heavily involved in finance.  As an example, Messrs 
Mills, sugar merchants in London, needed to extend credit to planters in the colonies 
frequently advancing sums of £2,000, and also additionally financed the activities of 
Liverpool and Bristol slave traders that formed part of this trading network. Merchants thus 
required substantial capital to conduct their businesses, which was supplemented by loans 
from outside sources. The problem for these merchant firms tended to be periodic 
illiquidity. Indeed the financial capacity of merchants has led to tentative suggestions that 
the financial capacities of London merchants may have retarded the growth of real 
banking.61  
The other obvious development that can be linked to the increasing volume and 
sophistication of trade is the growth in marine insurance, a sector that has still not been 
adequately studied by historians. This development started as late as the Restoration 
period, but by the mid-eighteenth century London was the leading insurance market in 
Europe. Although regional insurance centres existed in the major and minor provincial 
ports, including Yarmouth and Lancaster, they were much smaller than those of London.62 
Furthermore they were not independent, with premiums in these local centres for example 
being dependent on prices set in London. Aside from the two chartered companies (which 
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may have accounted for 10% of all premiums in 1720), this market was dominated by the 
insurance brokers, although by 1780s specialised underwriters also began to feature.63  
The significance of London’s mercantile advancement throughout the seventeenth century, 
and the increasing use of London for making large-scale interregional and international 
payments, has been acknowledged as part of the reason causing a growing demand for 
banking facilities there.64 The relationship between commerce and banking is a subject that 
will be revisited in greater detail in following chapters. For now it is important to 
acknowledge the importance of trade in shaping London’s position as a financial centre, 
both through the demand it generated for financial services and through merchants’ 
adaptations and innovations to successfully meet the challenges they faced. 
III - Capital Markets 
 
Of Kynaston’s four pillars of the City, the one that has received the greatest attention in the 
eighteenth century is the development of what would become the stock exchange, which 
was tied to the finance of the English government.  As early as the 1720s, London came to 
be the location of the ‘the largest mass of tradeable securities available to European 
investors’. Over the course of the century, the government’s demand for money created 
Europe’s deepest, most liquid capital market.65 The creation and early development of this 
market was covered in the previous chapter and does not need repeating here.66 The 
eighteenth century witnessed an enormous expansion in the levels of English debt 
issuance. The English national debt stood at £3.1 million in 1691, rising to £54.0 million in 
1720, £78.0 million in 1750 and £456.1 million in 1801.67 This can be understood as a 
response to the need to fund ever more expensive wars as Britain took a more pro-active 
involvement in continental affairs compared to the previous century.68 Indeed, the 
increases all occurred in periods of warfare, with the exception of the period 1717-1720, 
while the wars of the second half of the century were significantly more expensive than the 
earlier ones. London to a degree therefore benefited from being the seat of government 
and most of this increased debt was raised through the London markets. In the early 
stages, foreign investment was also important in helping the market to develop. 
Amsterdam in particular played an important initial role in this developing the market and 
funding the debt. In 1776, foreigners owned about 20% of all 3% Consols (just under £8 
million), 85% of this foreign-owned debt being in the hands of the Dutch.69 The Dutch 
influence only declined in the 1780s, as they substantially disinvested between 1786 and 
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1792.70 Government securities dominated the capital market, and its role in directly 
financing trade and industry was more limited.71 The post-bubble act restrictions on joint-
stock companies were an obvious impediment to such developments. However some other 
opportunities were available to investors. Investment in the ‘monied companies’ offered a 
combination of government and commercial exposure. A small number of pure corporate 
investments were also available, most notably perhaps through the insurance companies. 
Total investable funds of the nine corporate insurers for which data is available rose from 
£0.25 to £4 million between 1720 and 1800, a compound growth rate of 3.5% per annum 
for eighty years.72  
In the context of this study, the development of the national debt itself is of less interest 
than the opportunity it presented for other financial specialists to emerge. The 
development of a significant national debt encouraged further specialisation in finance: it 
led to the development of a clearly defined ‘financial interest’ in the City. Brewer, 
somewhat unkindly, described this interest as a ‘consortium of bankers, “monied men”, 
investors, speculators and stock-jobbers who lived parasitically off the state’s need to 
borrow money to fund its wars’. This was a significant departure in that these 
intermediaries were no longer associated with the government through tax collection in a 
way that lenders to the government had been in the seventeenth century.73 London’s 
merchant community featured prominently in bringing these new issues to the market. 
They were clearly involved in floating not just the loans of the British government, but also 
foreign loans from a fairly early stage. A quarter of the £2 million loan raised by the new 
East India Company in 1698 is said to have originated from London merchants, to the 
surprise of foreign observers.74 This is not a place for a complete analysis of the 
government loan issuance. Instead it is intended to indicate how a relatively deep pool of 
merchant financiers emerged within London.  
Merchant financiers are readily identifiable from an early stage. Sir Gilbert Heathcote was a 
Baltic merchant who subsequently became heavily involved in government finance, 
contributing £8,000 to the first subscription to the Bank of England and he remained active 
with the Bank until his death in 1733, serving twice as governor. He was also a 
commissioner involved in raising £250,000 in London on behalf of the Hapsburg emperor in 
1706.75 The career of Sir Harry Furnese offers a similar example of the progression from 
merchant to international financier at this time.76 Sir Francis Eyles, originally a haberdasher, 
became a commission agent in the Atlantic sugar trade and then a director of the Bank of 
England in 1697. However it was his role as a commission agent supplying bills of exchange 
for the army in Flanders that really made his fortune. During the period from 1696 to 1706, 
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he was instrumental in raising money to remit to these armies, including being part of a 
syndicate that raised £300,000 at 8% and being a manager for the remittance of £250,000 
to Prince Eugene in Italy.77 While some merchants appeared to be putting their own 
fortunes to work in the stocks, others were also taking on the role of middlemen. Sir Peter 
Delmé (1667-1728) invested about 13% of his £200,000 fortune in Bank and South Sea 
stock, but held another £200,000 of financial assets on behalf of others.78 Similar 
experiences can be identified for government financiers as the eighteenth century 
progressed. The Russia merchant Samuel Holden became involved in the affairs of the Bank 
of England, serving as governor in 1729-31 and serving on the court of directors for twenty 
years. He also served as one of the City trustees for a £370,000 loan to the Holy Roman 
emperor in 1737.79  
All these merchant financiers required connections and wealth to operate successfully, 
traits that remained constant into the latter part of the eighteenth century. Gauci defined 
the merchant-financier as a person with substantial control/influence within one of the 
three monied companies, whose chief concern was in financing the government and 
maintaining macro-economic stability. He estimates that they numbered no more than a 
few dozen at any one time.80 Brewer similarly emphasises the role of connections, arguing 
that the ‘typical eighteenth century loan manager and contractor was a man with good 
banking and mercantile connections’, that he would often be connected to either the Bank 
of England or the East India Company and that he was usually wealthy. This was certainly 
true of the leading mid-century financiers, who included John Gore, George Amyand 
(banker to diplomatic service), Sampson Gideon, Samuel Fluyder (America), Richard 
Atkinson and George Wombwell, and Chauncy Townsend.81 A large number of financiers 
also served as Directors of the Bank of England. It has been argued that the presence of 
substantial international traders of known credit serving as directors encouraged 
confidence in the Bank as an institution in its early life.82 Similarly a directorship of a City 
company further enhanced the standing of the merchant.83 In some instances this status 
was unjustified: Humphry Morice, an African slave trader who became governor of the 
Bank, was upon his death discovered to have been acting fraudulently.84 
While many of these financiers eventually became very wealthy, they did not always start 
out with vast wealth. Sampson Gideon (1699-1762) originated from a Portuguese Jewish 
family, although he left this faith in 1753. His father had been a West India merchant of 
unexceptional wealth, who had come to London via Hamburg and Barbados. Sampson 
himself never appears to have worked in the family’s merchant business, but instead was 
active from 1719 as a jobber or broker. It was a combination of skill, initiative and fortunate 
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timing that allowed him to make his reputation in the Austrian War of Succession and the 
Seven Years War. In 1742 he created the first “list” of Jewish subscribers to a government 
loan, raising £600,000, and he contributed substantial subscriptions for most of the 
subsequent loans of the Austrian War (including a subscription of £1.07 million in 1746). He 
also started advising the government on loan floatations. In this latter role he would 
become even more important in the Seven Years War, when he became a principal 
financial adviser to the Duke of Newcastle.85 While Gideon was foremost amongst the mid-
century contractors, others were also of considerable note. In the Austrian War of 
Succession, Portuguese merchants Peter Burrell and John Bristow contracted to remit 
money overseas, raising £240,000 of the £1.8 million loan of 1744. These men also 
developed innovative ways to raise loans for the government. Previously these had been 
arranged through government contracts, but in 1746 Henry Pelham and John Bernard 
devised a system of ‘open’ subscriptions. Regardless of this innovation, investment in new 
subscriptions remained confined to a small initial grouping. Half of the £6.3 million pound 
loan of 1748 was covered by 139 subscribers, of whom 75% sold out before the ledgers of 
the loan were opened. This should not be seen as pure profiteering, as it is possible that 
they had already pre-arranged to sell on parts of their stakes. Alongside floating new 
government issues, most of these merchant financiers also provided other financial 
services for the government, especially for contracts to finance overseas troops and 
garrisons. This reflected the substantial capital required for both operations, and the time 
needed to realise a profit. John Gore, a Hamburg merchant, handled over £5 million of 
remittances.86 This remittance and army contracting business was lucrative for some for 
the merchants of slightly lesser substance. This can be seen in the case of Richard Oswald, 
who used the logistical and financial skills he had acquired as a merchant to supply troops 
in Germany with bread for four and a half years during the Seven Year Wars, earning a 
£112,000 in the process.87 
What is conspicuous in all these examples is the lack of continuity between merchant 
financiers. There was no equivalent to the merchant banking firms that had already 
developed in the Netherlands for example. Samson Gideon had a son and two daughters 
but his main concern for these children was to see them advance socially: his eldest 
daughter became Lady Gage, while his son was raised to the baronetcy.88 However over the 
latter part of the century this absence of continuity did begin to change. An example of this 
can be seen in the case of the Vannecks. Little is known in detail about this family’s 
business, yet they established themselves as important financiers in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century. They were an important Dutch family and the first Sir Joshua Vanneck 
became involved in financing the British government in the era of the Duke of Newcastle, 
for which he was made a baronet. Little has been written on this Sir Joshua, despite his 
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importance as ‘a mighty financier of Dutch extraction, who had interests in every part of 
Western Europe and America’. 89 A general trader by background, he came to prominence 
by organising syndicates of Dutch merchants who wished to invest in British government 
securities. In 1757 he contributed half a million pounds towards a £3 million loan raised by 
the government. 90 Together with Zachary Fonnereau and George Amyand, he was crucial 
to the financing of the latter part of the Seven Years war.91 His eldest son Gerard Vanneck 
seems to have removed the family more firmly into London, withdrawing assets from 
Amsterdam prior to his death in 1791.92 A second Joshua Vanneck (1745-1816), brother of 
Gerard, became the 3rd Baronet and was raised to the peerage as Lord Huntingfield.93. It is 
known from a document in the Barings archive that he still featured as a financier in the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, as he served on committees with Sir Francis 
Baring.94   
As the century progressed, and particularly as the full impact of the French Wars begun to 
be felt in 1790s, the opportunities in the issuance business increased. Samuel Thornton, the 
brother of the banker Henry Thornton, succeeded to his father’s business in Hull, trading 
with the Baltic. He became a director of the Bank of England in 1780 and would serve as 
governor from 1799 to 1801. He was clearly well-informed on financial matters and as an 
MP spoke to address the major financial crisis in parliament in the 1790s.95 While there 
were opportunities for lesser merchants to transition to this role, certain merchant firms 
featured especially prominently. Boyd, Benfield & Co became a significant firm of loan 
contractors in the City at this point, while other important firms included Godschall, 
Johnson & Co, J.J. Angerstein & James Morgan, and James & William Mellish. The role of 
these principal contractors was to form a list of subscribers for the loans being offered by 
the government. Deposit taking banks formed a core part of these lists. Thus for the 1796 
loan, the banking house of Newnham, Everett & Co was allowed a subscription of £30,000 
(apparently much less than they had desired).96 The distribution of Boyd & Co’s portion of 
an £18 million loan issued by government is illustrative of the connections between various 
financial firms. The firm’s total list amounted to just over £5.7 million, of which the firm 
held onto £1.2 million. A further £1.2 million was distributed between a variety of banking 
houses, with Smith, Payne & Smith receiving some £650,000. This left a sum of 
approximately £3 million to be distributed between London merchants and brokers, 
including JJ Angerstein; Godschall, Johnson & Co; Charles Herries & Co and William Ker & 
Co.97 Towards the end of the century some deposit bankers became directly involved in the 
negotiations with the government to raise money, especially in times of war. Thus the 
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partners in Glyn, Mills and Co received an invitation from Messrs Lefevre and Co to attend 
a meeting with Mr Pitt. The exact purpose of this meeting is not clear, but might relate to 
an enclosed document outlining plans to raise money for the government by issuing £110 
debentures at £100, paying 5% interest and repayable at the end of the war.98 
However not all deposit banks wished to be engaged in such ventures. In June and July 
1786, Francis Baring was involved in a scheme to purchase £800,000 of East India Company 
annuities. The plan was to create a consortium together with Hope & Co, who would find 
£300,000 of the total, while Barings themselves would hold £100,000 and seek partners to 
purchase the outstanding half. Baring, who had close connections with the Company, 
believed that this was a good opportunity as the market was excessively pessimistic on the 
fortunes of the Company and because the annuities were easily used as collateral for 
advances and, unlike the shares, the interest payments were effectively underwritten by 
the government.99 A key part of the scheme involved the formation of consortium to 
provide half of the suggested £800,000 total. In this instance invitations to participate in 
the scheme were sent to other financial houses, effectively providing a prospectus for the 
Baring’s scheme. While most of the responses have not survived, that from Drummond’s 
Bank is available. They declined to partake in the venture, for fear of their reputation, ‘not 
wishing to be considered as speculators in the Stocks’.100 
The firm of Boyd, Benfield & Co was one of the leading contractors in government loans 
during the French wars. Walter Boyd learnt his business in France as Boyd, Ker et Cie. He 
had strong Scottish connections, becoming Vice-President of the Scottish Corporation in 
London.101 Upon his return to England he went into partnership with Paul Benfield. Benfield 
enjoyed a poor reputation even for a nabob, but was of considerable wealth. He made his 
initial advances in India ‘making fictitious loans’, then lending money on the security of the 
lands of Tanjore. He was suspended from the East India Company on a number of occasions 
and endured voluntary exile from England. They launched the firm of Boyd, Benfield & Co 
on the 15 March 1793.102 By this point Benfield had set himself up as a country gentleman, 
buying Watton Wood Hall and its estate in Hertfordshire for £125,000. A third partner was 
recruited in 1793. James Drummond had served at Charles Herries & Co since 1784. He 
received a notional share of £5,000, but did not share in the losses of the firm and had to 
pay interest on the £5,000. He was active in business, dealing with ‘correspondence’. 
Benfield was not active in the management the firm.103 The firm soon came to hold a 
significant business in London, and despite the somewhat dubious reputation of one of its 
partners, it was held in enough regard to act as the London agent to the emperor of 
Austria. 
The early business of this merchant bank was in foreign exchange, importing gold from 
Hamburg and Lisbon. It also started handling finances of merchant firms, the first account 
                                                             
98
 RBSGA, Glyn Mills Currie & Co, Guard book, volume 1, 26 Nov 1794. 
99
 Baring, Northbrook Papers, NP1A, 23.13 M26, ff. 1-2. 
100
 Baring, Northbrook Papers, NP1A, 23.14. 
101
 Cope, Walter Boyd, pp. 40-41. 
102
 Ibid., pp. 37-9. 
103 Ibid., pp. 40-3. 
64 
 
being the Scottish firm of Alexander Houston & Co, a connection that proved to be 
problematic in the long run. The business for this firm was carried out through Boyd & Co’s 
account with Smith, Payne & Smith, and also at one stage through an account with the 
Bank of England and soon Boyd had advanced £138,000 on Houston’s behalf. 104 It would 
appear that the relationship with Smith, Payne & Smith was essential to the firm’s 
functioning. As well as providing a broad client base that could be expected to participate 
in loan offerings, it was also a discounter of Boyd & Co’s bills. Smiths’ caused the firm some 
difficulties when it placed a limit on these discounts and then caused a collapse in the 
firm’s credit when it refused a £600 bill in June 1798.105  
Indeed, while the issuance of English government debt could lead to considerable wealth, it 
was clearly not risk free. The Goldsmids rose to prominence as loan contractors, but 
spectacularly failed towards the end of the war.106 The house of Boyd, Benfield & Co was 
undone at an earlier stage by overextending itself. Although the spark that precipitated this 
collapse was the Smiths’ decision to stop discounting the firm’s bills, the underlying cause 
of the firm’s failure appears to have been a Scottish merchant firm. Francis Baring believed 
Boyd, Benfield & Co had saved Houston & Co from ruin initially, but that they had ‘in their 
turn by an abuse of the Liberality of the House in London been the chief cause in its 
Overthrow’. This letter also raises criticism of another Scottish firm, McDowall’s, with 
whom Benfield appears to have had dealings.107 There is an interesting parallel here with 
events in 1772, where imprudent Scottish connections had caused the downfall of the bank 
of Fordyce, Neale & Co. Sir Francis Baring was well placed to comment on the failure of 
Boyd, as he was closely involved with in the process of resolving the fallout from the 
House’s failure. A scheme was developed whereby important merchant houses, including 
Hope’s, would subscribe shares of £5,000 each in a loan of £80,000 to the company to be 
made on security of Benfield’s estates, although this appears to have foundered on the 
question of security.108 
Francis Baring had by this stage already established himself amongst the premier group of 
merchants and was substantially involved in the issuance of state debt in his own right. The 
business had been an area of strong growth for the firm from 1780 onwards. That Francis 
Baring became involved in government finance is not surprising: he had probably 
experienced work on government contracts under his mentor, West India and Manchester 
merchant Samuel Touchet. Baring’s first involvement in government finance came in 
America, as he participated in the provision of loans to the government during the 
American War of Independence, as well as moving into other early financial initiatives in 
the America.109 However the real increase in this business came in the French Wars, as 
Baring’s participated as a contractor in issuing government loans. This was risky but could 
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be very profitable: in 1799 loans accounted for £21,000 of profit, or half the firm’s total for 
that year.110 Participation in such wartime finance required considerable skill. Francis 
Baring himself noted the difficulty of the remittance of subsidies to the Austrians, as the 
places through which such advances could be made on credit, such as Holland, Antwerp, 
Brussels and even parts of northern Germany were susceptible to French ‘vengence’. The 
document also makes clear that the operation was too large for Baring’s to carry out by 
itself. At the same time there was a requirement for secrecy as ‘the operation on the 
continent must after be confidential and of a nature that we could not communicate to 
others’. This meant that the house was apparently not willing to make formal agreements 
with other houses to co-operate on these schemes.111 
It was of course not just the issuance business which saw significant advances. Central to 
the effective functioning of the secondary market were the stockbrokers. From a very early 
stage the attraction of the ‘monied companies’ was their accessibility. Prices were regularly 
advertised through the press and transactions were not taxed. Furthermore there existed a 
ready supply of brokers who were happy to deal in these securities, and encouraged 
dealing through techniques such as ‘refusals’ and ‘puts’. Initially based in the Royal 
Exchange, in 1698 they would move to Change Alley, in particular Jonathan’s Coffee House. 
This would eventually in 1773 become the London stock exchange.112 The market was very 
liquid. After the South Sea Bubble, registered transfers of government stock were in the 
region of 4,000 to 7,000 per annum through to 1750, at which point the consolidation 
increased turnover to 20,000 transfers per year. This was indicative of the attraction of 
long-term, income paying securities to the investing public in this period.113 It is argued that 
it was investor appetite, not the needs of borrowers that drove the growth of the British 
securities market of the eighteenth century.114 One example of this might be the utility of 
the stocks in settling legacies upon family members, in preference to lottery loans or life-
assurance.115 Government securities provided a useful avenue for merchants to 
invest/deposit cash beyond their main commercial business. Throughout the century the 
liquidity that the government debt, especially the Consols, could provide was important to 
the merchant community, despite the later emergence of other investment 
opportunities.116 
The need of bankers and merchants to deal in stocks meant that the larger London banks 
and merchants could generate a substantial business for stockbrokers and the ties between 
these groups could become strong. The early history of James Capel & Co provides an 
example of this through the connection between Edmund and Philip Antrobus and Thomas 
Coutts. Edmund Antrobus joined the banking partnership of Thomas Coutts in 1777, but 
before this appears to have been a stockbroker, although not much of his activity in this 
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area is known. The stockbroking business was subsequently taken up by Philip, his younger 
brother.117 The Bank of England ledgers are the sole source of Philip Antrobus’ activity, but 
they indicate that between 1779 and 1783, he built a substantial business through his 
connection with Coutts’ Bank. In 1782 and 1783 he purchased £110,000 of Consols from 
the banker and sold them into the market. Also in 1782 he was able to subscribe to 
£102,000 of new stock, suggesting he had become an influential applicant. By the 1790s he 
had likely achieved a position as a substantial subcontractor in the government loans. His 
reputation continued to grow to the extent that he was chosen by Pitt to manage the 
issuance of Exchequer bills by 1797.118 One can in this instance clearly see the benefits that 
the support of a prominent banking house could provide. Such a beneficial relationship was 
not unique. Surviving correspondence suggests that the brokers Thomas, Robertson & 
Sutton conducted a considerable volume of business on behalf Francis Baring, carrying out 
orders of at least £112,000 over six days in December 1794.119 It is also argued that the 
stockbroking house of John Francis Menet, which Philip Cazenove joined in 1819, was 
viable in its early years largely due to the business it received from Rothschild’s.120  
The brokers of the City provide an example of the benefits of London’s relatively open and 
cosmopolitan nature in developing new financial business activites. For much of the 
eighteenth century, this profession was held in very poor esteem, with one commentator 
describing brokers as ‘vermin who took advantage of the public folly’.121 Some of the 
criticism derived from the association of this group with foreigners. The work of Carlos, 
Maguire and Neal has shown that Jews did feature reasonably prominently in the South 
Sea Bubble, participating in 20% of all transactions. They also argue that these Jews, 
through their strong connections to the Amsterdam market, provided much needed 
expertise and a perspective that may have helped to stall an even more severe crash.122 Yet 
other brokers clearly developed domestically. One can note that the three most substantial 
brokers in the South Sea Bubble were Sir George Caswall, Robert Westley, a merchant 
tailor, and James Martin, formerly a goldsmith, were all English.123 Edmund Antrobus, who 
established the stockbrokers now known as Capel & Co in 1776, originated from 
Cheshire.124 
It was not just in the broking sphere that immigration was important. The widespread re-
location of foreign talent, especially Dutch bankers and brokers and French Huguenots, to 
the City of London and their role in developing financial techniques and driving the volume 
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of business taking place have underpinned the understanding of London’s emergent 
position.125 Cassis claims the experience of the City’s bankers and financiers in foreign 
issues ‘barely dated back to before the wars of the Revolution’. He regarded Walter Boyd’s 
raising of the first Austrian loan of £3 million as the first significant example of this type of 
activity. Equally he suggests that Barings gained their leading position in this business under 
the tutelage of Hope & Co of Amsterdam.126 However it is perhaps important not to 
overstate the significance of the immigrant communities. For instance in the case of Francis 
Baring, Buist has argued that the Hopes’ relevance to Baring’s emergence was not that 
substantial, and that ultimately the most significant contribution of the Dutch house was 
the provision of its capital to Barings in 1794/6. He equally highlights the willingness of 
English merchants to move abroad to learn their trades there.127 One might in this respect 
note that Boyd had worked in both Paris and Amsterdam before setting himself up as a 
banker in London.128 
IV – Banking 
 
It is within this broader context of financial specialisation that private banking developed in 
London. Our understanding of this development during the eighteenth century is guided by 
Hilton-Price’s Handbook of London Bankers.129 The existing historical literature has already 
highlighted some of the more obvious flaws in this list. In particular there are instances of 
double counting and, perhaps more surprisingly, a number of well known banks are 
occasionally omitted. It should also be noted that, although Hilton Price’s lists are regarded 
as the best available data source, the totals given for each year are probably too low.130 The 
numbers that are now generally cited in the literature are shown in Figure 2 and provide a 
useful indication of the trends taking place.  
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Figure 2: Number of banks in London 1670-1797, the numbers in 1670-1700 refer to goldsmiths keeping 
running cashes. (Source: for 1670-1700, see Melton, Sir Robert Clayton, p. 236-242; for 1725-1786 see Joslin, 
‘London Private bankers’, p. 173; for 1792 and 1797 see Hilton-Price, pp. 206-7, 212-3) 
Although the developments in the first quarter of the eighteenth century are unclear from 
this data, by 1720 London had witnessed the emergence of a core nucleus of about 25 
banks. This number is noticeably lower than that of the goldsmith-bankers identified by 
Melton at the end of the seventeenth century. Net formation of banks in the second 
quarter of the century was limited and the environment for banking appears to have been 
volatile. In the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble weaker banks continued to fail: one third 
of all listed ‘goldsmiths keeping running cashes’ disappeared. Bankruptcies were common 
in 1720, 1721, 1739-42 and 1745. That the progress in the 1730s was undone by the 
problems of the 1740s suggests that firms were still not fully able to cope with widespread 
collapses in public confidence or economic crises, which still occurred with relative 
frequency. Yet it also relates to mistakes resulting from inexperience, such as the inability 
of some bankers to keep an adequate reserve of cash or liquid assets, or unwise 
commercial speculation.131 Consequently the overall number of bankers in London grew 
only by five between 1725 and 1754, with a core of older houses that were particularly 
stable. The real growth of the banking sector was therefore concentrated in the second half 
of the century, when overall numbers more than doubled. Joslin noted the ‘crucial 
importance of the foundations of 1769-73 in creating a major addition to the banking 
structure’, identifying 13 new banks that emerged at that point.132 Although those 
formations were significant, they occurred within a wider period of sustained growth, as 
the number of banks rose roughly 31% over these seven years of 1763-1770, followed by 
another 21% increase from 1770 to 1776. This was then followed by another surge in 
formations in the period 1786-1797, where net bank numbers grew by another 29%.  
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There are however two problems to approaching the analysis of bank numbers in this 
manner. Most obviously, the irregular dates for which the total number of banks are 
available is not ideal. These years are those that Hilton Price included in the second part of 
his work. However Hilton Price’s book also includes a short history of all the banks he 
identified. Using these, it is possible to create a continuous data series across the century. 
The greatest challenge to such an analysis is that Hilton Price included both goldsmiths and 
bankers, and in the earlier part of the century it is often difficult to establish from the short 
descriptions if the former carried out any banking activities.133 The second issue is that 
considering the total number of bankers within London obscures the divide that existed 
between ‘West End’ and ‘City’ businesses. These descriptions reflect the two groups’ 
differing locations within London and also the different types of activity they were engaged 
in. It is argued that the distinction between West End and City banks was long-standing. Of 
the 42 goldsmith-bankers recorded in 1677, 33 were located in the City, with the rest in the 
‘West End’ and even at this early stage there was little contact between the two different 
groups.134 In terms of overall numbers, City banks remained the more important group of 
bankers throughout most of the eighteenth century, as will be seen below. Concentrated 
around Lombard Street, they are often characterised as being riskier undertakings than 
those of the West End.135 Orientated towards serving clients from the City’s commercial 
sector, their business was distinct from those bankers of the West End, who were more 
likely to focus on the gentry or the legal and military professions. The extent of the 
differences in these firms’ businesses in this period is however difficult to judge, as most 
early records of City banks, including those that survived, appear to have been lost.  
This geographic separation was very real. A partner in Forster, Lubbock & Co complained to 
a customer about his remitting bills on ‘Kinsington’, as porters would not go there at an 
acceptable cost to collect the money. Equally when discussing the financial pressures of 
1772, he made a clear distinction between City banks and those at ‘the other end of 
Town’.136 The distinct paths of these businesses were however not inevitable. Hoare’s for 
example is regarded as amongst the most important of the West End banks, however in the 
early stages of the bank the partners made a concerted, unsuccessful effort to enter the 
diamond trade. Richard Hoare set up a partnership with Mr Marcus Moses in Amsterdam 
and also dispatched two of his sons to that city to help fulfil his ambitions in this area. The 
endeavour tied up substantial parts of the firm’s capital between 1710 and 1720.137 
Following these unsuccessful attempts, Hoare’s moved away from more general financial 
activities, such as pawnbroking, dealing in diamonds and speculation in ships to become a 
bank focused on meeting the needs of the aristocracy and gentry, removing lines of 
business with a more mercantile nature.138 This shift in direction has been at least in part 
                                                             
133 The underlying lists still can have some influence, as often it is the only record of a firm’s 
emergence and sometimes disappearance. 
134 Mitchell (ed.), Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers, pp. 9-10. The different customer bases of 
these groups is also reflected in the metal-working business, where the West End goldsmiths tended 
to focus on finer wares, while City goldsmiths produced larger volumes of plainer work. 
135
 See for example Hutchings, Messrs Hoare’s Bankers, p. 18. 
136
 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, Messrs Lemon & Co to James Willyams, 4 August 1772 and 23 June 1772. 
137
 Hutchings, Messrs Hoare’s, pp. 21-3, 24-7. 
138 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, pp. 171-2. 
70 
 
attributed to the character (and change of) of the managing partner in the early 1720s.139 A 
more detailed examination of the two types of business will be made in the following 
chapters. The purpose here is to indicate the differing patterns of development in the two 
sub-sectors, which is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Growth of City and West End Banks, 1700-1800 (Source: Hilton Price, Handbook, passim) 
Unsurprisingly, the general pattern of total development indicated in earlier paragraphs 
remains intact, with initial decline and stagnation followed by rapid growth in the second 
half of the century. It should be noted though that the total number of banks in any year 
shown here is consistently higher than estimated in the existing literature. More 
interestingly, a stark difference between the City and West End banks does become 
apparent. In the West End bank numbers were pretty consistent, and only passed 20 in the 
late 1780s, in a second growth spurt that followed a noticeable pick up in the early 1770s. 
The major variable factor in the development of banking for most of the century was 
therefore the City banks, which across the century on average accounted for about 60% of 
all London banks in any given year. The first quarter of the century saw a marked decline in 
the number of City banks, with their numbers effectively halving by 1726. Some caution is 
required here, as it is possible that the names of City banks in this period have lost, as no 
formal lists of bankers exist between 1700 and 1725.140 Instead one is dependent on 
fleeting glimpses: from Hilton Price’s work it is possible to identify eight City banks that 
failed between 1720 and 1740, but for which no start date is known and therefore cannot 
be included in this dataset. 
In an average year in the eighteenth century, one could expect 2.3% of banks to be created 
and 1.7% to fail. This of course masks the volatility of the underlying numbers, which can 
be seen in Figure 4. The first half of the century saw switches between periods of growth 
and periods of decline. In contrast after 1750, there was a generally consistent stream of 
additions, especially in the 1770s.  
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 Temin and Voth ‘Banking as an emerging technology’, p. 156. 
140 Hilton Price, Handbook, pp. 184-5. 
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Figure 4: London bank entries and exits, 1700-1800 (Source: Hilton Price, Handbook, passim) 
The overall pattern of bank development within London corresponds with the trajectory of 
London’s broader economy over the century. Economic activity in London, as derived from 
construction levels, was fairly buoyant until the mid-1720s, but then largely stagnated until 
around 1760, with the 1740s seeing a particularly sharp contraction, a period when bank 
numbers also did not grow. Coal imports, beer production and foreign trade all indicate a 
similar trend, with sustained growth in beer production for example not re-appearing until 
the 1770s. This pattern was in direct contrast to developments in the provinces, where 
economic activity continued to expand through to the 1750s, and accelerated further 
thereafter. The reasons for this depression in London have not been fully explained, 
although population stagnation due to apparently high mortality rates is likely to have 
played a part.141 Once economic growth did return after the Seven Years War, it maintained 
its pace, with only a small setback during the wars of the 1790s.142 Again, the movements in 
bank numbers appear to match this broader economic trend.  
The general economic weakness of the 1720s was further compounded in banking by the 
impact of the South Sea Bubble. The Bubble was England’s first modern financial crisis and 
has been the subject of considerable interest and historical research, in the process 
achieving ‘mythical status’.143 The precise course of events is well known and it is not 
necessary to re-visit this matter here. What is relevant however is its impact upon 
                                                             
141 Schwarz, London during the age of industrialisation, pp. 79-84. Schwarz argues that something of 
the ‘great depression’ of the eighteenth century can be gleaned from national income statistics, and 
it is probable that this can be almost entirely attributed to London. Although some of the outports 
were impacted, London was worse affected and took longer to recover as indicated by some the 
performance of proxy industries.  
142
 Ibid., p. 85. The author is less clear on the timing of the divergence of provinces from London in 
terms of the trade. This may not have happened until after 1815, see ibid., p. 89. 
143
 Julian Hoppit, ‘The Myths of South Sea Bubble’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 12 
(2002), pp. 141-65. 
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England’s early bankers.144 No precise analysis of this topic exists, perhaps partly due to 
some of the difficulties surrounding data that have already been alluded to. Most of the 
existing literature does allude to the difficulty experienced by bankers at this time. Malcolm 
Balen for example noted: 
 
… banks with long lineages such as Atwill and Hammond, Long and Bland, and 
Nathaniel Bostock, were closing their doors. Hoare’s was busy offloading stock in 
great quantities, and bankruptcy proceedings were being taken against two 
bankers who had once been worth £300,000.145 
The Sword Blade Company, which had been closely associated with the South Sea 
Company, collapsed as did Mitford and Merten’s, with liabilities of £170,000.146 Carswell 
identified six banks that failed in the aftermath of the crisis.147 These were numbers that 
were thought to be unusually high.148 Exposure to the Bubble was twofold: some banks had 
direct exposure through investment in the actual stocks, although the significance of this 
was probably relatively limited, as Dickson suggests only £105,000 was subscribed by 
twelve banks in 1711.149 Of more consequence was the general squeeze in liquidity that 
accompanied the collapse of the Bubble.150 Although there had been a general financial 
squeeze in 1710, that in 1720 was more severe.151 Some bankers struggled to shield 
themselves from the activity of their customers: George Middleton stopped payment in 
December 1720, undone by his actions on behalf of John Law, who had unsuccessfully 
speculated in the shares of the East India Company.152 Martins bank survived the crisis, but 
had come under severe pressure.153 It was this squeeze in liquidity then that caused 
problems for the London bankers and likely accounted for the failure of the above firms. 
The Bubble also possibly undermined confidence in banking for a number of years. At 
Hoare’s banks customer deposits fell in the years following the Bubble, leading to a 
                                                             
144 For accounts of the Bubble, see Malcolm Balen, A Very English Deceit (London, 2003); Hoppit, 
‘Myths’; Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias (Cambridge, MA, 
2000) pp. 109-122; John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London, 1960); Gary Shea, ‘Financial 
market analysis can go mad’, EcHR 60:4 (2007) 742-65; Ron Harris ‘The Bubble Act: its passage and 
its effects on business organisation’, Journal of Economic History 54:3 (1994), pp. 610-627. 
145 Balen, English Deceit, p. 155. 
146 Hoppit, ‘Myths’, pp. 157-8. 
147 Carswell, South Sea Bubble, p. 197. These were Atwill and Hammond, Cox and Cleave, Long and 
Bland, Nathaniel Bostock, Mitford and Mertens, Daniel and Jospeh Norcott. 
148 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, p. 174. 
149 Dickson, Financial Revolution, p. 449. With astute timing it was also possible to profit from the 
Bubble, as did Hoare’s, who made £28,000; see Carswell, South Sea Bubble, p. 197. Healey, Coutts, p. 
49, shows that George Middleton had very limited investments in the stocks. 
150
 Neal, Financial Capitalism, pp. 106-10; Hoppit, ‘Myths’, pp. 157-8. 
151
 Hoppit, ‘Financial crises’, pp. 44, 48-9. 
152
 This transaction is covered in Larry Neal, ‘For God’s Sake, Remitt me’: the Adventures of George 
Middleton, John Law’s London Goldsmith banker, 1712-1729’, Business and Economic History 23.2 
(1994), see pp. 55-7 for Middleton’s failure. See also Healey, Coutts, pp. 49-52.  
153 Martin, The Grasshopper, p. 129. 
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reduction in profitability from the £40,000 achieved in 1720, to a figure in the region of 
£20,000 per annum.154 
The Bubble also had other impacts on the banks that survived. Temin and Voth have 
written about the South Sea Bubble in terms of a learning event for Hoare’s in developing 
this still nascent business.155 A key point from this argument is that after the Bubble, the 
bank was run on a much more liquid basis, with the cash/assets ratio moving from about 
20% pre-1720 to an average 34% over the period 1720-42.156 However Temin and Voth did 
not provide any evidence that the response by Hoare’s was common, or simply an isolated 
incident. Equally it should be noted that there were other influences that could drive this 
change, such as the bank’s partners changing as first Richard died in 1719, and then ‘Good 
Henry’ in 1725.157 The aforementioned George Middleton re-established himself after 
stopping payment and also focused more on liquidity, claiming that he ‘learn[ed] so much 
experience as always for the future to be in a condition to meet any storm’. Upon re-
opening his business, he aimed to meet most demands for cash at an hour’s notice.158  
While there is therefore an argument that the South Sea Bubble was a positive learning 
experience for some bankers, this remains a question that requires further examination.  
While the South Sea Bubble was clearly a major short-term shock, bank numbers did 
eventually recover. From the low point in 1726, the number of City banks grew on average 
by 1.7% per annum, compared to the 0.7% rate experienced by West End banks. The 
growth of City bank numbers was not evenly spread. Numbers recovered somewhat by 
1730, but then effectively remained stagnant until the mid 1750s, after which point there 
was consistent growth until the French Revolutionary wars. The subsequent growth in the 
number of banks was achieved despite the number of conflicts that England was involved 
in during that period, which throughout the century tended to slow bank formations. Joslin 
maintains that ‘in years of war, or during later years of war, when monetary conditions 
were difficult, the rate of increase was damped down, and new foundations merely 
balanced defections through bankruptcy’.159 
Over the course of the century bank numbers recovered and by 1800 London had clearly 
developed into the country’s banking centre. In 1797, the 79 London banks identified 
accounted for 17% of all banks in England and Wales.160 This probably understates the 
significance of the London banks as they tended to be larger than their provincial counter-
parts: their share of banking assets should therefore have been even greater. Precise 
numbers to prove this point are probably not possible, but it is generally accepted that the 
average provincial bank had a capital of £10,000, whereas most London banks by the last 
quarter of the century appear to have had a capital of £20-30,000. Assuming that the 
provincial banks were not on average more leveraged, and arguing that the average 
                                                             
154 Hutchings, Messrs Hoare’s, p. 37. The figure for 1720 was probably inflated through the 
extraordinary profits related to the Bubble. 
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 Temin and Voth, ‘Banking as an emerging technology’, pp. 152-4, 165. 
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 Ibid., p. 160. 
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160 See chapter 7 for provincial banking. 
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London bank was 2.5 times the size of its provincial counterpart in terms of assets, then 
London banks accounted for about 25% of the total banking assets of the country.  
IV 
While the individual aspects that made the City have been considered largely in isolation so 
far, it is important to bear in mind that in many cases the relationship was symbiotic and 
there were numerous interconnections between the various elements. The links between 
deposit banking and the issuers of government debt have already been touched upon and 
other important interconnections between the banks and other parts of the City will 
become clearer in subsequent chapters. For now, it will suffice to use an example from the 
1790s to illustrate how different functions were integrated and that there was a shared 
interest between parts of this group. The outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in 
1793 led to a significant degree of financial upheaval. One of the most disruptive events 
was the occupation of Amsterdam by French forces in early 1795. The commerce and 
financial activity between London and this city were still significant.161 The implications of 
the occupation therefore required a coordinated response. The actions of the British 
government in response to the occupation required enough guidance to lead to the 
formation of committee to represent the interest of the merchants and bankers trading 
with Holland upon the occupation of Amsterdam. Sir Francis Baring was the committee’s 
chairman.  At a ‘a very numerous meeting or Merchants, Bankers, Remitters & Others 
connected with Holland’ on Saturday 24 January 1795, it was resolved unanimously that 
the chairman should remonstrate with the Postmaster general for the return of 
correspondence sent on the 13th, 16th and 20th of January. He should also ‘request 
permission to pay such bills or other engagements they [the merchants and banker] may 
have contracted for their correspondents in Holland’. This was all a reflection of the fact 
that they believed that actions of the government had made it illegal for them to carry out 
these obligations.162 This demonstrates the close connection of trade and finance that had 
been achieved by this stage and the importance these issues created at a national level. 
The elevation of Sir Francis Baring to the head of the committee might serve to indicate his 
position as a genuine merchant banker and his ability therefore the meet the needs of both 
the banking and financial community.  
Serving with Francis Baring on this committee were members of the City’s cosmopolitan 
and international elite: Sir Joshua Vanneck, Sir Charles Pole, Mr Harman, Mr G Thornton 
and Mr Thellusson. The importance of Vanneck has already been discussed. The 
Thellussons were another substantial merchant banking family, this time of French 
Huguenot extraction. It is not clear from the document which Thellusson was being 
referred to, however Peter Thellusson died in 1797, so it could plausibly be him. He arrived 
in England in 1761, in which year he was also naturalised. His brother George had been 
based in Paris, creating the famous bank there with Jacques Necker. This contact, together 
with the help of Phillip Naville, a London based merchant from Geneva, allowed Thellusson 
to create a merchant banking firm in London. During the revolutionary wars, as chief 
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 Neal, Financial Capitalism, chapters 7 and 10. 
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correspondent for the Paris bank of Greffulhe and Montz, he received substantial funds 
from French émigrés.163 
Equally important in terms of the discussion of the wider significance of the City are some 
of the notes on amendments to be made to the bill that was proposed to solve this issue. 
One amendment suggests that ‘the correspondence between Holland, Spain and Portugal 
has passed through London for a long while’. This passing of correspondence through 
London houses suggests the control that London had on the flow of finance and goods 
between the Iberian Peninsula and the Low Countries.164 It also relates that the houses had 
many different clerks writing their letters, and that the volume of the remittance business 
in particular was so large that some houses had resorted to the use of stamps or printed 
letters for their communication on some topics, such as in relation to dividends.165 All of 
this is indicative of the growing relative and absolute importance of London as a financial 
centre in Europe, which this chapter has sought to emphasise. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, London and Amsterdam were the key European 
financial centres, with the balance of power between the two shifting in favour of London 
as the century progressed. This was partly possible because Amsterdam was struggling 
under pressures within its domestic economy. London clearly benefited from the creation 
of a large, liquid national debt, which allowed further specialisation, for example in debt 
issuance and broking. However despite its relative significance within the country declining, 
London’s emergence was also driven by the strength of its wider economy, particularly its 
commercial interest. It was this dual strength that meant that by the end of the eighteenth 
century the City of London had developed its own money market, encompassing ‘hundreds’ 
of merchants, bankers and brokers involved in financial transactions.166  
Clearly the development of the City was helped by its position as the key financier of the 
English state and the significant expansion of the government’s borrowing requirements 
over the course of the century.  It is difficult to overstate the centrality of the English 
capital markets within London. However focusing too closely on this part of London’s 
financial economy can lead to a neglect of other important aspects of its emergence, for 
London appears to have been undergoing a significant process of financialisation in this 
period. It can be argued that work such as that carried out by Neal and Carlos 
underestimates the significance of the bankers and merchants as financial actors in London 
in this period. While the rate of growth of London’s banking sector in this century was 
uneven, it was on a clear long-term uptrend, especially with regards to the City banks 
which appear to have been the more dynamic. It was also becoming more closely 
integrated into the wider financial world of London. Having considered this development in 
overview, the following chapters will consider aspects of London’s banks in greater detail.
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Chapter 3: Bankers, merchant bankers and finance in the eighteenth century City 
 
It was shown in the previous chapter that the dynamic part of the London banking sector 
was to be found in the City. This set of banks will therefore stand at the centre of the next 3 
chapters. Despite their known existence and the prominence of some of the individual 
firms, City banks have however generally not been well studied. Joslin’s famous article 
‘London Private Bankers’ devotes less than half of its content to city banks.1 A similarly brief 
overview of the subject can be found in James’ article on English banking, although he does 
succeed better at encapsulating their potential significance, for example noting that they 
accounted for the vast majority of London’s bankers.2 I.S. Black’s and Pressnell’s work both 
provide important information on the agency system that formed a key component of 
some City banks’ business. However their interest in this link was very much from the 
perspective of the provincial banks, and they therefore do not fully consider the 
significance of this type of business to the City banks.3 Finally some commercial historians, 
most notably J.M. Price, have shown an interest in the activities of the City banks in 
providing financial backing to merchants.4 The limited analysis that has been carried out on 
this group of bankers means that judgements on this group of banks are more tentative 
than those on other parts of the English banking system. In the first instance, it will seek to 
provide a better understanding of the eighteenth century developments in the number and 
composition of City banks. It will then proceed to examine their place within London’s 
wider financial community and how together they were able to contribute to the 
development and strengthening of London’s money market.  
In chapter 2, a discussion of the overall growth in the number of City banks over the course 
of the century was provided.5 In total, there were 104 identifiable City banks between 1700 
and 1800, or about 66% of all known banks in London over the century. This is a 
conservative number, as it is possible that others were not identified through the various 
lists, while in the earlier part of the century, some goldsmiths may have had banking 
businesses that are not captured in this analysis. It is nonetheless clear that City banks were 
normally more numerous than those of the West End, although there was some variation 
in their share of the total over time. On average about 60% of London banks were City 
banks, but from 1760 to 1794, this proportion was noticeably higher at 67%. Some of these 
banks had a continuous existence throughout the century, while others only appear to 
have survived for a handful of years. 
While Joslin provides very little depth of information on the actual internal structure of 
most of these City banks, he does provide some useful information on the background of 
                                                             
1 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, p. 179-85. 
2
 James, ‘English Banking and Payments before 1826’, pp. 130-35. 
3
 Pressnell, Country banking, Chapter4, especially pp. 75-84, 105-16. 
4
 Price, Capital and Credit, chapter 5. See also Hancock, Citizens of the World, pp. 250-52 on the 
financing of merchant businesses.  
5
 See chapter 2, pp. 68-70. The data used in this chapter is based on the same database derived from 
Hilton Price’s Handbook. 
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their partners.6 Based on this article and Hilton Price’s data, it is possible to identify three 
main groups within the City banks, according to their origins, age and function. The first 
group originated from the goldsmiths of the Restoration, much like the West End banks. 
However they evolved into banks more closely related to trade, rather than focusing on a 
gentry/aristocratic clientele. Examples of this type of bank include Martin’s, Barclays 
(originally Freame and Gould), Bland, Barnett & Hoare, Hankey’s  and Merle, Son, & Co, all 
of which can trace their origins to the seventeenth century.7 In terms of numbers, these 
goldsmith-derived City banks accounted for about 38% of the 104 City banks identified. 
Practically all of the City banks in existence before 1700 derived from goldsmith businesses 
(95% of the total). Thereafter the importance of this profession as a source of bankers 
clearly lessened (Figure 5). Furthermore, it can be argued that many of the banks within 
this group lost much of their goldsmith heritage over time, as they brought in external 
partners from other trades to complement their existing resources over the course of the 
century. For example, Fraeme and Gould, who had both been goldsmiths, brought in the 
merchant David Barclay as a partner in 1730s. Eventually the Barclay family came to 
dominate the bank.8 
 
Figure 5: City banks, 1700-1800 (Source: Hilton Price, Handbook, passim) 
The second group of City banks is again defined by age, but also importantly by the absence 
of a goldsmith connection. The decreasing significance of the goldsmith profession became 
particularly pronounced in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, as London 
witnessed what has been described as a miniature revolution in banking, coinciding with 
the first growth of provincial banks.9 The expansion of the number of banks was driven in 
part by secessions from existing businesses, as clerks or partners left established banks to 
                                                             
6 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, p. 179-81. The only bank that he provides any detail on is Martin’s 
bank – the partnership was Martin, Surman & Stone from 1732 to 1744 (see Hilton Price, Handbook, 
p. 111). The information he appears to be based upon Martin’s Grasshopper in Lombard Street. 
7
 For Bland, Barnett & Hoare, see Hilton Price, Handbook of London bankers, pp. 13-4 and Sayers, 
Lloyds Bank, pp. 14-7; for Barclays and Martins see below. 
8
 For the early development of Barclays, see below, pp. 103-8. 
9 Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 69-70, see also below chapter 7 for provincial banks.  
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set out in their own enterprises. Boldero, Carter & Co, a firm dating to 1738, split into two 
separate banks in 1770, with a Boldero present in both new banks (Boldero, Kendell & Co 
and Boldero, Carter, Barnston, Snaith & Co). Another important example included Vere, 
Glyn and Hallifax.10 Joseph Vere learnt the business as an apprentice at Martin’s bank, 
continuing there as a clerk before becoming a partner in his uncle’s firm, Glegg & Vere. 
Upon the two elder partners’ death, this firm became Vere & Asgill, which it remained until 
1753, when the partners separated, Vere going into partnership with Sir Richard Glyn and 
Thomas Hallifax.11 Vere’s association with this firm did not last long: Joseph Vere died in 
1766, bequeathing his fortune to his cousin Charles. He appears to have exited the business 
and in 1770 invested in a new bank led by Sir Charles Raymond.12 Unfortunately it is not 
clear precisely why these separations occurred.  Rarely did private banks make use of all six 
partners permitted to them, with most only having three or four. So secessions were 
unlikely to have been the result of the legal restrictions on a partnership size. Instead it is 
likely that for more junior partners there may have been a desire to gain a greater 
participation or control in a bank, where the established partners desired to avoid a 
reduction in their interest. Gaining access to an established banking house was clearly 
difficult without a family connection. Robert Ellison served as an apprentice with the 
banker Godhard Hagen in London, but was initially refused admittance as a partner. The 
need for greater capital eventually changed Hagen’s mind, so that Ellison gained a 25% 
share for £5,000 in 1763. This partnership was short-lived, as Ellison left in 1766, regarding 
Hagen’s business as excessively risky.13 Similarly it would appear that Ebenezer Blackwell’s 
attempts to move from head clerk to junior partner in Martin’s bank in 1746 was not 
straightforward, the existing partner Mr Surman appearing to be somewhat reluctant to 
agree to this promotion.14 This was then a small, fluid business community, as is illustrated 
by the genealogies in Figure 6. 
                                                             
10 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, pp. 180-1. More detail on the links between banks can be found 
in the individual entries within Hilton Price, Handbook of London Bankers, p. 17 for Boldero & Co. 
11 Anon., Williams Deacon’s 1771-1970, pp. 27-31. Thomas Hallifax was the son of a Barnsley grocer 
and had also previously been a senior clerk at Martin’s. Asgill went into partnership with John 
Wickenden, junior partner in the bank he was leaving, and John Nightingale, a clerk, in a bank which 
failed in 1796 according to Hilton Price.  Wickenden left that bank in 1775 to establish another new 
bank, Kensington & Co, which failed in 1812. 
12 Ibid., p. 31-2. This bank in due course became Williams Deacon’s bank. 
13 Edward Hughes, North Country Life in the Eighteenth Century, The North-East, 1700-1750 (Oxford, 
1952), p. 104-112. Ellison was the second son of a gentry family from the North East of England. He 
had been educated at Eton, and had to spend three months at an academy before his 
apprenticeship to learn book-keeping and other technical skills of the counting house, which were 
not taught at Eton. Hagen’s bank does not appear in Hilton Price’s Handbook. 
14
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Forster, Lubbock & Bosanquet (1785) Bowles, Beachcroft & Reeves (1770) 
[Brown joined by 1796]
Forster, 
Lubbock & Co 
(1800)
Bosanquet, 
Beachcroft & 
Reeves (1800)
Bowles, 
Brickwood, 
Ogden, & 
Wyndham 
(1801)
Brown, Cobb, 
and Stokes 
(1801)
Joseph Vere, clerk at Martins
Glegg & Vere Vere & Asgill (1739-1753)
Asgill, Wickenden & Nightingale 
(1754-1796)
Vere, Glyn & Hallifax (1754-70)
Glyn & Hallifax (1770 onwards)Raymond, Williams, Vere, Lowe, and Fletcher 
(1770 onwards)
Nightingale, clerk at Martins
Wickenden, Moffatt, Kensington & Boler (1775-1812)
 
Figure 6: ‘Genealogy’ of some of the early City Banks (Source: see text) 
However the expansion in the number of banks was not just driven by secessions from 
existing businesses. Where clerks or partners were leaving existing firms, they were often 
combining with merchants or manufactures from the wider London community.15  Many of 
the merchants who decided to join or form banks did so after 1770 and from the 
perspective of the banks, trader and merchant involvement was significant. The example of 
Sir Richard Glyn has already been noted. Other important merchant families that entered 
banks included Herries, Hanbury, Magens, Thornton and Sir George Amyand, who 
maintained a share in a merchant house trading with Hamburg.16 Henry Thornton joined 
Marlar, Lascelles, Pell & Down in 1784, having previously been apprenticed to a merchant 
relative, where he had gained experience in carrying out bills to be accepted and working in 
a counting house. He had also worked for his father, who speculated in commodities and 
contracted for loans in the American War of Independence. Similarly Mason, Currie & Co. 
combined the activities of two partners of a banking house that failed in the crisis of 1772 
with William Currie, who was a distiller.17 Other banks formed in this period had no 
partners with prior banking experience. Prescott, Grote & Co was formed in January 1766 
by George Prescott, Andreas Grote, William Culverden and John Hollingworth. Prescott, the 
son of a lead merchant from an old-established family from Cheshire, had served an 
apprenticeship in Leghorn. His second wife was the daughter of Jacob Elton, banker of 
Bristol. Grote was a merchant of Dutch extraction who came to England from Bremen in 
1731. Culverden was his brother-in-law.18 
                                                             
15
 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, p. 181. 
16
 For Amyand, see Gauci, Emporium, pp. 162-63. 
17
 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, pp. 181-83. 
18
 Anon, ‘Prescott’s Bank: the First 125 Years’, National Provincial Bank Review 75 (1966-68), p. 15. 
Little is known about the careers of Culverden or Hollingworth. 
80 
 
It was largely from this second group of City banks that the third important group of City 
banks emerged in the 1780s, namely those that developed into substantial agency houses 
for country banks. This group included banks consisting solely of partners from London, but 
many of these partnerships also contained partners of provincial banks that were looking 
to establish their own businesses in London. By the end of the century, some of this last 
group were setting up banks in London solely to improve their own access to the London 
money market: these became what Pressnell described as the ‘pig-on-pork’ banks of the 
1790s, which he viewed as being of a more dubious character.19 More charitably, one might 
argue that striving for better access to the money markets was actually a reasonable 
objective. In this instance one might suggest that they represented an early form of branch 
banking, designed to overcome one of the more obvious shortcomings of the unitary 
banking model. This third group is covered in greater detail later.20 
I 
This overview of the development of City banks in the eighteenth century emphasises the 
importance of the merchant community in their expansion. In contrast to the banks in the 
West End, where we have already seen that the original firms of goldsmith origin continued 
to feature prominently, City banking saw a substantial shift and became dominated by 
merchant interests. To examine the reason for this transition of the City banks, it is useful 
to consider the changing position of the merchant in London’s economic life. The 
prominence of the merchant in London is well known and merchant figures dominated 
much of the City’s life. Stanley Chapman emphasises the importance of the eighteenth 
century for the ‘emergence of merchants as an economic and social elite, the major role 
played by migrants from the Continent and the dominance of London in the commerce of 
Britain’.21 Furthermore the finance of London’s trade was becoming a more important 
feature within the London economy and some merchants acquired considerable financial 
expertise.22 Indeed the requirements of trade demanded knowledge of credit, and even 
prior to 1660 merchants had been lenders to both individuals and governments. However 
at this point merchants did not tend to specialise in finance, in contrast to the goldsmith 
bankers of the period. The eighteenth century has therefore been acknowledged as 
significant to the initial emergence of ‘an elite group of merchant-financiers, as well as the 
first merchant-bankers’.23 To this one might also add their role as nascent commercial 
bankers. 
The link between merchant and finance was in many ways a natural one. Merchants or 
wholesalers were primarily interested in their firms’ extension of credit and in the 
management of their balance sheets, which were dominated by accounts receivable and 
debts owed.24 From this perspective they resembled financial firms rather than 
manufacturers. Chapman is also convinced that merchants were becoming increasingly 
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involved in financial activities, citing the example of a number of West Country cloth 
industry merchants who were simultaneously operating as export merchants and 
bankers.25 By the 1770s, one of the key similarities between the merchant and the banker 
was that they were both significant mobilisers of capital. Both were among the most capital 
intensive businesses in Britain at the time, in terms of the capital required to enter the 
trade.26 
The path by which merchants gained their knowledge is not always readily apparent from 
the surviving records. One instance where it is possible is in the case of Anthony Gibbs & 
Sons. This firm’s development into a merchant bank is normally considered to have 
occurred in the nineteenth century. Yet Anthony Gibbs was operating as a merchant in the 
eighteenth century and from surviving correspondence in the Guildhall Library it is possible 
to gain an idea of how the skill set that would allow him to be successful as a merchant and 
later as a merchant banker was established. In so doing it is also possible to establish the 
wider importance of merchants to the banking world of London and abroad at the time. It 
is instructive about the transitions that were occurring within English finance during this 
period. 
The Gibbs family originated from the South West of England, featuring prominently in the 
cities of Exeter and Bristol. This family illustrates the strong links that existed between 
finance and merchanting. Anthony’s brother George became a partner in the Bristol 
merchant firm of Munckley, Gibbs & Richards in 1789. The connection to Munckley came 
through George and Anthony’s mother Anne Gibbs, who was Samuel Munckley’s aunt and 
George had initially been apprenticed to Samuel Munckley’s merchant business.  Munckley 
also had connections to Bristol’s banks, as he was a partner in the Harford Bank. In time 
George came to act as his brother Anthony’s banker and is said to have provided a 
counterbalance to Anthony’s sometimes rash temperament.27 The Gibbs family itself also 
had a broad range of merchant interests. Two half cousins became merchants in Italy, most 
notably Abraham Gibbs, who established the firm of Gibbs & Co in Palermo and Naples, 
which became ‘banker to the Court of Naples, agent for Lord Nelson in the management of 
his Sicilian estates, and Consul at Palermo for the United States of America’.28 Anthony 
himself was apprenticed to Mr Brook, a woollen exporter in Exeter, shipping to Spain and 
other Mediterannean countries. In 1778 he set himself up in that line of business, in 
partnership with Samuel Banfill. He was willing to work hard, which letters to his future 
wife Dorothea Hucks in 1783 regularly attest to: ‘I was obliged to be at the counting house 
the whole day & til one o’clock this morning, & I am afraid that this work must continue a 
full fortnight longer’.29 At this point it would appear that Banfill was in Spain, and Gibbs was 
running the business in England and he did not envisage that his situation would ease until 
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Banfill returned in nine months. However he also noted that ‘the business goes well’. The 
firm appears to have been largely financed by Gibbs’ father at this point, as he explained to 
Dorothea that: 
a great deal of money we have in the business is borrowed by my father and in 
case any accident should happen to him, would in all probability be called in. This 
would create a necessity of us lessening the business in such a degree as very 
considerably to diminish the profits, it is therefore certainly very much to be 
wished, before my expenses are increased [through marriage], that the capital in 
the business should be so far increased as to provide against any such misfortunes 
as I have mentioned.30 
This fear was unjustified at the time. However Anthony Gibbs was eventually bankrupted in 
1789, his failure attributed to overtrading.31 Anthony Gibbs’ bankruptcy led him to spend 
much of the 1790s abroad in the Iberian Peninsula, where he had initially traded when he 
set out as a merchant in Exeter. He acted as an agent for a number of British and European 
merchant firms. He moved to Madrid as an ‘Agent for British Manufacturers’ and also 
became a partner in the Malaga trading firm of Juan Pomar, Gibbs y Cia, which in 1797 
moved to Lisbon and in 1802 to Cadiz under the pressure of war. He is said to have been a 
man of talent and great integrity who could inspire loyalty and confidence amongst his 
Spanish and English connections, to the extent that many Spanish families supposedly 
deposited money and securities with him, effectively acting as a banker there.32 The 
correspondence highlights the nature of this merchant business, and the large number of 
financial transactions that a commission agent had to deal with.33 To carry out the business 
successfully required strong linguistic skills (letters are in English, Spanish and French) and 
an extensive network of contacts. The majority of the letters received by Gibbs appear to 
have come from Schmiedeberg (in Saxony, near Dresden), Cadiz, Seville and Bristol. Some 
of this correspondence provides simple instructions to Gibbs regarding goods to dispatch, 
as can be seen in the letters from Charles Harris in Bristol, requesting amongst other things 
oil and Alicante cork.34 While the French wars were not universally damaging to British 
commerce in the region, the Gibbs papers are indicative of the difficulties and risks of 
trading in this period of hostilities.35 
Much of Gibbs’ time was spent trying to arrange recovery of debts and payment for goods. 
It is these transactions that are of particular interest in the context of this study. In a letter 
in September 1796, Gibbs appears to be advising Diescher on the likelihood of recovering 
money due to him by selling a debt to Jacques Courant. He indicated that if Diescher 
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accepted payment in goods by one Jacques Courant, he might be likely to recover 60% of 
his initial debt; if he accepted payment in cash he would get as little as 50%.36 Other letters 
give an indication of the trading network in this trade: one letter shows that a Mr d’Altonas 
had remitted £450 to George Gibbs in Bristol, which Anthony Gibbs was supposed to put to 
the account of Diescher (who was based in Dresden).37   
Being able to form a reliable impression of the credibility of other houses was an essential 
skill for carrying out his role successfully. Gibbs’ work involved assessing the credit 
worthiness and general desirability of trading with certain houses in Spain and Portugal. In 
one letter, Diescher described the house of Messrs Guillot in Lisbon as essentially solid, but 
Diescher was not keen to work with them on the basis that they were a difficult firm to 
work with, being prone to quarrelling for no apparent reason. In addition their charges of 
2-3% were also regarded as expensive. On that basis there were better houses to conduct 
business with in Lisbon.38 In another example, Diescher decided to stop doing business with 
the house of Martin & Co in Cadiz, on the basis that they are were quarrelsome, late in 
payment and generally not solid. Instead they would start using the firm of Altonas in that 
city.39 The skills that Antony Gibbs acquired were undoubtedly important when he 
eventually came to be established as a merchant banker in London. He had developed a 
good understanding of local connections and their credit worthiness, and the finance of 
trade. He was entrusted by his partners with the collection of their debts and the 
administration of their finances, especially for the firms of Dolz & Co and Diesher.  
Despite an overlap between the skills of a banker and a merchant, some commercial 
historians have questioned the likelihood of movement between merchanting and banking. 
The financial business of merchants was distinct from that of a note-issuing banker in that 
merchants did not operate current accounts as such, but ‘carried accounts for merchants 
and others whose foreign business they financed, for shipping people whose insurance 
they placed at Lloyds and for foreign houses needing a London correspondent’.40 Gauci 
argues that it was rare for merchants to move into banking outright, with most maintaining 
a focus on their trading businesses. One of the few merchants he identified as having 
moved into banking was Sir George Amyand, who set up a banking partnership with Roger 
Staples and George Mercer in Cornhill in 1760.41 Amyand’s transition was a successful one, 
the bank becoming Dimsdale & Co, which merged with Prescott’s in 1891.42 The analysis 
provided above however suggests that Gauci probably underestimated the degree of 
merchant participation in banking, perhaps because his analysis was principally focused on 
the earlier part of the century. He is likely to be on firmer ground in arguing that 
merchants’ financial specialism hardened over the course of the century as they tended to 
focus on international or government finance, or acted as an agent for a country bank.  
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The analysis presented previously showing strong merchant involvement in commercial 
banking raises questions about this line of argument. Many merchants did move towards 
areas more traditionally associated with merchant banking, and it has rightly been a topic 
of interest to historians.43 However in doing so, they have arguably downplayed the 
connection that existed with commercial banking. This closer integration of the merchant 
and banking matters through merchant participation in banking partnerships speaks of a 
change in the banks’ function from the previous goldsmith era. The banks that had 
emerged in the seventeenth century appear to have facilitated two key activities. They 
acted as a place where merchants could reliably store their money and also provided notes 
that helped merchants conduct their businesses. A principal outlet for the accumulated 
deposits was through lending to the government. However these activities probably 
declined in relative importance over the eighteenth century. The stop of the exchequer 
displayed the risks of using their deposits to lend extensively to the government, while 
their note issues were ultimately supplanted by those of the Bank of England. Instead these 
banks became more aligned with the commercial activities of the City of which they formed 
a part.  
II 
Alongside the eighteenth century increase in the overall number and a change in the 
character of the City banks, the City was also seeing a gradual deepening of the 
interconnection both between the individual banks and with other parts of its financial 
system. Much of the history written about banking in its early stages in London emphasises 
the diversity of the institutions and the segregation of different types of banks, especially 
‘West End’ and ‘City’ banks. While this is to a certain extent unavoidable, it is important 
that it should not obscure the equally important accompanying developments in the 
clearing system and the discount market that ultimately meant that banks were 
increasingly integrated by the third quarter of the eighteenth century. This is not to argue 
against distinct functions and specialisations, but to look at how banks interacted with each 
other. Nor should it highlight just the interconnections amongst banks, as the links with 
other parts of the financial system also increased. The growth of the banking system for 
example allowed merchants to become more ambitious. There was a growing inter-
dependence with ‘normal’ banks, which could provide merchants with capital, and a 
discounting facility (in return for a fee/interest).44 It is to this deeper integration of banks 
and financial markets within London that this chapter now turns. 
The most obvious way to search for inter-connections between banks is through direct 
lending between financial institutions. Some of the institutional histories hint that 
temporary assistance in the form of such direct lending did take place. For example it is 
known that Smith, Payne & Co lent money to both Currie & Co and Sir Charles Price & Co, 
at a time when both were potentially vulnerable.45 Evidence of such direct lending between 
banks is fleeting and it is difficult to form any indication of the extent to which such lending 
took place, however the examples are sufficiently frequent to suggest it was not an 
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uncommon practice. More long-standing bi-lateral relationships were established between 
some City banks and West End firms. In some ways this relationship was akin to the 
arrangement that existed between country bankers and City bankers. That West End banks 
had mismatches in their asset and liabilities and thus had occasional surplus funds, or 
needed access to short-term lending, is not surprising. City banks appear to have eventually 
provided a means of addressing these mismatches. A large number of payments between 
the banks of Cocks, Biddulph & Co in the West End and Martin’s bank in the City around 
1760 have led to the suggestion that some sort of connection was in place between these 
two banks.46 A more concrete example of such a relationship can be found when 
Drummond’s in the 1770s established what would prove to be a longstanding relationship 
with Smith, Payne & Smith. The move implies that Drummond’s could not internally 
employ the resources at their disposal in a remunerative fashion.47 From the Drummond’s 
ledgers, Smiths’ Bank first appears as a separate account in April 1773, and by the end of 
the month the bank appears to have deposited over £7,600 with the Smiths’. Year end 
balances indicate that Drummond’s had about £5,000 on deposit with Smiths’ at this stage 
in 1773, 1775 and 1785. By 1795, this balance had increased substantially, with the opening 
balance showing Drummond’s to have had £26,043 on deposit with Smiths’, which did fall 
to £11,356 by the end of that year. In 1797, the opening balance was over £15,000, which 
fell by about £3,000 across the course of the year. The turnover through this account was 
relatively large: from April to December 1773, total deposits from Smiths’ amounted to 
over £39,000, which rose to £73,050 in 1775. In 1785 this value was once again in the 
region of £50,000, with the value of transactions at a similar level in 1795, then falling to 
£37,000 by 1797. Smiths’ deposits with Drummond’s are dominated by large, irregular 
payments, whereas the flows the other way are much more numerous, but for a smaller 
value.48 The bank of Smith, Payne & Smith at times also borrowed from Child’s bank, an 
example being a £50,000 loan in 1792 for 6 months at 4.5% interest on security of £60,000 
worth of 3% Consols. While this transaction was not unique, it does seem that the 
relationship was not as strong as that which Smiths’ had established with Drummond’s.49 
Aside from such bi-lateral relationships between private bankers, it might be thought that 
the position of the Bank of England could have been an opportunity for facilitating inter-
bank relationships and transactions. From the existing literature it appears however that 
private banks had limited connections to the Bank of England in this period. Although it was 
possible for private banks to open drawing accounts with the Bank from its inception, 
Clapham’s analysis of the Bank of England shows that this was a facility that was initially 
rarely utilised. Indeed he demonstrates that, even by 1774, the number of private bankers 
with direct access to the Bank was but a small minority of the total and that these were 
generally City firms.50 Clapham argues that  
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by 1785 a radical change in its [the Bank of England] position had occurred: it was 
easily the largest single discounter in the City, whereas some forty years earlier its 
bill portfolio may easily have been smaller than those of its private competitors.51 
Price’s analysis of the Bank’s discounting activity suggests a similar transformation occurred 
after 1756, with discounts increasing sixfold between 1748 and 1756. By 1782 it was 
discounting 10,000 or so bills per month. He tentatively attributes this to ‘some 
liberalization in discount criteria and a corresponding greater eagerness among London and 
provincial and perhaps foreign business men to take advantage of London discount 
facilities both at the Bank of England and among private bankers’.52  
The greater involvement of the Bank of England as a the discounter in general also appears 
to have led to greater integration between private bankers and the Bank over the last two 
decades of the century. While only a small minority of bankers maintained accounts at the 
Bank of England in 1774, by 1794 about half of London’s bankers appear to have been 
account holders at the Bank. Of the names suggested by Clapham, it would appear that the 
more commercially minded banks utilised this service, including Barclays, Thornton’s, 
Goslings, Smith Payne & Smith’s and Herries. By contrast absentees included Coutts’, 
Child’s and Hoare’s.53 Glyn’s opened its account with the Bank in 1799, with a deposit of 
£30,000.54 However while London bankers do appear to have made greater use of the 
Bank, it is important to remember that they were only a small subset of the Bank’s overall 
operations. Thus of £6.6 million of discounted bills in January 1800, only £396,000 was 
attributable to bankers (i.e. about 6% of the total). Direct discounting on behalf of 
merchants therefore clearly provided the bulk of the Bank’s business in this regard.55 
Indeed the core of the Bank’s discount activity was built around merchants, especially 
those in areas such as the linen trade, where bills were commonly granted on long-term 
credit.56 Furthermore the business of the Bank as a discounter, while substantially 
enlarged, represented but ‘the tip of an iceberg’ as many bills were discounted elsewhere, 
or simply held to maturity. Perhaps the most significant implication of the Bank’s growth as 
a discounter was that it shows that the second half of the century saw firms become 
increasingly comfortable and familiar with the discount market. Meanwhile bankers were 
also finding ‘it increasingly attractive and not inadmissibly risky to satisfy this growing 
demand, domestic and foreign, for discounts’.57  
As well as increasingly utilising the Bank of England, the City banks also developed a system 
for better settling payments between one another, which was reflected by the formal 
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establishment of the London Clearing House in 1773. This venture is thought to have 
developed out of the actions of the banks’ walk clerks, which may have dated back to the 
1750s. At first it was a labour saving device, the clerks exchanging drafts and bills on their 
respective banks and then noting the balance outstanding. The banker would need to 
decide if he was willing to accept the paper being handed over. The clerks then met at a 
public house called the Five Bells at lunch to settle the balances that were agreed upon. 
The actual rental of a room evolved because bank owners became apprehensive of the 
number of notes being exchanged.58 It is important to note the Clearing House’s organic 
development: it was ‘a remarkable instance of evolution; it was not suddenly created, but it 
was the outcome of a gradual growth brought about as a necessity to meet the 
requirements of the times’. As a means of settling payments more effectively it was 
extremely important: one author described it as the hub of City finance. This was especially 
true once it added the function for clearing country cheques. It was also advantageous to 
customers, who could expect their balances to be adjusted more quickly.59 The House was 
exclusively used by City banks (31 in 1777).60 In time commercial advantage could be 
gained from membership of the Clearing House: it offered obvious ease of payment, but 
‘also the preference of their paper in the bill market’.61 The noticeable absentee from the 
Clearing House was the Bank of England, which did not join until 1864. This led Price to 
claim that the ‘the use of cheques to transfer credits between it [the Bank of England] and 
the private banks must have long been limited’.62 The outstanding balances between the 
private banks were settled through the use of Bank notes or bills, rather than through 
notional balance transfers within the Bank of England. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the clearing house. One early nineteenth 
century commentator argued that City bankers and their ‘ingenious contrivance of the 
Clearing House’ were essential parts of the system and that without them the circulation 
would ‘hardly remain in existence, or would at any rate be reduced to insignificant limits’.63 
The power of the City banks came through their agency on behalf of the country banker, a 
business which one contemporary estimated was exceeded £1.5 billion per annum, with 
Heywood suggesting it was more likely in the region of £2 billion.64 The advantage of the 
clearing house was that it reduced the need for the use of currency in settling transaction, 
which obviously was a more convenient method of payment. This in turn allows a greater 
value of transactions to be made, as less currency is required. 
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III 
One of the reasons why the circulation in bills through the Clearing House was so successful 
was the practice of accepting bills, which increased the likelihood of the holder of the bill 
eventually receiving payment. Acceptance has two potential meanings. Firstly, any bill of 
exchange needed to be accepted to be valid for use. In this instance acceptance refers to 
‘the writing across the face of a bill by which the drawee agrees to the order of the drawer. 
The drawee is the person to whom a bill is addressed, and who is required to pay’ the sum 
contained in the bill. It therefore represented the drawee’s agreement to pay the bill.65 
Over time, some merchants developed this practice into a stand-alone business, where 
they used their specialist knowledge to guarantee other merchants bills of exchange, 
essentially beginning the process which would create the nineteenth century acceptance 
houses. In merchant banking terms, the act of adding a firm’s name to the a bill ‘gave it 
credibility and ensured that if it came to be sold or discounted before it fell due, it would 
be done at the most favourable rates’.66 One historian has argued that the development of 
the acceptance business in London was a core component of the City’s rise as a financial 
centre.67 This business was carried out not only by bankers but also by merchants. Indeed, 
this activity as guarantors was one with which many merchants were more comfortable 
relative to ‘pure banking’.68 The gradual rise of the acceptance led to the creation in time of 
accepting houses, which Chapman describes as ‘wealthy merchants who were graduating 
to pure finance and providing credits for manufacturers to send their goods to agents 
abroad’.69  
Not all historians have been comfortable in applying such “merchant banking” terminology 
to this period, viewing the term as anachronistic.70 Those that accept this view believe that 
all merchants and commodity traders were to some extent engaged in financial services. 
They argue that although the acceptance business might increase as a proportion of total 
business within the larger firms, there is no real basis to judge when this happened, or by 
how much.71 Essentially there was insufficient specialisation at this stage to justify the 
term. However this line of argument does ignore the fact that in any period, merchant 
banking is not a clearly defined profession, with one author claiming that it was ‘an ill-
defined profession that included neither trading nor banking’.72 While it is important to 
note that full specialisation was only achieved at a relatively late stage in the nineteenth 
century, the financial activities undertaken by these firms nonetheless existed at an earlier 
point. As Price suggests, although the terminology of merchant banking was not in use, the 
‘larger merchants in London and a few other ports performed many of the functions later 
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associated with those terms [merchant banker and acceptance house], including remitting 
government funds abroad and performing other services for the state; handling 
subscriptions to the national debt; and routinely accepting bills of exchange relating to 
transactions in which they were not otherwise involved’.73 Other works on merchant 
bankers have seen the core competencies of the profession as providing credit to traders, 
or acting as business banks with strong international ties, operating in money or foreign 
exchange markets and doing the financial work of governments and other public bodies.74 
Again, it is clear that such functions were being carried out by eighteenth century 
intermediaries and that the changing emphasis away from trade to the provisions of credit 
makes it indeed appropriate to talk of merchant banking in this period. 
However, while the eighteenth century undeniably saw a greater specialisation in financial 
activity by some of London’s leading merchants, the firms were still hybrids in that most 
still maintained a link to the merchanting business. There were good business reasons to 
maintain this interest in commerce. This can be illustrated through reference to 
Amsterdam, for the delay in the adoption of the title of merchant banker was not unique to 
England. A desire to maintain close connections to the physical trade in goods has also 
been identified amongst the early financiers of Amsterdam, a mode of operation which 
lasted throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In this instance the lack 
of specialisation is therefore attributed to a justifiable commercial decision on the basis 
that the knowledge gained through trade was essential to conducting a successful financial 
business.75 Another reason cited for the reluctance fully to retreat from the merchanting 
business was the fact that specialised financial dealings still delivered uncertain profits in 
comparison to overseas trade, which was the main occupation for the merchant.76 Finally 
there were also perhaps cultural impediments to full specialisation, relating to the 
respective social status of merchant and banker, or at least formal acknowledgment of this 
shift: Henry Thornton’s mother thought in 1802 that to move from merchant to banker was 
‘to descend in life’.77 
A number of reasons have been suggested for the emergence of the acceptance business. 
Wilhelm and Morrison, drawing on both Dutch and English experience, argue that this 
development addressed informational asymmetries that could no longer be solved in the 
context of the family. In particular the authors describe an emergence of a ‘technological 
requirement for trust’. The informational asymmetries became particularly noticeable in 
the eighteenth century Atlantic trade, and it was in this area that these authors saw the 
initial development of merchant banking practice.78 The growth and changing structure of 
the American trade was certainly important: of the leading accepting houses of the early 
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nineteenth century, five originated from transatlantic merchant houses, compared to three 
from European ones.79  
Acceptance as carried out by banks was distinct from that of the merchant. The key to 
understanding this distinction is that banks focused predominantly on bills relating to 
inland trade and tended not to get involved in the business of dealing in foreign bills.80 This 
was a question of knowledge: they did not have enough knowledge to be able to take on 
the risk. The merchant who had been trading in foreign goods on the other hand did 
possess the knowledge that could be applied to endorsing the bills of lesser known foreign 
merchants in London.81 Furthermore, there were structural changes in the nature of English 
trade that encouraged merchants to engage in such acceptance business. Chapman has 
argued that although provincial manufacturers were beginning to operate on a scale that 
allowed them to dispense with the services of a London export merchant, they still needed 
access to capital. Thus Liverpool remained financially dependent on London, and export 
merchants in the metropolis began to specialise in a banking function.82 The motivation for 
merchants to devote a more significant share of their capital towards financial activities is 
hard to establish, however some reasons can be suggested. In terms of overall numbers, it 
has been suggested that the growing volume of trade was being concentrated in an 
increasingly narrow number of peoples’ hands up to 1775, at which point the numbers 
begun to increase again.83 Thus in 1700 there were about 1,000 merchants in London, and 
by 1760 this had grown to 1,300 (a 30% increase). In comparison, overseas trade had 
increased from £8.8 million to £19.1 million (a 117% increase).84 This must have played 
some role in financial specialisation, as it meant that firms had greater demand for and 
more leeway to provide credit.  
Of all the merchants that shifted to financial activities in the eighteenth century, the most 
well known example is Francis Baring, and the Barings archives provides one of the few 
opportunities to study this transition. The focus of most historical works on the Barings 
banking business has been its operation in the nineteenth century, perhaps because the 
business retained the character of ‘general merchants until well into the nineteenth 
century’.85 The basic outlines of the Barings’ early history are well known, but as Orbell has 
indicated, there are still some useful avenues to be explored in the earliest surviving 
material.86 Upon visiting the archives it becomes clear that the records of the firm provide a 
significant insight into their business activity in the eighteenth century. Three key points 
emerge from this study. Firstly, the firm had already developed a considerable financial 
business. As well as conducting a genuine merchant business, Francis Baring became 
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involved in two areas of banking: the issuance of government debt, both for the British and 
American government, and the acceptance of bills of exchange for their trading partners. 
Less appreciated are the strong links that the firm maintained with other members of the 
financial community and also perhaps the social standing of Francis Baring, and hence the 
firm, even at this early stage.  
The firm of Baring Brothers originated in Exeter, where John Baring the elder had moved to 
from Bremen in 1717 and established himself as a merchant and manufacturer by 1723. He 
was followed in the business by his sons John, Charles and Francis. Francis was sent to 
London as a child and in 1755 was apprenticed to the merchant Samuel Touchet. He 
therefore was less connected to the woollen business. In 1763, the family firm was re-
organised, with Charles heading the Exeter house and Francis controlling the new London 
house, both houses acting as a common concern. The purpose of the new London business 
was to improve financing through easier discount of bills and to gain new markets for the 
firm. Orbell describes the London house as a traditional agency house, where bills accepted 
by the Exter house were made payable, negotiated and collected. In time, this could open 
up further avenues in finance.87 However the early ambitions were undermined through 
Charles Baring’s speculations and excessive drawings on the London house, which had 
started with a relatively small capital of £4,200. As such the largest account by far of the 
London business was its agency on behalf of the Exeter business. This partnership was 
dissolved on 1 January 1777, largely due to Francis’ dissatisfaction with his brother’s 
business acumen and conduct, which often left the London house’s capital constrained.88 
In spite of the help and guidance of both Samuel Touchet and the merchant and family 
friend Nathaniel Paice, over the first ten years of carrying out business in London, growth 
had been slow and profitability limited, with no profit in six out of 14 years. This was partly 
due to the difficulties resulting from the Exeter house’s action, but also represented 
Francis’ investment in learning the trade.89 Over the last quarter of the century however 
the London house flourished. By contemporary standards, Baring’s business became vast. 
By the end of the period, the firm was growing rapidly. In 1790, total assets were about 
£385,000, by 1795 £765,000 and in 1797 £1.66 million.90 Part of the increase in size 
between 1795 and 1797 was linked to the addition of Hope’s capital to that of Barings.91 In 
terms of total asset size, only the largest banks, such as the Smith, Payne & Smith or 
Hoare’s, reached a similar scale. 
The business was multi-faceted, but the priority here is to focus on the acceptance 
business. Francis Baring’s acceptance business commenced in 1768. Both Ziegler and Orbell 
make reference to the increasing importance of the acceptance business, although Orbell 
does qualify this by seeing it as the third line of business for the firm.92 The acceptance 
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business grew substantially, as the firm’s balance sheets demonstrate. In 1777 total 
liabilities for acceptances amounted to £42,000, a figure that had grown threefold to 
£121,000 by 1793.93 Commission income (which included acceptances, but also other 
commission) went from £4,000 to £10,000 p.a. over the same period (Figure 7).94 The 
French wars provided a further boost to this side of the firm’s business and by 1797 
liabilities from this source had reached £454,800.95 In 1781-1784, acceptances formed 
about 17% of the total liabilities of the firm. By the mid 1790s, this had risen to about a 
third of the firm’s business.96 
 
Figure 7: Barings’ Acceptance and other commission income, 1763-1803 (Source: Ziegler, The Sixth Great 
Power, p. 373-4) 
Much of this acceptance business appears to have been related to financing trade between 
Liverpool and the United States, although Hidy is unclear about exactly how much of the 
firm’s resources were devoted to this business.97 Baring’s growing acceptance business is 
significant. It is of course possible that this was an isolated or extreme case, however it 
seems more likely that other merchants were engaged in a similar manner, even if on a 
lesser scale. The timing of the growth is also of interest, as it coincides with the general 
timing seen in many other emergent financial practices, attesting to the wider importance 
of this period in general. 
The records also suggest that Baring carried out more basic banking tasks for commercial 
clients, although establishing the extent of their involvement in this area is difficult. 
Surviving correspondence can provide some indications, usually in instances where 
difficulties arose, making it difficult to assess how generally applicable these points are. 
One document shows the existence of an outstanding debt of £3,950 to the house, part of 
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which was held through two promissory notes for £238 and £112. It also highlights some of 
the prospective income to pay this down, including dividends receivable of £1,250 and a bill 
for £250, which would total £3,579, presumably indicating that the firm expected to take a 
loss £371 on this business.98 More substantial were problems relating to the firm of Richard 
and John Codman in Paris. From a letter from February 1797, it is clear that Codman was 
experiencing some difficulty in paying money due to Barings, which Codman estimated at 
£24,000.99 In April John Baring informed John Codman that not only had a promised 
remittance of almost £5,700 not materialised, but that the firm was also underestimating 
its debts to Barings, which were actually in the region of £46,400. Furthermore this delay in 
payment was also causing some embarrassment for Barings with other customers.100 
Subsequent correspondence is indicative of the scale of the problem facing Codman: in a 
letter to Labouchere he claimed to ‘feel hurt that so great delays have happened in the 
reimbursement of what Messrs Barings have so handsomely advanced my house’. Some of 
Codman’s difficulties can genuinely be attributed to the challenges of selling and remitting 
cargoes (in this instance coffee) during a period of hostilities.101 This debt remained an 
issue for some period, for a letter in April 1801 from John Codman to Messrs. Baring 
indicate that ‘any new advances will be perfectly unavailing & that it is necessary that I 
should decidedly say that I cannot authorise them, in order that in future I may be relieved 
from that suspense which I have too long experienced. Besides I have every reason to think 
it is the only way to terminate my Brother’s affairs in France’.102 The final outcome of this 
situation is not clear, but it is indicative of the sizeable advances Barings was making to 
commercial firms during this period and the difficulties that could arise, especially in 
periods of conflict. It may indicate that the firm was acting as international commercial 
bankers. 
The firm was undoubtedly financially astute. Extensive dealings in foreign commerce meant 
that the firm thought carefully about how it handled its foreign currency transactions in 
order that they were structured to achieve the greatest advantage to the firm. Thus notes 
were made on the advantages of converting 10,000 livres directly in Paris, where one 
would receive £412 for them, compared to Hamburg where £415 was achievable at sight, 
rather than two and a half months notice.103 The records of the firm in this period show 
ways in which the partners could spot operations of a financial nature to deliver profits that 
had become completely detached from trade. For instance a document dating to 
approximately 1795 demonstrates how the partners looked at making money from 
investments in India Bonds. They estimated that they could buy £1,000 of Indian bonds for 
about £1,390, and use this as security to borrow £1,120 in Holland. This means that the 
bank would have to invest £270 of its own money, but through differences in interest 
payable on money in Amsterdam and the interest paid out on the bonds, after commissions 
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there would be a profit of £37 16s, delivering a return of 14% on the original £270.104 It is 
not clear whether this scheme was ever enacted, but it shows clearly that the firm had 
moved well beyond simple merchanting actively to seek to profit from pure financial 
transactions. 
While Francis Baring represents the foremost example of the merchant increasingly 
focusing on financial activities, he was by no means unique in so doing. Another example of 
this development can be found in the case of Cazenove. Of Swiss extraction, Theophile 
Cazenove settled in London in the mid-eighteenth century with his son Jean Henri, a 
merchant who was naturalised in 1762. He operated as a merchant dealing with the French 
and English East India Company, building a large connection to Lisbon, as well as drawing 
on connections in France and Amsterdam. He became involved in finance at an early stage, 
dealing in government stock and later securing business on behalf of the US government, 
distributing dividend payments to English holders of US securities. Cope argues that the 
family managed to establish a sound merchant banking business on the back of the family’s 
extensive connections, but did not have the dynamism or the capital to put themselves in 
the same league as the Barings or the Thellussons.105 
IV 
This chapter has principally focused on understanding the significant growth and changing 
nature of City banking during the eighteenth century. For, although goldsmith-bankers 
pioneered the business of City banking, by the mid-eighteenth century the significance of 
the goldsmiths had clearly dwindled. Instead new capital and expertise was brought to the 
City banks by the commercial community of the City. While perhaps a natural 
development, given overlapping skill-sets across the two trades, the extent of merchant 
involvement in London’s banks is not fully appreciated. In explaining the trend of increased 
merchant participation in banking, it is also important to acknowledge that the experience 
was not confined to City banks, for London merchants increasingly were specialising in 
other types of financial activity as well. Indeed commercial historians have long 
acknowledged the importance of the merchant community in their capacity as state 
financiers. Merchants were also notably developing embryonic merchant banking houses in 
the later eighteenth century. Merchants were consequently responsible for broadening and 
refining London’s financial infrastructure. Equally importantly, while greater specialisation 
was occurring, intermediaries across and within groups were at the same time becoming 
increasingly interconnected through London’s money market. City banks played a 
particularly important role in this area, as they sat at the hub of early interbank activity, 
especially through the development of the clearing house and their role as agents for 
country banks. 
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Chapter 4: City banking in practice 
 
The previous chapter has highlighted the changing character of City banks in the eighteenth 
century, as they became more aligned with the commercial character of the City, and 
attempted to show their place within the City’s wider financial sector. However it is also 
important to understand their development as banks. Two broad areas are covered: the 
first half of the chapter covers the internal workings of the bank, with a discussion of the 
types of customer and how these banks were managed, with a particular focus on Barclays 
bank. The second half of the chapter then explores the functioning of the London agency 
business that was important to a number of City banks and the English banking system as a 
whole.  
Although the City in this period still had clear retail and residential functions, its significance 
in these areas was declining. The relative weight of the City’s population within London 
shrank as newer suburbs were built, while the absolute population was also in decline.1 
Thus in contrast to West End banks, personal banking was relatively unimportant, and City 
banks were much more closely aligned to the needs of business. Given that many City 
bankers had strong mercantile links, it is perhaps not surprising that the clientele of City 
banks is generally understood to have consisted of London traders and merchants.  As an 
example, the bank of Mason, Currie, James and Yallowely, founded in 1773, had about one 
hundred customers by June 1774, mostly City traders and manufacturers (especially 
merchants, wool and linen drapers), with total deposits of just over £87,000.  The bulk of 
the bank’s assets initially were in discounts, but by the 1780s it had expanded into 
providing loans for the brewing and distilling trades and developed an agency business for 
a few country banks. There was a clear connection between the previous activities of the 
partners and the customers of a bank. However there were obvious difficulties in making 
the transition to becoming a banker. William Currie believed that his bank was not 
particularly profitable.2 It is also known that this bank experienced some difficulties in its 
early years: it had to borrow from Smith, Payne & Smiths, and these loans were grouped 
amongst the category of that bank’s bad loans in 1782.3 
A further example of the links between commerce and banking can be seen in the case of 
Vere, Glyn and Hallifax, established in January 1754. Glyn was a drysalter and as the only 
non-banker of the partnership might have been expected to play a secondary role. 
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However Fulford argues that ‘his [Glyn’s] position in the City, his business experience and 
his private fortune suggest he must, in reality, have been pre-eminent in the partnership’ 
and that he was responsible for securing many of the initial customers of the bank. This 
bank was again heavily focused on discounting and lent to some industrialists, but also 
developed an extensive agency business for both Scottish and English provincial banks.4 
Given the clear connection between City bankers and merchants, it is of note that relatively 
little has been said of their significance in the literature on merchants. The most recent 
attempt to address merchants’ use of London bankers is to be found in Hancock’s Citizens 
of the World. He contests Joslin’s view that bankers were significant in their provision of 
credit or loans to merchants in this period, but believes they instead acted as safe 
depositories.5 Some caution is needed in accepting this conclusion for two reasons. The 
first is the limited number of merchants studied by Hancock: his sample was limited to 23 
transatlantic merchants.6 Furthermore he also only searched for these merchants’ accounts 
accounts at a narrow number of banks, namely the Bank of England, Barclays, Child’s, 
Coutts’, Drummond’s, Goslings and Hoare’s, alongside some of the Scottish banks. This 
means that he only covered two banks (Barclays and Goslings) with extensive City 
connections, of which Goslings’ interest was with East Indiamen rather than Atlantic 
traders.7 It is not inconceivable that the merchants had accounts with other City bankers.  
Equally Hancock was only really interested in bank lending: he did not really consider their 
role in making payments or discounting for example. Furthermore, even within this 
relatively narrow sample, there was evidence of bank lending to merchants. Sir John Boyd 
is known to have suffered from the failure of the City bankers Colebrooke, Lesingham & 
Binns in 1773, where he had £18,000 on deposit, and Oswald is known to have received 
loans from Barclays on four occasions for at least £1,000.8 Finally substantial merchants 
could supplement access to a private banker with direct access to the Bank of England, as 
in the example of John Sargeant II, who had balances there and whose private banker could 
not be identified.9 The evidence is therefore at best ambiguous and does not really justify 
Hancock’s negative conclusion on the links between merchants and bankers. 
Indeed Hancock’s view is also at odds with that of Price, who studied the role of bankers 
specifically in relation to the Chesapeake trade. Price’s conclusion emphasised the close 
connection of these merchant businesses with the nascent banks, indicative of an 
awareness of the merchants’ need for banking facilities. While the overall level of credit 
that banks made available was not enormous, they were nonetheless useful, especially as 
providers of liquidity.10 Although discounting of bills was the preferred activity of these 
banks, examples of direct lending can also easily be found. The sums involved were not 
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enormous, which he believes was sensible risk management on the part of the banks, given 
that ‘they [merchants] were not the best of risks’.11 
The relationship between banks and the brewing industry in London is one of the few 
instances where significant research into the finance of a London-based industry has been 
carried out. Mathias’ study focused in particular on the finance of the Whitbread, Anchor 
(Barclays Perkins) and Truman breweries in the last two decades of the eighteenth century. 
The study shows the extent to which banks could finance domestic industry. In the case of 
the Barclays Perkins operation, the link was given in the name. Both Barclays and Gurneys 
lent money towards the initial purchase of the Anchor brewery in 1781. This was a 
relatively safe investment that would pay a 5% per annum return. Although the connection 
to these banks declined over time, they were ‘perhaps vital on occasion’ in the earlier 
years.12  The extent of the connection with Gurney & Bland (via Barclays, Bevan & Co) in the 
the 1780s can be seen in that bank being used for the payment of suppliers of hops and in 
the provision of a £20,000 loan for expansion, repayable over four to six years in 1785. 
Other money was lent for shorter terms on notes, normally for four to six months, but 
usually renewable. This financing was provided by a variety of banks in London, including 
Barclays and Taylor & Lloyds, but also in the provinces, especially in Norwich.13 A £20,000 
loan was truly remarkable at a time when a large bank might only have assets of £300,000, 
in which case the advance would represent 6% of all assets. These loans were not liquid, 
although the strong underlying cash flows of breweries would have been attractive to the 
lender and provided some compensation. Nor was such lending atypical. The Trumans 
brewery similarly had familial links to banking families from the 1790s, when Sampson 
Hanbury entered the business. Taylor, Lloyds & Co. provided short-term financing to this 
business, the outstanding balance usually being £2-£12,000. From 1801 the Gurneys would 
provide longer term loans of around £5,000 to the brewery.14 
The Whitbread brewery also drew on bank finance, despite having access to an internal 
quasi-bank, which provided £37,800 of internal deposits in 1796.15 In 1786, the bank 
borrowed £10,000 from Child & Co, half of which was transferred to Down & Co the 
following year. In the 1790s, Down & Co provided short-term financing of between £5,000 
and £18,000 over the summer months.16 This example obviously also highlights the danger 
of trying to categorise a bank too strictly. Finally it should also be noted that the flow of 
finance went both ways, and the brewers could lend to the banks. When Norwich was 
experiencing financial stringency in 1783, the Barclay Perkins brewery lent Gurney & Bland 
£11,000 from August through to December.17 Whitbread’s was lending to both Brown & Co 
Co and Bowles & Co in the period 1800-2.18 The financing of the brewery industry raises a 
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bank which led the owner of the brewery to seek emergency finance via both fire-sale of securities 
by senior staff and on expensive loans on mortgage of his own estates, see pp. 284-5. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 281-3. 
17
 Ibid., p. 296. 
18 Ibid., p. 283. 
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number of interesting points. It has obvious significance as an example for the finance of 
domestic industry, both by provincial and London based banks. However it is also 
noteworthy because it shows how provincial banks’ money could flow to London 
organisations and be sunk there, rather than remitted to other parts of the country, an 
issue that will be revisited below.19 
Another sector to make use of City bankers were the insurance companies. After initially 
maintaining a small account with the Bank of England, the Sun Insurance Office then 
decided to hold its own cash from 1712 to 1741. In 1742, the decision was taken to lodge a 
portion of this balance with the bankers Messrs Colebrooke & Co, amounting to £3-6,000 in 
the 1740s, a sum which doubled in the 1750s. In 1751, the balance was transferred without 
explanation to Surman, Dinely & Cliffe, which failed in 1757 when the Office owed the bank 
£4,500. This account was taken over by Hankey’s who provided a loan of £2,630 to repay 
Surman & Co. In 1776 this account was supplemented by one with Drummond & Co., to 
handle the cash of the Charing Cross office. Later that year the Office wanted a £10,000 
loan from Hankey’s, which was refused and led to yet another change of banker, this time 
to Messrs Mason, Currie, James & Yallowley.20 The nature of these advances seems to have 
have been short-term, partly to stop the Office having to sell securities to meet pending 
obligations. In 1756 £7,000 was borrowed from Surman & Cliffe towards a £20,000 loan the 
office was providing to Lord Pomfret; in 1769 Hankey & Co provided £6,000 for a £13,000 
loan to Edward Mansell.21 
Bankers of course required some flexibility in their business model, and it has been shown 
that City bankers needed to adapt their business models during periods of conflict, as 
monetary conditions tightened. The entry and potential exit from conflicts caused volatility 
in the price of government securities owned by banks, and also could affect the level of 
deposits that customers would be willing to leave with banks.22 Wartime conditions meant 
it was not always possible for a bank to accommodate its customers, even if the 
requirements of the client were legitimate. Thus Glyn, Mills, Hallifax & Co were obliged to 
turn down an application from the brewers Meux & Co to borrow £10,000 (half of the total 
for six months, the other half for nine) towards the £40,000 cost of a new brewhouse. The 
brewers faced ‘a temporary depression in our cash’, as the construction of this structure 
caused them to need to buy in beer for their trade. The depletion of stocks of hops and 
malt would facilitate the repayment of this loan. The bank responded that that it ‘will not 
at present be convenient for us to comply with the request’ as ‘our balances are very much 
reduced, so much so, that we have been under the necessity of calling upon money of our 
friends’. This was attributed to the ‘circumstances of the time’, i.e. the Revolutionary 
                                                             
19
 See below, pp. 109-10. 
20
 P.G.M. Dickson, The Sun Insurance Office, 1710-1960; The history of two and a half centuries of 
British Insurance (Oxford, 1960), pp. 236-9. 
21
 Ibid., pp. 252-3. 
22
 D. M. Joslin, ‘London Bankers in Wartime, 1739-84’, in L.S. Pressnell (ed.), Studies in the Industrial 
Revolution (London, 1964), pp. 156-77. 
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Wars.23 However this example is illuminating, for it suggests that in normal times such a 
request would probably have been granted.  It is therefore indicative of the type of role 
that City banks played as a source of funds for the London’s business community.  
The strength of London’s economy also meant that in their early stages at least, London’s 
banks did not need to look elsewhere in the country for business or profit.24 Sayers argues 
that provincial customers were in general an exception and that the vast majority of a City 
bank’s customers were based in London and formed part of the mercantile community.25 
Some London bankers did however engage in lending to businesses outside of London. The 
Carron Iron works arranged for a £10,000 credit from Walpole, Clarke & Bourne, although 
this does appear to have been a reserve option for the Company. In 1769, the Carron 
Company was also provided with financing from Glyn & Hallifax, via an account in the name 
of Francis Garbett. In the crisis of 1772, it was thought that over £50,000 was due to the 
bank as accommodation bills were presented for payment.26  
How this activity was reflected in balance sheets of the banks at this time is difficult to 
establish with any precision, as detailed information on the operation of City banks is 
scarce and dispersed. Joslin’s analysis was based principally on the records of Surman & 
Stone (Martin’s bank). As with banks previously covered, depositors and customers of this 
bank were largely City men, together with some country correspondents (based on 
evidence from 1731). These included both well known English mercantile firms and Anglo-
Dutch and Anglo-Portuguese concerns. The bank was smaller than its West End 
counterparts at this time, with deposits of £139,995 and a note issue of £19,476. Almost 
half of the loans were covered by cash; assets included loans to City men, the discount of 
bills (the larger part of the business), and securities investment. 27 Depositors increased 
from 195 to 255 between 1732 and 1744, with total deposits in 1749 standing around 
£194,000, a decline from the £247,000 held on deposit in 1744. The bank also grew the 
payouts to its partners over this period, although the absence of detailed balance sheets 
makes the reasons for this increase difficult to establish (see Table 3).  
  
                                                             
23 RBSGA, Glyn Mills Currie & Co, Guard book, volume 1, p. 107, Meux & Co to Glyn, Mills, Currie, 2 
February 1797. Mathias’ study of the brewing industry does not consider the financing of Meux & Co 
in this period. 
24
 Bowen and Cottrell, ‘Banking and the evolution of the British economy’, p. 96. 
25
 Sayers, Lloyds Bank, p. 91. This is probably based on the experience of Hanbury, Taylor, Lloyd & 
Co, and Barnetts, Hoares & Co. 
26
 R.H. Campbell, ‘The financing of the Carron Company’ Business History I (1958), p. 30-2. The debt 
to Glyn and Halifax was against an original estimate of the debt at £4,282. 
27 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, pp. 179-80. 
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Year Profits 
1732 £2,500 
1733 0 
1734 £6,000 
1735 £4,500 
1736 £4,500 
1737 £4,500 
1738 £4,500 
1739 £3,000 
1740 £4,500 
1741 £6,000 
1742 £6,000 
1743 £8,400 
1744 £7,000 
Table 3: Profits attributable to the partners of Martin's Bank (Source: Chandler, Four Centuries of Banking, 
vol. 1, p. 119) 
At this stage the bank was unwilling to engage in lending upon mortgage or allowing 
overdrafts. In 1753 they wrote to a customer:  
our manner of carrying on business is to let nobody overdraw their account 
without having bills in our hands, and then if we like those bills we discount one or 
more of them, as much as is wanted to pay the drafts on us. We always discount 
the bills that have the least time to run that you may not pay more discount than 
you need ... there is now about three hundred pounds due to us ... we have not 
charged you any interest for money advanced as we look upon what has been done 
only as a trial.28 
To a different customer in Birmingham, they explained that they were happy to conduct his 
business, but would expect him to always have £1,000 on deposit at the bank.29  While the 
bank was willing to deal with customers outside of London, it did not take on many agency 
businesses for country banks.30 Those few country businesses it did administer appear to 
have been fairly routine: discounting bills, granting acceptances, investing in securities, 
making payments and receiving deposits. This was undertaken on the provision of a cash 
balance by the country correspondent.31 The long-term growth of this firm was constant, 
but not spectacular: by 1789 deposits totalled £370,210, a compound growth rate of about 
1.7% per annum from the levels in 1731. The structure of the business did not change 
substantially over the course of those six decades, although some advances on mortgages 
were added and the note issue was reduced, usually to below £10,000.32 In this later 
period, the bank gained perhaps its most famous London customer, Baring & Co, whose 
account turned over £45,000 in the year of 1774.33 
Similarly, Dimsdale’s bank described their business as to ‘provide accommodation “for any 
space of time, not exceeding three months, upon good Bills of Exchange, or Notes of Hand 
                                                             
28
 Cited in Chandler, Four Centuries of Banking, pp. 134-7. 
29
 Chandler, Four Centuries of Banking, p. 138. 
30
 Ibid., pp. 157-8. 
31
 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, p. 180. 
32
 Chandler, Four Centuries of Banking, pp. 214-8. 
33 Ibid., p. 151. 
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with one Indorser at least, upon East India Warrants, East India, upon Receipts for Publick 
Loans or upon any of the Government Securities of this Kingdom”’.34 This focus on short-
term lending via discount was readily apparent in the balance sheets of the firms for which 
they are known. The importance of discounting was however not unique to Dimsdale’s, but 
common to all City banks, across the whole century.  Most City banks would have at least 
50% of their assets invested in bill portfolios, with 60-70% appearing to be a more likely 
level, as some of the sample balance sheets reproduced in Table 4. The discount facility 
was essential for many private banks’ customers, many of whom would have also had a 
discount account with the Bank of England. However the Bank could impose restrictions on 
customers in terms of the volume of discounts it allowed or the bills it would accept. At 
other times, the Bank might refuse to discount on the basis of location or nationality, such 
as in 1772, when it refused to discount most Scots bills and those of Jews with connections 
to Amsterdam. What set the private banker apart was the ability to offer more consistent 
service and also grant special accommodation.35 If a banker stopped discounting a client’s 
bill, it could lead to a switch of banker: the Maryland merchant Joshua Johnson switched 
his account from Hanbury, Taylor & Co to Prescott’s in 1772 for this reason.36 
Baron Dimsdale, 
Son & Co 
Prescott, Grote & 
Co 
Smith, Payne & 
Co Barclays Martin’s 
Year 1796 1780 1797/98 1784 1744 
Cash reserve £25,347 12% £94,102 31% £158,225 18% £71,616 31% £125,456 48% 
Discounts £158,031 73% £204,226 66% £448,581 50% £78,362 34% £137,440 52% 
Loans - 
 
£4,200 
 
£51,334 
 
£16,421 
   
Investments 
    
£218,500 
 
£58,161 
   Country 
Banks - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
£4,491 
   
Other £32,245 
 
£3,780 
 
£16,194 
 
£2,138 
 
- 
 
Total Assets £215,623 
 
£308,088 
 
£892,834 
 
£231,189 
 
£262,896 
 
Capital - 
 
£30,458 
 
£52,000 
 
£20,000 
   Profit and 
Loss 
(Reserve) - 
 
- 
 
£74,269 
 
- 
   
Deposits £186,763 87% £277,630 90% £720,117 81% £182,769 
 
£246,832 
 Country Bank 
balances £21,933 
 
- 
 
- 
 
£21,329 
   
Cash notes - 
 
- 
 
£46,199 
 
£3,740 
 
£16,064 
 
Other £6,927 
 
£0 
 
£249 
 
£7,091 
 
- 
 Total 
Liabilities £215,623 
 
£308,088 
 
£892,834 
 
£231,189 
 
£262,896 
 
Profits 
  
£10,000 
     
£7,000 
 Return on 
Assets 
  
3.25% 
     
2.66% 
 Table 4: Simplified balance sheets for selected City banks (Source: for Baron Dimsdale and Prescott Grote, see 
Anon. ‘Prescott’s Bank’; for Martins, see Chandler, 4 Centuries of Banking; for Smith, Payne & Co, see 
Leighton Boyce, Smiths the Bankers) 
  
                                                             
34
 Cited in Anon, ‘Prescott’s Bank: the First 125 Years’, pp. 11-2. 
35
 Price, ‘The Bank of England’s Discount Activity’, pp. 99-105. 
36 Ibid., p. 105. 
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Much of this discounting then was carried out primarily on behalf of customers of the bank, 
most of whom were London merchants, who on average might discount four or five notes 
each per year. This becomes clear in the case of Smiths’, where the bill portfolio of over 
£0.5 million in 1798 was said to consist of  
bills [which] had nearly all been discounted for customers of the bank. Only a 
handful had been re-discounted for the Smith’s banks in the provinces and other 
provincial banks for which Smith, Payne & Smiths were the London agent.37 
Some of this portfolio could be financed by the deposits of the agency banks. However a 
small portion of the portfolio consisted of bills of London merchants that were not clients 
of the bank. Through to the mid-1780s, Smiths’ seems to have regularly sold and purchased 
parcels of bills in the City (but not with the Bank of England) to match the cash it had 
available. The portfolio in 1798 consisted of 392 at an average of £1,324. Not all bills were 
commercial: some covered loans, such as a loan of £18,000 to a firm of brewers. Other 
extensive borrowers were the Goldsmids, who had £42,000 outstanding, while the Thistle 
Bank in Glasgow was lent money through two bills totalling £18,000.38 
A few other important points emerge from Table 4. Smith, Payne & Co was atypical in 
terms of its size: total assets were over twice those for the other City banks shown here. 
One can argue that the typical size of a City bank appears to have normally been in the 
region of £200,000 to £300,000. All these banks were however highly liquid. Based on 
evidence from Barclays, Prescott, Grote & Co, Martins, Smiths’ and Lloyds, Price argues that 
liquidity was a key feature of City banks, with cash reserves of 30% to 50% not 
uncommon.39 Finally one can make some brief comments on profitability. The firm of 
Marlar, Lascelles, Pell & Down, which  dealt in acceptance and government paper, as well 
as forming connections with Country Banks, generated profits of between £1,500 and 
£2,000 per annum in its early years.40  In 1765, Glyn’s made a profit of £3,700, earning a 
return of about 15.5% on the firm’s £24,000 capital.41 Hanbury, Taylor, Lloyd & Bowman 
generated a return on equity of 11% per annum for its partners in the first five years of its 
existence.42 This sounds modest in comparison to some of the more established banks, but 
given this firm was established with a capital of £20,000, the implied £2,200 annual profits 
appears to be of a similar order to other newly established banks. 
I – Barclays, Bevan, & Co 
 
Following this general overview of City banks, the following section aims to complement 
the above analysis through a more in-depth look at the records of Barclays, to provide a 
better understanding of its longer-term development. Although a new history of the bank 
has been published fairly recently, it does not provide much detail on the bank’s operation 
                                                             
37
 Leighton-Boyce, Smiths the Bankers, p. 88. 
38
 Ibid., pp. 88-90. 
39
 Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 85-7. He also included evidence from Scottish and provincial banks. 
40
 Joslin, ‘London Private Bankers’, p. 181-2. It was founded in 1774. 
41
 Fulford, Glyn’s 1753-1953, p. 16. 
42 Humphrey Lloyd, The Quaker Lloyds in the Industrial Revolution (London, 1975), pp. 208-9. 
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in the eighteenth century, focusing instead upon the changes in the partnership structure.43 
Barclays was founded in the 1690s by John Freame, a Quaker goldsmith in Lombard Street. 
He took into partnership Thomas Gould, who was the son of a Kentish Quaker merchant 
family. Its main business in these early days lay in taking deposits, discounting bills and 
issuing loans, chiefly to the London merchant community.44 In 1730, Joseph Freame took 
over the management of the business, while Gould’s son left the partnership to set up his 
own bank, which was bankrupted within two years. In 1733 therefore, James Barclay, a 
Quaker of Scottish gentry origin, but whose father’s main interest was by this point a 
substantial linen business, was taken into the business.45 John Freame the Younger entered 
the partnership in 1755 and while he was a partner until his death in 1770, it is argued that 
he lacked of dynamism and a real interest in banking. 46 After his death, his wife removed 
herself with their 2 year old child to the country, so ending the Freame’s association with 
the bank. Although there was a hiatus between 1766 and 1774, when no Barclay was a 
partner in the bank, it would eventually come largely under the control of the Barclay 
family, who also benefited substantially from the Freame inheritance. The Barclays’ focus 
upon the bank was further strengthened when the American wars damaged their linen 
interests.47 
During the course of the last third of the century two further Quaker families became 
involved with the bank, the bank becoming Barclay, Bevan, Tritton & Co.  The Bevans had 
been Welsh merchants from Swansea and were previously clients of the bank. John Tritton, 
had been a partner in the bank Brown, Collinson & Tritton from 1778, which failed in 1782. 
He joined Barclays partly through the support of Mary Barclay and brought with him some 
of his former bank’s customers. In time he developed the reputation as a very astute 
banker.48 The Bevan connection brought with it the connection to the Gurneys, as Timothy 
Bevan had married into that family. This generated advantages for the bank through the 
interlocking partnerships.49 For about ten years from 1766 to 1776, there were two 
partners in the firm that had no long-term involvement, these being Smith and Bening, the 
latter a former clerk within the bank, while the former eventually retired in return for £500 
per annum. 
                                                             
43 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, The Business of Banking, pp. 1-42; details of the early bank can also 
be found in Mathews and Tuke, History of Barclays Bank Limited, provides a similar focus on the 
changes in the partnership, yet in other respects their account of the bank’s early years is limited.  
44 Ibid., pp. 1-12. Details of these early years are not known due to the absence of records pre-1729. 
45 Ibid., pp. 13-6. James Barclay was also married to John Freame’s daughter. His father, David 
Barclay was worth £100,000 upon his death. The business was in Cheapside and they were 
previously clients of the bank. Hilton Price, Handbook, and J.M. Price, ‘The Great Quaker Business 
Families of Eighteenth-Century London: The Rise and Fall of a Sectarian Patriciate’, in R.S. Dunn and 
M.M. Dunn, The world of William Penn, (Philadelphia, 1986), p. 367, both state that the date of 
James joined the bank in 1736. 
46 See BGA, 364/15 and 364/ 17 for the changes in the partnership. For these years the partners 
were therefore Joseph Freame, James Barclay and John Freame, each with a one third share in the 
bank. 
47
 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, The Business of Banking, p. 16-17. The Barclays inherited half of the 
founder’s capital in the bank from John Freame. See also Price, ‘Great Quaker Business Families’, pp. 
366-68. 
48
 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, The Business of Banking, pp. 18-19. 
49 Ibid., p. 21. 
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While the changes in the composition of the partnership over time are relatively clear, 
much less is known of the firm’s actual banking business. Hannah and Ackrill talk about this 
only in very general terms, highlighting the firm’s engagement in ‘deposit taking, 
discounting foreign and inland bills of exchange and loan accounts’. These operations were 
conducted largely on behalf of businesses within London’s economy, including the brewing 
industry and the London Lead Company.50 Price has made some further remarks on the 
operation of the firm for the period c.1750-80.51 This analysis was partly based on Barclays’ 
links with the Chesapeake trade. An important point Price raises is not just the number of 
these connections, but the quality of the customers that the bank serviced, including Capel 
& Hanbury; Z.P. Fonnereau; Thomas and Richard Penn; Gurnell, Hoare & Harman; and 
Ambrose and John Crowley.52 He also noted some broad trends in the development of the 
bank’s finances over the course of the eighteenth century. Barclay’s liabilities peaked in the 
late 1750s, when they stood at £308,637, a level not reached again until December 1798.53 
Price argued that the bank was highly profitable, generating an estimated 36% return on 
capital for the partners.54   
 
 
Figure 8: Barclays bank assets and liabilities, 1733-1798 (Source: BGA, 0131-0071 to 0131-0084, 364/1 to 
364/50) 
Figure 8 illustrates the growth of the firm from 1733 to the end of the century. A number of 
key phases can be identified. During the twenty years from 1733 to 1753 the firm grew 
reasonably steadily. From 1754 to 1757 there was a vast expansion in the firm’s balance 
                                                             
50 Ibid., p. 12. 
51 Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 71-6, 79, 81-2, 90-1. 
52 Ibid., pp. 71-3. The son of Samuel Hoare, of Gurnell, Hoare & Harman, was apprenticed to Henry 
Gurney in Norwich and then joined the bank Bland & Barnett, apparently because at the time it was 
the only bank in London with only two partners. The bank eventually became Barnett, Hoare & Co, 
see Hilton Price, Handbook, pp. 13-4. 
53
 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, The Business of Banking, p. 16; Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 81-2. 
The initial peak was in 1757, see BGA, 364/10. For December 1798, see BGA, 364/50. 
54 Price, Capital and Credit, p. 79. 
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sheet to its peak, followed by an equally sharp downturn by 1762. From 1762 to 1772, the 
firm’s balance sheet very gradually contracted, bottoming in that year with liabilities of 
£134,178.55 The last quarter of the century witnessed a return to a steady growth phase, 
until the Suspension of 1797, which coincides with a sharp upturn in business. If one 
ignores the extreme spike around 1760, one can broadly speak of a growth period through 
the second quarter of the century, stagnation in the third quarter, with renewed expansion 
in the final quarter of the century. 
Explaining the events of the late 1750s and early 1760s is not a matter of certainty. What is 
clear is that from 1754 to 1756, around the point that John Freame entered the bank, the 
cash held by the firm almost trebled, before falling sharply by 1758. It is notable that the 
contraction from 1762 onwards occurred at a time when the bank experienced a degree of 
turnover amongst its leading partners. The Freames, who had been the senior family, were 
exiting the business at this stage, while James Barclay died in 1766, at which point none of 
his Barclay successors were available to inherit his share, leading to Isaac Smith (who 
remained a partner until 1775) and then Silvanus Bevan joining the partnership.56 The 
return of a member of the Barclay family (David Barclay) to the partnership in 1776 
coincided roughly with the trough of the bank’s size.57 While one would hesitate to 
attribute all the performance of the bank to the presence of a certain family in the 
partnership, it is nonetheless likely that frequent changes in partners was destabilising and 
had some impact on the performance of the business. This is particularly likely because in 
general the third quarter of the century was a period of expansion for other banks. 
The decision of Joseph Freame to leave the bank had a very noticeable impact. The Freame 
family had been connected with the bank since its inception and a substantial part of the 
firm’s capital was attributable to that family. For example in 1755 Joseph Freame owned 
two thirds of the firm to James Barclay’s one third.58 Until 1764, the bank had been 
gradually increasing its capital, however in that year, Joseph Freame’s share of the capital 
was paid to him, and withdrawn completely from the bank.59 This meant that the bank 
effectively lost one third of its capital, which fell from over £33,600 in 1763 to £21,320 in 
1765.60 From 1766, the firm’s capital was fixed at £20,000 and remained at that level until 
the end of the century.61 While this could reflect the fact that the partners were 
constrained by an inability to increase their capital, it seems more likely that this was a 
conscious choice by the partners, especially as the re-investment of profits would not have 
been precluded. It is possible that they decided that the bank was operating around its 
optimal scale, and were therefore content to maintain this level of capital. This would be 
supported by the firm’s assets remaining around £200,000 between 1766 and the early 
1790s. Price argues that this decision not to grow capital was not uncommon, as many 
                                                             
55 BGA, 364/25. 
56
 BGA, 364/22 and 364/25. 
57
 BGA, 364/29. 
58
 BGA, 364/8. 
59
 BGA, 364/15 to 364/17. 
60
 BGA, 364/16 to 364/18. 
61 BGA, 364/19 to 364/50. The fixing of the firm’s capital is noted in Price, Capital and Credit, p. 76. 
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bankers were ‘cautious about risky expansion and did not consider book capital all that 
important’.62 
However this did not prevent continued volatility in the firm’s liabilities (Figure 9). Thus 
over the period as a whole, the firm on average grew at 4% per annum. However, the 
standard deviation was substantial, at 17 percentage points. If one considers just the 
period from 1762 to 1788, where the overall size of the firm remained static, the volatility 
is even more pronounced, with a standard deviation of 19 percentage points around a 
mean of 2%.  
 
 
Figure 9: Changes in overall liabilities of Barclay & Co, 1733-1798 (Source: BGA, 0131/0071-0084, 364/1-50) 
The ability to gain an in-depth understanding of the management of the firm’s assets and 
liabilities is limited by the quality of the surviving balance sheets. The dates chosen for the 
more in-depth analysis of the balance sheets are in many ways rather arbitrary, partly 
dictated by the quality of the records in any given year. In 1748 Barclay’s bank had almost 
£175,000 worth of assets, of which £78,700 were in cash. The partners had a joint-capital 
of about £21,300. Other assets appear to have been quite a mix, but were dominated by 
customer loans or overdrafts (it is not possible to distinguish between the two from the 
main balance books). They also included some £465 worth of shares in a lead mining 
venture, £7,500 of Bank Annuities, £10,100 of East India Bonds and £1,100 of lottery tickets 
(a total of £19,165 worth of securities of various descriptions).63 Altogether this means that 
that total liquid assets accounted for about 56% of the firm’s assets, with 45% of this in 
cash, once again highlighting how banks sought to maintain incredibly high levels of 
liquidity. 
By 1786, the balance sheets become more detailed, allowing some more granular 
comments to be made, as well as comparisons to other banks. We have already noted that 
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 Price, Capital and Credit, p. 80. 
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the partners had fixed the firm’s capital at £20,000 in 1766. Assets had grown since 1748, 
and stood at £231,000, of which £71,600 was still held as cash (31% of total assets).64 
Investments in securities were almost £55,100 (24% of assets). In term of the firm’s overall 
liquidity therefore, no substantial change had taken place since 1748, although there was a 
greater preference for securities that generated a return for the bank. The discount ledger 
held a balance to the bank’s credit of £78,360, or 34% of all assets. In comparison, loans 
were relatively insignificant, accounting for only 7% of assets. The other notable change 
was that the bank had established a substantial country agency business, acting as agent to 
11 banks. Seven of these had deposits with Barclays, while four were running overdrafts, 
with an overall net position of £16,383 deposited at Barclays. The bank still seems to be 
issuing a very small number of its own notes (about £3,740, given as ‘Notebook’). In 
summary then, the balance sheets would indicate that Barclay’s was fairly typical for a City 
bank of this period. 
 
Figure 10: Cash and capital of Barclays bank in the eighteenth century (Source: BGA, 0131-0071 to 0131-0084, 
364/1 to 364/50) 
The overall size of the firm may have fluctuated, yet Figure 10 shows that in contrast its 
capital buffer remained remarkably steady, remaining around 10% from 1763 onwards. It is 
worth bearing in mind that the bank’s capital was fixed at this point. The general increase 
in capitalisation from 1740 to 1754 reflects the retention of profits within the bank by its 
then partners. The steep decline from 1755 to 1756 was attributed by the partners to an 
act of fraud on the part of a clerk, which cost the partners £5,947.65 While the capitalisation 
capitalisation of the bank was remarkably consistent, a different trend can be seen in the 
bank’s cash reserves. Ignoring the extreme peak and trough in 1756 and 1770 respectively, 
one can suggest that from 1733 to 1755, the bank tended to maintain its cash reserve 
around the 40% mark. The upward trend in cash levels in the late 1730s is perhaps 
attributable to a more conservative positioning of the bank by its partners ahead the 
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Austrian War of Succession. Similarly, at the outbreak of the Seven Years War there was an 
obvious move towards holding more cash. However from the end of that war onwards 
there is a very clear downward trend in this ratio, with an average around 30% for the last 
20 years of the century, which may be indicative of a greater confidence on the part of the 
partners in their ability to manage the bank effectively.  
Overall, the performance of Barclays over the course of the eighteenth century looks 
mixed. It initially experienced strong growth, and appears to have been profitable. In terms 
of its balance sheet composition, it looked like many other City banks of the period, and in 
that sense is unremarkable. From an operational perspective Barclays was similar to 
Smiths’: both had a strong focus on liquidity. Smiths’ tended to operate with a pure cash 
liquidity ratio of at least 20% and a broader ratio (including discounts) of over 70%.66 
Equally the business split of Smiths’ in London is fairly close to that of Barclays: in 1797, 
bills discounted accounted for 46% of the balance sheet, while 24% was invested in 
government securities.67 Both banks had similarly strong country connections to draw 
upon. However questions can be raised over Barclays’ performance in the second half of 
the century. The bank appears to have stopped growing at precisely the time that 
conditions for banking were becoming more favourable. The contrast with the Smiths’ 
London bank is stark. This bank was of less long-standing in London, having not been pro-
actively managed until 1769.68 By 1797, with total assets of £821,000 it was about two and 
half times the size of Barclays.69 Smiths’ Bank was admittedly atypical, however Barclays 
was also smaller than Prescott’s, whose ledger debts and notebook debts alone totalled 
£413,000 in 1793.70 It seems likely that this was a result of the partners’ decisions, either 
through a lack of leadership at important times, a lack of talent, or through being overly 
cautious. It therefore does not seem unreasonable to suggest that Barclays could have 
done more, given its position at mid-century.  
II - The London agency business 
 
So far this chapter has focused on the London centred activities and internal development 
of these banks. The final important function of the City banks was as agents to Country 
Banks. It is to the matter of this agency business, a subject of considerable historical 
interest, that the remainder of this chapter will be devoted. Economies as a whole rarely fit 
the model of centre and periphery, however it cannot be denied that the English financial 
system was based upon such a relationship.71 The reasons for this London-focused network 
network were of long-standing origin and included the presence of the national debt 
markets, the tax collectors and the fact that it was the country’s leading port. Regardless of 
the reason for London’s centrality, the fact remains that a provincial bank could not 
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 Ibid., pp. 85-6. 
68
 Ibid., pp. 74-6. 
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 Price, Capital and Credit, p. 81. 
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function without a London agent. Black has highlighted that one of the first issues a country 
bank needed to address was the employment of an agent bank in London.72 The 
emergence of the agency system has been viewed as one of the key features in creating a 
fully integrated banking system in the UK. It was on the basis of the agency system that 
Rondo Cameron could suggest that country banks were the ‘most important feature’ of 
English banking.73 
The agency system is significant to the overall understanding of the English economy during 
this period. Many discussions of eighteenth century financial requirements tend to focus on 
regional, or even local, imbalances of supply and demand for credit. It is common to refer 
to industrialising regions, such as Lancashire, the West Riding of Yorkshire or the Midlands, 
as developing capital deficits, while other regions, in particular East Anglia had surpluses of 
savings that needed effective employment. Developing ‘conduits and intermediaries’ to 
meet these differences effectively is consequently perceived to be a principal raison d’être 
of banks that developed during the eighteenth century. Nor is this gap perceived to be 
solely geographic, but equally sociological, between landed, commercial and professional 
wealth and entrepreneurs without direct access to these groups.74 Pressnell goes so far as 
to claim that, when they first emerged, local banks’ ‘leading function was that of 
remittance, and their most indispensable feature was a regular link with the London 
market’.75 The importance of remittance reflected the historic role of London as a centre of 
of the bill market. The discounting of bills was also carried out in counties such as Norfolk, 
Suffolk or Sussex, but the opportunities in London were more substantial than in the 
provinces.76 Unsurprisingly the topic is one that has also interested historical geographers: 
Iain Black in particular believed that the activities of bankers could throw light on inter-
regional and intra-regional economic relationships and that this was important for 
developing our understanding of Britain’s Industrial Revolution. He argues that the drive to 
look at events at a more regional level, as advocated in particular by Pat Hudson, has gone 
too far and obscures the integrated nature of the English economy.77  
In the integration of regional economies, financial flows can be conceived of as roads, some 
of which are better travelled than others.78 The most thorough analysis of major flows of 
capital throughout the country has been carried out by Black. His research interests as a 
geographer focus on spatial differentiation within Britain during the Industrial Revolution 
and the way these were overcome and harnessed to a form an integrated national 
market.79 In this context finance capital played a major role, through flows between 
                                                             
72 Black, ‘Geography, political economy and the circulation of finance’, pp. 375-76. 
73 Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, p. 15. 
74 See for example Peter Mathias, Transformation of England, pp. 92-3. 
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‘agricultural and industrial regions’ which created ‘a definite spatial interdependence 
between regions as finance capital switched from surplus (agricultural) to deficit (industrial) 
regions’.80 In particular, flows of capital moved through London to Leeds, Manchester, 
Newcastle, Whitehaven and Carlisle, implying that these provincial centres did not 
‘subsume the full range of commercial and social infrastructures that some people have 
implied’.81 The flow of bills through the Smiths’ banks provides a more specific example of 
such an inter-regional flow of money between industrialising regions and rural areas with 
higher savings.82  
While Black’s work comes closest to demonstrating that the banking system actually did 
transfer money through London between different regions, the evidence is not clear-cut. 
Pressnell has argued that there are question marks regarding how well this link worked in 
practice. The history of the Smiths’ partnerships suggests that the possibility at least has to 
be entertained that substantial amounts of the money remitted to London became ‘stuck’ 
there.83 Other evidence indicating this possibility can be found in Chapman, who 
highlighted the requirement of Dutch lending to the UK in order for London merchants to 
be able to finance the long-term credit required for overseas trade.84 That provincial money 
money should fulfil a similar role would seem likely, especially as Dutch capital was 
withdrawn from England from 1780 onwards.85 The possibility that provincial money was 
financing London based activity is also suggested by Thomas Richardson, the largest bill 
broker of London. He described the role of the London agent bank as ‘in the first place to 
procure money for country bankers on Bills when they have occasion to borrow on 
discount, which is not often the case; and in the next place to lend the money for the 
country bankers on Bills on discount’. He believed that the sums borrowed by banks were 
50 times the size of those lent out by banks.86 A similar picture also emerges in the case of 
Lloyds bank in Birmingham, where Sayers has estimated that a quarter of the resources of 
Taylor & Lloyds were used to purchase London bills over the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century. If other banks in Birmingham were operating in a similar manner, then the total 
invested annually in this manner would be around £100,000, despite Birmingham being at 
this stage a rapidly growing industrial town.87 
Despite London’s financial significance, actually drawing on, or remitting money to the 
capital was not straightforward at the beginning of the century. The difficulties of remitting 
funds throughout the country were commonplace in the early modern economy. Moving 
specie by road risked falling foul of highwaymen, while movements by sea risked loss by 
                                                             
80 Ibid., pp. 367-8. The role of money here is examined in the broader context of whether 
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81 Ibid., p. 377. 
82 Black, ‘The London Agency System’, pp. 123-27. 
83 Pressnell, ‘Family Bankers’, pp. 93-4. 
84
 Chapman, Merchant Banking, pp. 1-9.  
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shipwreck.88 From at least the mid-seventeenth century, major landowners and traders 
needed to find ways to move their money through the country, and that this was by no 
means straightforward. This led initially to the emergence of a ‘return’, ‘an arrangement by 
which a claim to money payable in London was transferred to a representative of the 
landowner in London’, which has been described as a simplified, less formal version of the 
inland bill.89 By the first half of the eighteenth century, the inland bill was fully established 
and merchants were also becoming an important feature of this payment network. 
Sampson Lloyd of Birmingham employed John Pocock, a corn and iron merchant of 
Queenhithe to handle his bill transactions through London in the 1730s.90 Similarly the 
Goldney family of Bristol used the Quaker merchants Joseph and Thomas Ingram to handle 
their business in the capital in the 1740s.91 In both instances the London merchants were 
acting as quasi-bankers. Indeed it has been suggested that every tenth trader in England in 
this period acted in the capacity of a retailer or a retailer of cash.92   
Certain employment groups that featured as remitters prior to the establishment of banks 
became partners in new provincial banking ventures. Great significance has been attached 
to the drovers and tax remitters with regular contact with London and who consequently 
were used to move money between country and capital, principally through the medium of 
the bill on London, from the late seventeenth century.93 Drovers were useful remitters, but 
but also slow and risky: one large family of drovers went bankrupt in 1678 owing £30,000.94 
£30,000.94 The most commonly cited examples of drovers becoming bankers are two Welsh 
Welsh banks: the Black Ox at Llandovery and the Black Sheep Bank at Aberystwyth.95 
However it has also been convincingly stated that these were both relatively late 
formations and, combined with their relatively small scale and the lowly status of the 
Smithfield bankers in London, their importance should not be overstated.96 Tax remitters 
enjoyed a considerable advantage as bankers because they were capable of ‘borrowing 
money on discount at the public expense, thereby expanding their local cash reserves’. If 
none of a bank’s partners was the local remitter, then convincing the collector to use the 
bank might achieve the same end.97 This occurred in Newcastle, where the collector of the 
excise was persuaded by the bank of Carr, Airey & Co to accept their notes and pay cash for 
them, which had the added benefit of convincing people of the sound status of the firm.98 
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The second advantage was the use of collected taxes as bank deposits, which could provide 
a cushion for the bank to protect from runs.99 In contrast, the difficulty of attorneys in 
moving significant sums of money made it more challenging for them to develop into 
bankers on a standalone basis, despite their local role in providing financial services.100 
Two reasons exist for regarding the tie to a London agent as the most important feature of 
provincial banks. Firstly, many customers of provincial banks needed a London link, as most 
bills in this period were drawn on London, as well as for accessing the capital markets. The 
second was that the London agent could provide the bank with an outlet for surplus funds, 
or a source of funds in times of scarcity.101 Iain Black’s research has shown that the link to 
London through an agency system was essential to a bank’s viability, and was often the first 
business that a new establishment would attend to. While in the case of Lambton’s bank, 
the main source of profit was local business rather than the remittance business, it was 
ultimately the remittance business that made the bank viable.102 While the importance of 
the London agent is frequently acknowledged, most studies of the relationship between 
country banker and London bank agent have been written from the perspective of the 
provincial bank and relatively little is known about the agency houses in London.103  
The key features of the agency system were already in place by the 1772-3 financial crisis, 
as it was transmitted nationally through the banking system.104 By 1780, the expanding 
numbers of country bankers had spurred the development on a large scale of the London 
agency banks.105 By the end of the century there was a clear leading group of agency 
houses. Table 5 shows Black’s data for 1802, drawn from the Post Office directory of that 
year, together  with some attempts to draw this back to the 1790s, both of which indicate 
the degree to which the agency business rapidly consolidated into the hands of a number 
of leading firms. When comparing the information for 1790 and 1802, the overall rankings 
of the principal agency banks in London changes only minimally. The key points are that it 
shows that the Post Office data underestimated the extent of the provincial banking and 
how quickly the agency business had consolidated in London. While some West End banks 
had a limited country connection, this was never substantial: in 1797, 17 London banks had 
no country links, all of which were located in the West End.106 Within the City banks, it was 
generally the newer banks that exploited this opportunity, which required specialist 
commercial knowledge and a tolerance for new risk.107 Esdaile’s Bank was founded in 1781, 
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while Robarts emerged as late as 1792.108 A number of significant agency banks originated 
from provincial banking houses. Most famously, this group included Smith, Payne & Smith, 
but one can add the examples of Jones, Loyd & Co. (originally of Manchester); Messrs 
Forster, Lubbock & Co (Truro Bank, Cornwall); the short-lived Halliday, Duntze, Praed & Co 
(Exeter, although Halliday had previously been a banker in Lombard Street); and eventually 
Praed & Co (Cornwall again). Hanbury, Taylor, Lloyd & Co was established to handle the 
business of the Birmingham Lloyds bank, but unlike some of the others did not become a 
significant agency house.109  
London Bank 
No. of Country 
Correspondents 
1802 
No. of Country 
Correspondents 
c. 1793 
Esdaile & Co. 39 44 
Robarts & Co. 26 23 
Forster, Lubbock & Co. 22 23 
Down, Thornton & Co. 19 21 
Harrisons & Co. 18 21 
Barclays & Co. 16 18 
Masterman, Peters & Co. 14 17 
Boldero, Lushington & Co. 12 9 
Wilkes & Co. 12 9 
Glyn, Mills & Co. 9 11 
Veres, Lucadon & Co. 9 12 
Williams, Deacon's & Co. 9 8 
Table 5: Leading London agency houses in 1793 and 1802 (Source: for 1802 see Black, 'London agency 
system', p. 116; data for 1793 derived from Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
The eighteenth-century history of the principal City agency houses remains remarkably 
shrouded. Historians of Barclays have tended not to examine the early agency business in 
detail.110 Equally the record of Glyn & Co’s emergence as an agency bank remains obscure, 
partly due to the loss of this firm’s relevant records. Before 1797, they were barely engaged 
in this business, acting perhaps for only 3 to 4 country banks. In the early 1800s, this figure 
was rapidly expanded to over 40.111 Equally for Smith, Payne & Smith, little detail 
surrounding its agency business is known. The bank in 1798 operated twelve agencies (not 
including the Smith family banks), of which three were Scottish. Most of the little remaining 
information provided by Leighton-Boyce refers to the 1810-25 period.112 The early history 
of the five leading agency houses that had emerged by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century is even less well known.  
Some attempt to document the early history of Esdaile & Co, the leading agency firm at the 
time, was made by Lampard in his study of the Margate Bank. Its founders, Sir James 
Esdaile and Sir Benjamin Hammet were already men of substance when they established 
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the bank in 1781. Esdaile was descended from French Huguenots, who had made their 
fortune supplying clothing to the army. Hammet was his son-in-law, a man of property in 
Carmarthenshire who also had a controlling share in a substantial works for the 
manufacture of tin plate. The bank expanded in 1792 through an amalgamation with Smith, 
Wright & Co. The management of the bank was left in the hands of William Esdaile, fourth 
son of Sir James, who had been given a “commercial education” and had served as a clerk 
at Ladbroke & Co. However little else is known of this bank in its early years, or indeed for 
most of it history until it’s failure in 1837, apart from its prominence in the agency 
business.113 What this short description does indicate is that there was nothing unusual in 
the background of this bank at its formation, which might have explained its rise as an 
agency house. 
A key service provided by these London agency banks was the handling of the provincial 
correspondents’ remittances and as such they became an essential part of the nation’s 
payment network. The process for administering these payments can be summarised in the 
following manner.114 A provincial bank would discount bills in their locality, which would 
form part of that bank’s bill book. If the bill was due to be paid in the vicinity of the 
provincial bank, it would hold the bill at the bank’s office. If however payment was due 
elsewhere, the bill would be dispatched to the London agent. Given that the immediate 
catchment area of the bank was generally limited, this meant that the majority of a 
provincial bank’s bills were sent to London. The London agent would receive these, but 
would only enter them to credit of the provincial bank’s account when the bill was past 
due. As a partner in Forster, Lubbock & Co explained to the Truro bank, provincial banks 
therefore needed to keep two accounts with their London bankers. In one of these, the 
general account, all bills remitted to and drafts made on the London house would be 
entered. However he added:  
but as by this methods I should never know whether the London Bank was in 
advances or in Cash for the Truro Bank, I keep a Cash Acct. besides in which your 
drafts are carried to the Debit of said Account only as they are Paid & your 
Rem[ittan]ces to the Credit of it as they are rec[eive]d.115 
Thus the London bank would generally have a substantial number of bills due for the 
provincial banks that were not noted in its cash books. If the country bank was overdrawn 
with its London agent, these bills not yet due could be used as security (the London agent 
secures a lien on these bills). This step for example was taken by Esdaile & Co when the 
Margate Bank overdrew its account with them in 1797.116  
It should be clear therefore that not all bills remitted were discounted by the London bank. 
Discounting might be carried out by the London agent himself or elsewhere in the London 
market and appears to have been done at the London bank’s discretion. Esdaile explained 
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to the Margate Bank that: ‘The reason why those bills you mentioned were not discounted, 
we generally take those that come first in our Bill Book.’117 Discounting was generally 
carried out to cover any cash flow issues experienced by the provincial bank. Again Esdaile 
notified the Margate bank that ‘we have debited you with us for being under a thousand 
pounds according to agreement which has been the case notwithstanding the Bills we have 
from time to time discounted’.118 The Margate Bank had an agreement to maintain a 
balance of £1,000 interest free with their London agent and was now being charged 
interest for failing to do so. This was despite Esdaile’s attempts to maintain the balance by 
discounting bills it had received. Discounting a country bank’s note also increased the 
London agent’s exposure to the country bank: in May 1787, Esdaile noted that it had 
discounted £8,200 of the Margate Bank’s paper, which together with the outstanding 
balance of £6,000 meant that there effective advance to the bank was £14,200.119 
A successful relationship with the London agent therefore required careful management 
and supervision to avoid placing unnecessary strains on either side.120 Pressnell believed 
that the London account was ‘probably the best-managed part of a country banker’s 
business’.121 To maintain accurate balances of these accounts therefore required a 
substantial volume of correspondence between City bank and their correspondents. The 
most basic task was to keep the London agents abreast of the extent of drawings and 
remittals. Barings, Short and Collyns reported regularly (probably weekly) to Goslings about 
the scale of both their remittals and drafts, for example, on the 18 January they wrote ‘we 
remit 36 Bills £1,480.7.10 and have drawn £1,089.17.0’ on the London house. Another 
letter indicates the remittance of £2,997.10.7 of bills by the Exeter bank and the drawing of 
£1258.4.8.122 This is very similar to the nature of the correspondence between Esdaile and 
the Margate bank, where the vast majority of the letters (there was on average one every 
two days) cover routine business, including drafts payable, remittances received and bills 
returned due to non-payment.123 This is equally true of the correspondence between 
Messrs Lemon & Co and the Truro Bank.124 Other mundane tasks could also be carried out 
by the London agent. The Devonshire bank used Goslings as a place for the receipt of 
interest on securities for its Exeter clients; it contains a number of requests to collect 
interest due on securities or to affect the purchase of new securities.125 The London bank 
could also use Goslings for the purchase or sale of securities on behalf of clients: one letter 
                                                             
117 KHAC, EK-U1453/B3/14/7, Esdaile to Cobb & Son, 29 March 1787. 
118 Ibid., 7 April 1787. 
119 Ibid., Esdaile to Cobb & Son, 14 May 1787. 
120 Nevin and Davis, Clearing Banks, pp. 38-9. 
121 Pressnell, Country Banking, p. 116. 
122 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, Barings, Short & Collyns to Messrs Gosling, 4 January, 18 January 1796 and 
12 January 1796. 
123
 KHAC, EK-U1453/B3/14/7, see most of the letters from January through to March 1787 for 
examples; Lampard, ‘Cobb & Son, bankers of Margate’, pp. 129-30. 
124
 See below, chapter 5.  
125
 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, Barings, Short & Collyns to Messrs Gosling 18 January 1796. See also a 
similar letter 9 January 1799. 
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requested they acquire another £250 stock for Hugh Myddelton, who already had 
£6,750.126  
The volume of business conducted by the London agency bank was heavily dependent on 
the size of the provincial bank, as can be seen in the case of Goslings’ agency business. 
Goslings was not a first-rank London agency house, however its business is sufficient to 
allow some interesting analysis to be undertaken. Between 1787 and 1788 Goslings held 
the agency of seven banks: Barings, Short & Hogg (of Exeter); Cross, Son, Hutchison & 
James; Ellison, Cooke, Childers & Swann (Doncaster); William Symonds; the Swansea Bank; 
John Lacey and finally Twining, Twining & Mills (Colchester).127 Of these, the most 
important in terms of size, by some considerable distance was that of Barings, Short & 
Hogg. This was the Devonshire Bank of Exeter whichalso had a London agency with Francis 
Barings in London. Pressnell speculated that Goslings gained this agency business through 
Sir Francis Baring’s connections to the East India Company, to which we have seen that 
Francis Gosling also had close ties.128 The name of Twining is also very recognisable: this 
was the Colchester and Essex bank established by John Mills, which was formed in 1787. 
The London tea merchants were associated with this house, however their relationship was 
unusual, for the partnership indemnified them against any losses, while all profits from the 
bank accrued to John Mills. In 1797 the London tea house completely separated its links 
with this bank and it became Mills & Co, continuing in business until 1892, when it merged 
with Lloyds.129  
From the 1794 accounts, one can see that the Devonshire Bank held £6,375 of cash with 
Goslings, compared to £3,438 deposited by Twining & Mills and £1,500 by Messrs Ellison & 
Company.130 The actual balance of the country banker could obviously fluctuate over the 
year, and the Devonshire bank was not always a source of cash to Goslings. Although 
Barings & Co would normally maintain a credit balance on their account in January 1788 
and February 1789, small debit balances occurred, presumably reflecting the seasonality in 
the Devonshire Bank’s business (Figure 11).131 In January 1796, Barings, Short & Collyns 
credited Goslings with £10.19.0, being 20 days interest on £4,000. This correspondence 
goes on to say that they wish Goslings to allow them to draw up to £5,000, for which 
Goslings should either charge interest or credit by use of bills in the bank’s hands for the 
same amount, as they feel appropriate.132 Given that in the previous month, interest had 
been charged, it would appear that this was the bank’s preferred method of payment.  
                                                             
126 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, Barings, Short & Collyns to Messrs Gosling 12 January 1796. 
127 BGA, G&S, 0130/0691. 
128 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 336-7. Curiously, John Baring’s other bank at Plymouth drew on 
Hoare, Barnett & Co, see Margaret Dawes and C.N. Ward-Perkins, Country Banks of England and 
Wales, Private and Provincial Banks and Bankers, 1688-1953, vol. 2 (Suffolk, 2000), pp. 465-66. 
129
 Stephen H. Twining, The House of Twining 1706-1956, being a short history of the Firm of R. 
Twining and Co. Ltd, tea and coffee merchants, 216 Strand London WC2 (London, 1956), pp. 59-60. 
130
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0716.  
131
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0691, 0130/0692. 
132
 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, Barings, Short & Collyns to Messrs Gosling, 4 January 1796; for the 
payment of the London agent, see Pressnell, pp. 401-15. 
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However the balance of the accounts is only part of the picture and the turnover of the 
accounts was at least as important. The volume of business on account could be 
substantial. Letters indicate that between 4 and the 18 January 1796 Barings’ account 
remitted around £6,800 to Goslings and drew on the London bank for about £5,500.133 
From 1787 to 1789, this account was turning over between £50,000 and £80,000 per 
month (Fig. 10). This part of the business required considerable attention and supervision 
by the partners, as indicated by the surviving correspondence between the firms.  
 
Figure 11: Account of Barings, Short, Hogg & Co with Goslings, 1781-1789 (Source: BGA, 0130/0691-0692) 
Barings, Short, Hogg & Co also maintained an account with Francis Baring & Co. John Baring 
was titular head of both Exeter and London merchant houses, but his interests appear to 
have been in his estates and the country banks he helped to establish in Plymouth and then 
Exeter (the Devonshire Bank in 1770). To undertake this business they used Francis Baring 
as their London agent.134 The ledgers for the period 1781-97 show that in general the bank 
of Baring, Jackson, Short & Co was a useful source of cash to Francis Baring’s London 
merchant firm. Their balance was only negative in one year (1784). On average through to 
1796, the bank left £20,000 on deposit with Francis Baring, with excess balances generally 
larger in the 1780s than the 1790s. In certain years this could represent up to 18% of the 
firm’s total liabilities, although the average was about 8% for the period 1781-1795.135 
                                                             
133
 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, Barings, Short & Collyns to Messrs Gosling, 4, 9, 12 and 18 January 1796. 
134
 Ingram, Notes towards a history of Baring Brothers, pp. 21-3. This Exeter bank was Barings, Lee, 
Sellon & Green in 1770, becoming Barings, Jackson, Short & Co in 1774. By 1790 it was Barings, Short 
& Collyns. It closed in 1801. See Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, p. 219. 
135 Baring, HCOS, ff. 1-17. 
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The other significant account for Goslings from a volume perspective was that of Ellison & 
Co of Doncaster. In the month of June 1787, Ellison & Co  drew on the bank for £11,597 and 
deposited some £15,164.136 The impression one gets from this data is that the business was 
relatively steady, turning over on average £30,000, while providing in most cases a balance 
in favour of Goslings of £10,000. Even the smallest account, Twining & Mills, drew on 
Goslings for the not insubstantial sum of £51,940 for the period 22 November 1787 to the 
28 June 1788, and deposited £54,256 with the bank.137 
 
 
Figure 12: Account of Messrs Ellison & Co with Goslings, 1787-1789 (Source: BGA, 0130/0691-0692) 
For the latter stages of the century, good data is also available for the bank of Cobb & Son 
of Margate. Lampard’s analysis shows an awareness of the importance of Esdaile & Co to 
Cobb & Son, in particular in connecting the Margate bank to a national and international 
payment network.138 He speculates that the connection to Esdaile’s was established via the 
Chippendales, who were the largest coopers in London.139 The monthly balance of this 
account is given in Figure 13.  
                                                             
136 BGA, G&S, 0130/0691, pp.225-230. 
137
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0691, pp. 400-2, 407, 143, 367. Annualised this would equate to about £89,000 
and £93,000 respectively. 
138
 Lampard, ‘Cobb & Son, bankers of Margate’, pp. 87-100 and chapter 3, especially p. 133-139, 143-
45. 
139
 Ibid., p. 139. Sir James Esdaile was a member of the Coopers’ Company, although he never 
practiced the trade. 
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Figure 13: Balance of the Margate Bank with Esdaile & Co., October 1785 to November 1798 (Source: KHAC, 
EK-U1453/B3/11/1-14) 
There was a noticeable seasonal pattern to this account: the Margate Bank’s cash reserves 
tended to be highest from August to October, and lowest in May or June.140 The cash 
balances were rarely negative; when they did turn negative, it can be readily explained. In 
the first half of 1787, the bank had got itself into some trouble through some injudicious 
discounting of bills drawn by Rush & Tolson and Hague, which were of real concern to 
Esdaile’s.141 The other two occasions can be more clearly attributed to the broader 
economic environment in the crisis years of 1793 and especially in 1797. However Lampard 
was much less interested in the volume of business being put through this account. Over 
the period October 1785 to November 1798, the bank remitted around £1.7 million to 
London, or just around £131,000 per annum.142 Moreover it can be seen that the business 
of the bank passing through London was growing steadily over this period. This can be seen 
in Figure 14, which shows the rolling 12 month remittals and drafts of the bank with its 
London agent.143 After correcting the problems of the 1787 episode, it can be seen that 
bank managed to achieve a generally consistent growth in this business, which could well 
reflect the fortunes of its wider business.  
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 Ibid., pp. 148-151.  
141
 Ibid., pp. 152-4. 
142
 KHAC, EK-U1453/B3/11/1-14. 
143
 Using the rolling 12 month periods evens out some of seasonality effects and makes the longer 
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Figure 14: Rolling 12 month remittals to and drafts on Esdaile & Co by the Margate Bank (Source: KHAC, EK-
U1453/B3/11/1-14) 
Comparable figures for other banks are not common, however some data is available. It is 
known that the Smiths of Nottingham’s turnover with their London agent was on average 
£228,000 in 1756-7, and growing rapidly. In the period January to May 1758, turnover was 
£148,600 (£356,640 annualised).144 Leyland, Bullins & Co of Liverpool was remitting on 
average £652,500 to its London agent for 1808-10.145 From these comparisons, it can be 
seen that the Margate bank was very much a small country bank. If one considers that 
Esdaile’s had around 40 correspondent banks by the end of the century, it is possible to 
extrapolate that the bank was handling remittances worth a minimum of £5.2 million per 
year.146 Equally, it can be suggested that the minimum remittances handled by London 
banks on behalf of their customers was in the region of £60 million per annum (450 banks). 
IV 
This chapter highlights the inexplicable neglect of the City banks in the early stages of 
English banking. Banks were deeply engaged within London’s economy during this period. 
They were an important source of liquidity to the capital’s merchants, traders and 
industrialists, while also facilitating international payments. In the introduction to this 
thesis it was argued that there is an inconsistency in the historical analysis between the 
performance of England’s commercial economy and the supposed capacity of its banking 
system. City banks formed one of a number of specialised trades that helped to finance the 
commercial activities of the country’s leading commercial centre. The second half of the 
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 Leighton-Boyce, Smiths the Bankers, pp. 50-1. 
145
 Black ‘The London Agency System’, p. 124. This bank received some attention in Presnell’s, 
Country Banking, however he did not discuss its remittances. 
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 This is based on an average remittal from the Margate bank of £130,000 per year, assuming 40 
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chapter has focused on the reach of these banks, which extended far beyond London itself. 
They stood at the heart of the country’s agency networks. Cameron’s comment that 
provincial bankers were the most important part of the banking system is surely misguided, 
for without the London agents they could not have functioned in the manner they did. If 
the English banking system at the time was a body, then the core nucleus of agency banks 
in London represented that body’s brain. This was not solely because of the financial 
services they provided to the provincial banks (which in themselves were indispensible), 
but also because these City bankers often provided a knowledge of banking practice that 
prevented newer provincial banks with limited experience from making crucial mistakes. 
Thus the City bankers also served as a core regulatory component of the banking system. 
Obviously they were still exposed to the risk of their correspondents indiscretions, however 
their attempts to manage the behaviour, while potentially restrictive to the country bank in 
question, could serve as a method of stabilising the system. 
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Chapter 5: City Banking: Forster, Lubbock & Co 
 
As has been suggested previously, the history of the London agency houses has been a 
subject inadequately studied by historians. What follows in this chapter is therefore an 
attempt to provide a more detailed examination of such an agency banks, through an 
examination of the early history of  Forster, Lubbock & Co, the third most important of the 
London agency houses at the end of the century.1 Despite its rapid rise and clear 
importance in London by the end of the eighteenth century, very little is known of the bank 
itself.2 This must be attributed to the apparent loss of the bulk of the bank’s records, both 
for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A small collection of documents from the 
firm’s early years do however survive, deposited in the Lubbock MSS in the Kent archives. 
The most significant surviving document of the bank is an out-letter book dated 1 October 
1771 to 14 August 1773, which covers the initial formation of the London bank. The only 
problem with this book is that it is impossible to say exactly who wrote the letters, as 
signatures were not included on these copyletters. However they offer a valuable insight 
into the operations of the bank and its interaction with its clients.3 This collection of 
documents forms the basis of the following chapter. It adds important detail on the activity 
of City banks, in the process reinforcing many of the themes of the previous two chapters. 
Furthermore it provides an opportunity to gain a rare insight into the process and 
challenges of establishing a new bank in the City.  
In common with a number of the City agency banks, including Jones, Loyd & Co and Smith, 
Payne & Smith, Forster, Lubbock & Co’s origins can be traced to a provincial banking 
company, in this instance the Miners Bank of Truro, Cornwall. The Miners Bank (Sir William 
Lemon Bart., Furley,4 Lubbock, Willyams, & Co) was formed in January 1771, but may have 
dated back as early as 1759. As the name implies, it derived its business initially from the 
mining interests of the area, but soon expanded to include the business of county families, 
the leading commercial interest and local public institutions.5 As was the case with a 
                                                             
1 See table above p. 113. For consistency, I refer to the London bank as Forster, Lubbock & Co, 
despite this name only emerging around 1800. The other principal names of the house were Sir 
William Lemon, Buller, Furley, Lubbock & Co at its foundation and Forster, Lubbock, Bosanquet & Co 
from 1785 to about 1800, with other minor name changes in between. 
2 Even for the period of the nineteenth century, a biography of a later Sir John Lubbock, Lord 
Avebury, largely manages to avoid dealing with the bank in which he was a partner. See Adrian 
Grant Duff, The Life-Work of Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock) 1834-1913 (London, 1924), pp. 13, 51-
3. 
3 Although it is impossible to say if this was the only out-letter book of this period, there are two 
reasons to believe it probably covers the majority of the bank’s non-London customers. Firstly, the 
letters are written in date order and are not grouped by client, which implies that these were the 
only clients at that time. Secondly the index covers the full range of the alphabet, reducing the 
possibility that letters were grouped alphabetically. 
4
 Furley is probably a modern spelling of this name; in the seventeenth and eighteenth century it 
appears to have been spelt Furly, the version used here. 
5
 See John Orbell and Alison Turton, British Banking; A guide to the Historical Records (Aldershot, 
2001), pp. 547-8; Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, pp. 595-6; Philip W. Matthews, 
and Anthony W. Tuke, History of Barclays Bank Limited (London, 1926), pp. 264-8. The complete set 
of initial partners is thought to have included Francis Basset, John Rogers and Humphrey 
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number of firms from the South West of England in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, a London house was also established, in this instance under the title of Sir William 
Lemon, Buller, Furly, Lubbock & Co.6 The London house was opened for business on 5 
February 1772, as indicated by a letter to James Willyams Junior which explained that ‘Your 
Friends Messrs Lemon & Buller were with me as they Attended yesterday at the Opening of 
our Bank’.7 The initial agreement to form the London house had been drawn up by early 
October 1771, when John Buller has sent copies of the partnership agreement to London to 
be signed by the partners located there.8 The evidence is not clear on the precise 
motivation of the partners for establishing the bank. A consideration of their background 
provides indications of their interests, as well as the personnel requirements of a successful 
banking venture in this period. 
The senior partners in both establishments were John Buller and William Lemon, and both 
brought considerable status to the new undertaking. The two men were brothers-in-law, 
Lemon having married John Buller’s eldest sister Jane, while Buller was married to Lemon’s 
sister Anne.9 Both families were also independently important, the Buller family having sat 
as Members of Parliament since the time of Queen Anne and acted as election managers 
for the Pelhams. John Buller’s mother was a daughter of Earl Bathurst, while Buller himself 
became an MP for Exeter in 1768.10 William Lemon’s father, also William, is noted as having 
‘had very extensive mining and commercial concerns’ in Cornwall. This William was created 
a baronet in May 1774 and also sat as an MP, first for Penryhn, then for Cornwall.11 Lemon 
was certainly involved in the Cornish mining industry and his move into banking was not 
unusual: there was a strong connection between tin-smelters, who were also financiers 
‘advancing money to the miners against tin bills they themselves issued as receipts for the 
tin left with them for smelting’, and banking in Cornwall.12 Having said this, the family does 
not feature prominently in any of the literature on the mining industry, while Lemon’s 
exact role with the bank is also not clear. 
There is a bit more clarity on Buller’s role within the bank. Pressnell states that Buller was 
introduced to both partnerships to reform the existing Cornish bank in 1771 and to set up 
the new London house, while Sir John Lubbock permanently moved to London to manage 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Mackworth-Praed, who left shortly thereafter to from Praed & Co (the Cornish Bank), at which point 
Buller was introduced as a partner in the Truro Bank. 
6 See above, p. 112-3, for other agency houses that originated from provincial banks. The South 
West was also responsible for the emergence of a number of merchant banking houses in London, 
notably the Barings and Gibbs bank. 
7 For the initial style of the firm, see the front cover of the letterbook, KHAC, EK-U1979/B2; for the 
opening of the bank see KHAC, EK-U1979/B2 letter to James Willyams Junior, 6th February 1772. 
Similarly the plan to open the bank on that day can be found in KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, letter to John 
Buller, 11 January 1772. 
8 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, letter to John Willyams Jr, 3 October 1771. 
9
 Debrett’s Baronetage of England, 7
th
 edition (London, 1839), pp. 201, 240-1. 
10
 Ian R. Christie, ‘Private Patronage versus Government Influence: John Buller and the Contest for 
Control of Parliamentary Elections at Saltash, 1780-1790’ The English Historical Review 71 (1956), 
pp. 249-50. 
11
 Debrett’s Baronetage of England, p. 201. 
12 D.B. Barton, A History of Tin Mining and Smelting in Cornwall (Marazion, 1967), pp. 19-22. 
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the house there in 1776.13 From the surviving letterbook, the first part of this statement 
appears plausible. Buller regularly received letters in Cornwall and seems to have spent 
much of his time there, although as indicated in the extract above, he did visit the London 
house as well. Throughout the correspondence, Buller appears to be the more active of the 
two senior partners, and it is to him that the junior partners often looked for final 
guidance.14 Pressnell’s comments on Lubbock are however probably mistaken. The letters 
and circumstantial evidence indicate that Lubbock was in London prior to 1776 and in fact 
was never in Cornwall. It is known that Lubbock’s family originated in Norwich and that he 
became a partner in a merchanting business in London with his father-in-law Frederick 
Commerell.15 He also continued in business with one Mr Preston, as seen by these 
comments : 
Having lately Commenced partnership in ye Banking business with Wm Lemon Esq 
of Truro Cornwall Jn Buller Esq, Member of Parliament for Exeter & Mr Jn Furly of 
this place [London] ... I thought it needful to give you this Notice for fear you 
should not know I was ye partner  ...  and if we can render you any Services here, or 
at Truro where we have a Bank ... I continue my Business as usual with Mr Preston, 
in which we are always at yr Service. 
This letter was written because the bank wished to use Berte to pay any bills the bank had 
negotiated on Leghorn and on which the original payee had defaulted, ‘to protect the 
Honour’ of the bank.16 Given these strong connections to the London financial and 
commercial world, it seems highly unlikely he would ever have been based in Cornwall. It is 
more plausible that Lubbock was, together with Furly, an active partner in the London bank 
who managed the business there from the outset. John Furly’s precise background is less 
clear than Lubbock’s, but again he appears to have been active in trade. He was a 
descendent of Benjamin Furly, originally of Colchester, but who emigrated to Holland 
around 1660 and became one of the leading merchants of Rotterdam.17 This Benjamin’s 
                                                             
13 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 107-9. This was based on information in Mathews and Tuke, 
History of Barclays Bank, p. 264. 
14 This judgement is partially impressionistic, however there are letters that refer to seeking Mr 
Buller’s opinion in a way that cannot be said about Mr Lemon. See for example KHAC, EK-U1979, to 
James Willyams, 16 and 21 July 1772, or to John Buller himself 19 Nov 1771. It is not possible to 
comment on their engagement with the Truro bank.   
15 Robert Birkbeck, Notes on the History and Genealogy of the Family of Lubbock (London, 1891), pp. 
7-8 and 28-30. Few records of this partnership of Commerell and Lubbock survive in the Kent 
Archive Centre, however KHAC, EK-U1979/B1/10 shows a proposal for admitting one Mr Tuckwell to 
this partnership. It indicates that the partnership employed a capital of about £20,000, so was a 
business of reasonable size. 
16 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to Francis Berte, 29 May 1772. The business with Preston appears to have 
been in insurance. 
17 Julius F. Sachse, Benjamin Furly and Symon Jansz Vettekeücken, ‘Benjamin Furly’, The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 19.3 (1895), p. 277-8;Henry Horwitz and James 
Oldham, ‘John Locke, Lord Mansfield, and Arbitration during the Eighteenth Century’, The Historical 
Journal 36.1 (1993), p. 139; Charles R. Simpson, ‘Benjamin Furly, Quaker Merchant, and his 
Statesmen Friends’ Journal of the Friends’, Historical Society vol. XI (1914) pp. 62-73. He was 
certainly resident in Rotterdam in 1696, in 1696, but also appears to have been declared bankrupt in 
London in 1705, see H. R. French, ‘“Ingenious & Learned Gentlemen”: Social Perceptions and Self-
Fashioning among Parish Elites in Essex, 1680-1740’, Social History 25.1 (2000), p. 59. 
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sons were Benjamin, John and Arent, the elder two both merchants, while he also had a 
daughter named Dorothy. The younger Benjamin, like his father, appears to have remained 
in Rotterdam, for he died there in 1738. John Furly is known to have been active both in 
Amsterdam and London and it is possible that he eventually moved permanently to London 
and was the original partner in the bank.18 Thus, in common with many of the City banks to 
emerge in this period, the London end of the business was in the hands of two men from 
families with significant mercantile pedigree and commercial experience in their own right. 
Together the four partners of the bank therefore offered a useful combination of status, 
commercial expertise, and local knowledge of both London and the Cornwall economy, 
that was likely helpful in ensuring the bank’s viability and later success. 
The business over which they presided was initially small as judged by the number of 
customers outside of London. The index to the letterbook lists 71 distinct correspondents; 
however it is apparent that not all of these were clients of the bank, as some received only 
one or two letters, often in relation to a request by another client. Excluding recipients of 
three or fewer letters brings the total number of provincial customers down to 33 at this 
point. The index also provides details on the location of most of these clients, which has 
been summarised in Table 6. 
Location Number of customers % of Total 
Cornwall and Devon  11 33% 
Bristol and Bewdley 5 15% 
Other South England (mainly Norwich) 6 18% 
Northern towns, inc Birmingham 7 21% 
Unknown 4 12% 
Total 33 
 Table 6: Non-London based customers of Messrs Lemon, Buller & Co, 1771-3 (Source: KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, 
index) 
Although there are clearly notable concentrations in certain regions, it is apparent that the 
bank’s connections were quite widespread. Given the partners’ connection to Truro, the 
region of the South West is unsurprisingly well represented, with customers in Cornwall 
and Devon, especially Exeter. The Bristol merchants are also prominent, including 
important people of that town such as Ewbank & Co, Benjamin Loscombe, a banker in 
Bristol by 1774, and John Champion.19 Other clients were distributed in identifiable clusters 
around the country: there are 3 entries for Norwich. There are also contacts in newer cities, 
including Leeds, Sunderland, Whitehaven and Birmingham. One notable correspondent 
from this list is Samuel Skey & Co: by 1782, Samuel Skey was involved in the banking in 
                                                             
18 Sachse, Furly and Vettekeücken, ‘Benjamin Furly’, p. 296. They state that very little is known of 
this John, and give no date of birth. It is possible that the he is the banker, although he would have 
been old by this point: Benjamin was born in 1681, while Dorothy was born in 1710. There is 
therefore potentially a generation in between. Dorothy provided a key connection between the 
Rotterdam merchants and the bank, see below, p. 125. 
19
 Benjamin Loscombe was a partner in Peach & Co, which existed by 1774 to 1781, then operated as  
a banker by himself for another two years, failing in 1783, see Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country 
Banks, vol .2, pp. 102-3. 
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Bewdley, Worcestershire, with Forster, Lubbock & Co as their agent.20 Finally, although 
none were regular contacts and therefore do not appear in the above table, this index 
shows the existence of an international network covering Amsterdam, Barcelona, Verona, 
Ghent and Leghorn.21 This analysis demonstrates that the core of a new bank’s customers 
was clustered around the original home locality of the partners. However to function 
effectively, the network of correspondents needed to be reasonably broad and new 
business could be acquired almost anywhere in the country. The experience of this bank is 
also in contrast to Sayers’ opinion of London banks rarely doing business for provincial 
firms.22 Instead it suggests that the engagement in this type of business was very much at 
the discretion of the partners and may have varied considerably from bank to bank. Indeed 
there is no reason why a bank that engaged as an agent for country banks should not wish 
to carry out the London business of a large provincial firm, presuming the volume of 
business was adequate.   
The principal correspondent by number of letters received was James Willyams. His father 
was John Willyams of Carnanton, who as well as being a customer of the London bank, was 
probably related to Sir William Lemon.23 James Willyams was a partner in the Truro bank, 
and probably managed the business in Cornwall on a day-to-day basis.24 From 1777 to 
1785, he was also apparently a partner in the London house.25 The letters he received, 
covering the opening of the London house, are particularly informative in providing an 
insight into the way the business between the two connected houses was to be managed. 
The first point that becomes readily apparent is that the London operation was acting as 
the agent of the Truro bank before the articles of partnership were formally signed and the 
bank opened. Letters from October 1771 through to February 1772 shows that they were 
already accepting remittances and paying drafts of the Truro Bank at this point.26 Clearly 
there were difficulties that needed to be addressed at this stage. For example cheques that 
were due for payment in Cornwall found their way to London, which had the potential to 
cause difficulties for the London house and which were therefore important to iron out.27 
Other suggestions for the simpler running of the London account was that Willyams should 
add the Christian names to all bills mentioned in letters, so that the London house would 
                                                             
20 See Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, pp. 50-1; Crick, and Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of 
Joint-Stock Banking, pp. 46-7. Skey was in partnership as a banker with the attorney Wilson Roberts 
until 1790, when he set himself up independently. He had been apprenticed to a grocer and 
drysalter, going on to build a large works and to make a fortune through manufacturing sulphuric 
and nitric acid, as well as brass and pewter ware. In 1821 the bank had a capital of £21,000. 
21 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, Letter Book of Lubbock Forster & Co, 1771-3, index. 
22 Sayers, Lloyds Bank, pp. 89-91. 
23 Debrett’s Baronetage of England, p. 201. Sir William Lemon’s father was married to Anne, 
daughter of a John Willyams of Carnanton. If there was no generational gap, then the John Willyams 
in this correspondence would be Sir William Lemon’s grand-father, however given the ages implied, 
it is more likely that he was an uncle or cousin. 
24
 Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, p. 596. 
25
 KHAC, EK-U1979/B8/1. From this he may he have replaced Buller’s position in the London 
partnership. 
26
 See for example KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, letters to James Willyams on 1 Oct, 26 Nov 1771. There are 
many other instances. 
27 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to James Willyams, 19 Nov 1771, 23 Nov 1771. 
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be clear to whom these bills referred.28 Other issues addressed included simple 
administrative tasks, such as getting cheques for both banks printed.29 Equally there was a 
degree of caution at this early stage. The London house was reluctant to take on any new 
customers in London until both Lemon and Buller had arrived in the capital.30 This 
highlights that the senior partners’ did not just lend their names to the firm, but were 
genuinely engaged with the business, particularly perhaps in the management of client 
relationships. However there was also recognition on the part of the London bank that they 
could not afford to keep their new clients waiting too long as was explained to John Buller:  
those Friends who intend opening accounts with us are very desirous to know 
when we intend to begin that I beg the Fav’r to know whether the 1st February 
w[oul]d Suite Mr Lemon & You & whether you would permit me to fix it for that 
Day.31 
This point illustrates some of the practical difficulties of maintaining banks based on 
interlocking partnerships. Most importantly, it highlights the degree of trust and 
confidence that needed to be placed in the people actually operating the various branches 
for this approach to be successful. It may form part of the explanation as to why 
interlocking partnerships appeared so rarely. By way of comparison, the Smiths, despite 
being covered by one partnership agreement, managed the London branch independently 
under the direction of John Payne and then Robert Smith.32 
Because the banks were closely connected, it was possible to discuss business matters in a 
way that would not have appeared if the Truro bank had been a standard customer of the 
London bank. Thus beyond fixing administrative difficulties, discussions on the appropriate 
approaches to the conduct of the banking business also appear in the letters.  For example 
there was a clear emphasis that loans should be charged at 5%: ‘I by no means approve of 
advancing Mon[e]y at only 4% p. ann. For the reason you mention if we do to one we must 
to all & advancing under 5% p. ann. is quite contrary to the Custom or Method of any 
Banker whatever’.33 In December 1771, one of the letters noted that the London bank was 
glad to hear that the bank in Truro was doing well.34 The relationship between the two 
banks becomes clearer from a letter from February 1772, where the writer states: 
I am obliged to you for ye particular you send me of the transactions at Truro, & I 
am in hopes in time we may make more Advantages there first by getting money 
on our notes which in time ye people of the Country must find more Convenient 
than Specie & secondly by receiving Interest on Cash given for Bills on London & 
think you would do well to take what money you can get at 2% p.a. for as soon as 
                                                             
28 Ibid.,, to James Willyams, 5 Oct 1771. 
29
 Ibid., to James Willyams, 3 Oct 1771. 
30
 Ibid., to James Willyams, 30 November 1771. 
31
 Ibid., to John Buller, 2 January 1772. 
32
 Leighton Boyce, Smiths the Bankers, pp. 68-9, 74-6. The Nottingham bank was run by Abel Smith II.  
33
 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to James Willyams, 21 Nov 1771. 
34 Ibid., to James Willyams, 7 Dec 1771. 
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you can send me that Cash here by Bills on London I can most commonly make 5% 
of it & always 4%.35 
The sentiment was reiterated a few days later, when the writer bemoaned the shortage of 
money in Cornwall, but re-iterated his hope that this would get more of the bank’s notes 
into circulation. To this effect he also noted the efforts of John Oliver Willyams, father of 
James Willyams, at Carnanton to collect money on the bank’s behalf.36 At this point the 
balance of the Truro bank in London was about £8,917. This figure included all drafts made 
on the house which had been accepted, so the actual cash balance was somewhat higher at 
£11,794.37 Subsequent attempts to increase the resources of the Truro bank were always of 
considerable interest to the London bank. The bank was especially supportive of the plan 
by the Truro bank to potentially offer customers 3% interest for deposits left for six 
months, at the end of which they would be given the option of either renewing the 6 
month term or to renew on a note at 60 days sight, as this was definitely expected to be in 
the bank’s interest.38 An ‘experiment’ in issuing £5 and £10 notes, presumably to expand 
the bank’s circulation, was also encouraged by the London bankers.39  
These letter are incredibly significant in providing an understanding of the type of business 
the London bank hoped to operate. It is quite clear that it expected the increased deposits 
and note issues of the Truro to be of advantage to the resources of the London bank as 
well. The combined banks were operating a simple carry trade, where they would borrow 
at 2-3% and lend 4-5%, in the process in profiting from the 2-3% margin. It is unfortunate 
that it is not possible to see the accounts that would confirm the size of this type of 
business. It is also exceptionally hard from this type of letter to argue that the London or 
Truro bank was designed to boost the industry of Cornwall. There is no evidence from the 
letters of an interest in lending long-term to the tin-mining industry. Indeed, as will be 
shown shortly, there was a specific desire to avoid entanglements in the tin trade. What 
the Truro bank appears to have offered was a solution to the shortage of circulating 
medium and a relatively safe place to save. The correspondence also implies a surplus of 
short-term funds locally, which could funnel towards London, where there was always 
demand for these funds. This is very important in what it says about the English economy 
at this period in time. 
As well as the close relationship with the Truro bank itself, other letters indicate that the 
London bank acted on behalf of individuals who were agents of the Truro Bank. Most 
clients of the Truro bank would not have unrestricted drawing rights on the London house, 
as the latter would have no way of establishing the position of that person’s account in 
Truro. Mr William Harris of Cambourne was an important enough customer that the 
London house was happy to let him draw as much as he wanted in London, ‘it is hardly 
probable such a gentleman should overdraw, & if by accident it should happen observe we 
                                                             
35
 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to James Willyams, 27 February 1772. Unfortunately it is not possible to say 
exactly how this was achieved. 
36
 Ibid., to James Willyams, 5 March 1772. 
37
 Ibid., to James Willyams, 27 February 1772. 
38
 Ibid., to James Willyams, 13 June 1772. 
39 Ibid., to James Willyams, 30 June 1772. 
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are very safe’.40 In the early stages all the bills remitted by Harris and made by him were 
credited/debited to the account of the Truro bank. The London bank again highlights the 
somewhat different nature of these transactions by stating that Mr Harris does ‘not 
Correspond with the London Bank’, i.e. that all these transactions are carried out in the 
name of the Truro bank.41  Shortly afterwards the London bank sought to clarify this 
arrangement, asking the Truro bank if the transaction of Harris and one Mr Martin 
Stephens should continue to be directly passed through the Truro account, or if they should 
be set up as individual accounts.42 This method of accounting was confirmed as desirable.43 
A similar arrangement was established with Philip Richards of Penryn, who was regarded by 
the London bank as part of its ‘Country Connection’.44 Indeed from the wider 
correspondence it would appear that Richards’ agency for the Truro bank was the more 
substantial and that he was more often consulted on matters pertaining to the running of 
the bank. Unlike Harris, Richards was a direct recipient of correspondence in his own right 
from the London bank. While he was then more substantial, he was still closely linked to 
the Truro bank. 
These arrangements are significant because the country banks of the eighteenth century 
are generally regarded as unitary establishments, with a very narrow geographic reach. 
When considering country bank networks, studies have tended to focus on formal branches 
or offices that were established. Pressnell’s numbers suggest that by the mid 1780s, there 
were only seven banks with more than one office, and by the end of the century 14. The 
analysis is focused on banks with clear branches, such as the Gurneys or the Smiths.45 It is 
however possible that the use of agents has been overlooked, for the Truro bank is not the 
only example of such a relationship. Messrs Walkers & Co. of Sheffield maintained from the 
outset a ‘dual bank’ with an office in Rotherham, which initially was the bank’s head office. 
Rotherham’s significance, despite being smaller in population terms, was in its position 
with regards to the post office and being the seat of the county administration.46 Lampard’s 
analysis of the Margate bank demonstrates a similar network of local agents. It had agents 
in Canterbury (John Matthews, a builder and surveyor, and Epps & Co, wool merchants) 
and Sandwich, where Mr Josiah Stewart, a general merchant, worked on behalf of the 
bank.47 These agents were useful for the bank, partly for the local knowledge they 
provided, but also because they expanded the bank’s reach by procuring bills for discount 
and circulating its notes. These local agents were similarly connected to the head office’s 
London banker, in this case Esdaile’s. If Esdaile received a bill payable in Canterbury, then 
                                                             
40 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to James Willyams, 7 Dec 1771. 
41 Ibid., to James Willyams, 31 December 1771. 
42 Ibid., to James Willyams, 4 January 1772. Mr Stephens also appears to be of Cambourne, it is 
however not clear if both he and Harris were acting separately or in conjunction for the Truro bank 
in that town. 
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 Ibid., to James Willyams, 9 January 1772. 
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 Ibid., to Philip Richards, 23 June 1772. 
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 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 126-9. 
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 R.E. Leader, ‘The Early Sheffield Banks’, Journal of the Institute of Bankers, 38 (1917) p. 236. 
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 For Matthews, see Lampard, ‘Cobb & Son, bankers of Margate’, pp. 329-34. For Stewart, see ibid., 
pp. 334-36. 
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these could be dispatched directly to Canterbury. Once the money had been collected it 
was left at Matthew’s discretion whether it would be remitted to Margate or London.48 
In examining regional transfers, it should also be noted that despite the dominance of 
London, other cities still had some uses. In the case of Forster, Lubbock & Co it can be most 
clearly seen inBristol. The London bank made financial transactions through Bristol, as can 
be seen by the correspondence with Loscombe. There were two types: bills in favour of the 
Truro bank or Philip Richards that were payable in Bristol, but had come into the hands of 
the London agent and for which they wanted the money to be lodged in London. Thus 
Loscombe would often send bills on London banks and Bank of England notes to London. Of 
£800 that the bank was due to receive in favour of the Truro bank, they wrote to Loscombe 
to please ‘when due to make us returns for, with Bills on London but please if possible not 
to send us many small bills & not to endorse the Bills to our order’.49 Alternatively 
Loscombe also sent bills payable to Richards in London to the bank there to be collected.50 
Although the London bank had capacity to undertake transactions for Truro through 
Bristol, they were apprehensive of the cost of doing this. In reference to the £800 
mentioned above, the London bank suggested that: 
I was afraid their [other Bristol correspondents] Charges of Com[missio]n for 
receiving & remitt[in]g ye produce would have been to high as they pay me ¼ per 
cent for doeing such Business for them & that being ye Customary Charge in such 
cases, the making us Remitt[an]ces on Bristoll had better be if possible avoided I 
think.51 
The example is interesting in showing the general shape of the payment network that was 
in place at this time. In general it seems that the main flow of money was directly between 
London and Truro. However clearly in certain instances it was convenient to route these 
transactions through Bristol. 
Returning to the actual activities of Messrs Lemon & Co’s London bank, the letters provide 
an insight into the types of business that the bank was seeking to become involved in. 
Negotiations with a Mr Rosewarne show that although a potentially substantial business 
was obviously welcome to the partners of the bank, this would not to be done at any 
price.52 Rosewarne believed his business with the bank would amount to about £60,000 per 
year, which the partners regarded as attractive. They were less inclined to accede to his 
wishes that the bank guarantee to purchase a set quantity of tin per month or quarter at 
market price.53 The objection to this was twofold. One objection was that the London bank 
had no desire to ‘meddle’ in the trade which ‘would give Offence in general to the People 
of the County which we should avoid if Possible & should we Oblige one by taking tin in this 
manner others w[oul]d Expect it of us till at last we should be loaded with it [tin]’. There 
                                                             
48 KHAC, EK-U1453/B3/14/7, Esdaile’s to Cobb & Son, 2 June 1787. 
49
 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to Benjamin Loscombe, 18 June 1772. 
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 Ibid., to Benjamin Loscombe, 25 of February 1772. 
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 Ibid., to James Willyams, 18 June 1772. 
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 This is likely to be Walter Rosewarne, owner of Carvedras, an eight-furnace smelting house near 
Truro, see Barton, A History of Tin Mining and Smelting in Cornwall, pp. 21-2. 
53 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to John Buller, 19 Nov 1771. 
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was a belief that there were more attractive ways for the bank to employ its resources 
rather than in the tin trade. More interesting from the perspective of this study was the 
belief that the obligation to take this tin would act as a restraint upon the firm’s capital. In 
the event of a war there would be no flexibility to exploit other more profitable 
opportunities that inevitably, in their opinion, arose, and the firm would be exposed to 
losses from the fall in the value of tin that a war would likely cause.54 Even without a war it 
might constrain the firm in a way that was disadvantageous: 
as our Success here must Depend on our Obliging those Friends who open 
Accounts with us by Discounts which Paper I can ever turn into mon[e]y again at a 
days notice should it be wanted; but tin may lay many months before we can see 
Mony for it & at last perhaps sell to loss & the risk is Certainly much greater than a 
good bill with several Indorsers upon it or than Navy bills or India Bonds.55 
Not unsurprisingly, the London house was very keen to maintain a balance sheet that was 
as liquid as they could manage. Indeed it argued that ‘as Bankers we have nothing to Trade’ 
but needed to focus on discounting good paper for its customers.56 By this, the bank 
presumably refers to the direct financing of commercial and industrial ventures, although it 
does still imply a narrow, specialised focus. It is also interesting because it is one of the few 
references  to the types of investment the London house was making with its cash. It was 
not always possible to adhere to these ideals though. When Mr Lemon needed to dispose 
of surplus tin, the London house was not pleased by the prospect, but could not really 
refuse its partner.57 
Concerns about the management of the London business’ cash come through from other 
parts of the correspondence as well. The question of large drafts on the London house was 
one of concern. They wrote to Willyams that: 
we could Wish it was Possible for you to Persuade those People who take such 
Large bills on our House here as Mr Coppingers to take them at 30 days, which 
w[oul]d be of Great service to us if in your Power to do it.58 
This was broadly a repetition of a point already made in January, when the Truro bank 
drew £3,088 on the London bank via notes at hand, which had to be paid at sight. This was 
of course paid. However the bank on this occasion requested that in future such drawing 
be made at 3 to 4 days sight, as ‘we must not let money lay idle’ and they ‘should have 
quite sufficient time to find the cash in that time’.59 The bankers were therefore clearly 
aware of the conflicting desires to maintain a significant degree of liquidity, but not to keep 
too much cash at hand. If they had more notice of large drawings, then it let them run their 
business more effectively. However they also acknowledged that they did not have 
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complete control over this, as in relation to Copinger’s bills, they later wrote to Willyams 
that while it was desirable to get bills at a longer date: 
as it is full as Necessary you should have cash with you as that we should have it 
here, [and]  Mr Copinger frequently supplys you with it, I don’t by any means think 
it would be worth our while to Lett him Carry it any where else & therefore I think  
you had better not give up the connection. 60 
In this instance, it appears that the bank was trapped by their customer to provide the 
money required. While it was the most desirable form of conducting business from the 
London bank’s perspective, the business was valuable enough that they did not wish to lose 
it to a competitor, which appears to have been a genuine risk on this occasion.  
A strict focus on cash management was especially important in early 1772, which had not 
been the most auspicious time to start a new banking venture. Shortly after the bank’s 
opening, Britain was engulfed in a severe financial crisis. The tightness in the credit markets 
was clearly settling in by the beginning of the year, as the London house reported that 
money was scarce in London, Exeter and Truro, where Sir John Molesworth’s bank 
apparently had needed to have coin sent to it by land carriage.61 The shortage of cash was 
initially regarded as an opportunity, with hopes the Truro Bank  
may Introduce the use of Notes which must be much more commodious to people 
to be paid in than in Money & to make them circulate about the County of Cornwall 
is much to be wished for our Interest.62  
On 11 June, the London bank reported the failure of Neale, James, Fordyce & Down to the 
Truro agent. This had occasioned ‘great confusion’ and therefore the London bank was 
hopeful that Truro would send them any remittances they could spare, as they expected 
cash to become scarce.63 This sense of panic was heightened by the Glyn & Hallifax 
stopping payment at the end of the month. At this stage they reported that there ‘are 2 
more considerable Bankers in ye City & 2 at ye other end of the Town much talk’d of that 
you may suppose ye generall distress there is here & very great Scarcity of mony’. This 
caused the bank to bemoan the timing of the Truro bank drawing for £2,089 and led to a 
repeated request for extra remittances.64 When the Douglas Bank also stopped payment, 
the situation was such that the London bank argued that ‘I am fearfull such a scene will 
happen now as has never been known since ye year 1720’. Once again however this was 
not a time of complete despair, for they also argued that ‘those who can stand their ground 
at present may do well hereafter but it will be a very trying time indeed’.65 In July the tone 
of the letters improved and it seemed that the crisis might pass. However by 1773 the 
situation was again looking more precarious. The failure of the house of Clifford & Sons in 
Amsterdam caused ‘distress & confusion’, although fortunately neither of Lubbock or 
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Furly’s merchant businesses was directly affected by the failure, there was apprehension 
about indirect difficulties. Once again the call for extra remittances was repeated.66 The 
response to the crisis was clear: reduce the acceptance the firm was under as much as 
possible and lean on the country connection to increase its remittances. However the firm 
did find that the country bank connection was a two-edged sword, for its drawings could 
put extra demands on the London house that at this time were not welcome.67 
While the periods of crisis were difficult for the bank, they did also present opportunities.  
This was still a new bank intent on extending its connections. The correspondence shows 
how the partners sought to expand the bank. Norwich in particular appears to have been 
an area where the bank wanted to expand its business. One of the earliest firms to be 
approached in this area was Allday and Kerrison.68 Despite intervention of one Thomas 
Durrant, the attempt to gain this firm’s customs appears to have failed. The letter does 
however give an indication as to why the bank wanted this business in particular: 
We are promised by some Norfolk Salesmen that they will pay the Money into our 
House provided we will pay the same by a Friend at Norwich, which makes it 
absolutely necessary for us to have a Correspondence with your place & we know 
no House whose Friendship would be more desirable to us than your Good selves.69  
Further examples of the efforts made towards expanding the business in this region can be 
found when Sir William Lemon Forster Lubbock and Co discovered that Messrs Bevan & Co 
were ‘declining the Banking Business in Norwich’. On this occasion the bank was targeting 
in particular the following firms of the Norwich area: Messrs Edmund Gurney & Ellington, 
Mr William Mack, Messrs Addey & Page, Messrs Crowe & Taylor, Messrs Kett, Wells & 
Peckover, and Mr John Thurlow. To each of these houses the bank had written expressing 
their willingness to act as bankers for them.70 However the bank hoped that Scott & Son 
might recommend the bank to any of these houses if they were acquainted with them.71   
Some attempts to gain new custom more explicitly sought to exploit competitors’ 
weaknesses. In January 1773, Messrs Lemon, Buller & Co had attempted to win business 
from George Colebrooke’s bank, in this instance focusing on one Mr Carter, a grocer in 
Norwich who supposedly wished to leave that bank. Scott & Son was again requested to 
testify to the bank’s diligence; however they apparently had no connection to Carter.72  
When the firm of Sir George Colebrooke, Lessingham and Binns failed on 31 March 1773, it 
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was well-established.73 Hilton Price placed the earliest record of the firm to 1706, under 
James Colebrooke, who was described as a scrivener. By 1736 they were established near 
the Royal Exchange as Colebrooke, Rooke and Harvey.74 Sir George Colebrooke himself had 
important mercantile connections, being chairman of the East India Company and having 
inherited £200,000 from his father-in-law, Peter Gaynor, a merchant and planter in 
Antigua.75 This meant that it had some strong connections that the new bank wished to 
attract. Messrs Lemon targeted the business of the Norwich banker Charles Weston, who 
had previously used Colebrook as his London agent.76 In this instance Scott does appear to 
have made some efforts on the London bank’s behalf, however this was ultimately futile as 
in April Messrs Lemon wrote to them that:  
we are exceedingly obliged to you for your kind readiness to serve us on all 
occasions & for your very obliging desire that we should succeed in our attempts to 
increase our Connections which however to our surprise & disappointment we 
have failed in. 
Despite Messrs Lemons taking up the Norwich bank’s bills at Colebrooke’s failure, which 
might otherwise have remained unpaid, the Weston Bank took up the services of Messrs 
Fuller, Halford & Vaughan.77 While the expansion of the firm’s business was clearly 
desirable, the bank was also aware that during a crisis this needed to be done with caution 
and the people they chose to target were deliberate choices. The need to avoid reckless 
behaviour was emphasised in a letter to Richards:  
Had we attended to Nothing but the increasing our Number to the Bank we could 
have Procur’d many new Customers indeed, but we first Consider’d how far we 
could with Prudence assist ‘em which Occasion’d us to give up many we could 
Sincerely have wish’d to have had, & had we Acted otherways we sh[oul]d with 
reason soon have brought the Reflection of our Friends in the Country upon us by 
making as Ridiculous a figure as some of our Neighbours have done here.78 
It is now necessary to consider the actual business undertaken for clients. As has already 
been suggested, some business was gained through the personal activities of the partners 
of the bank, such as through the sale of tin. However this was not the only business that 
was carried out for the clients. The London bankers also carried out services more usually 
associated with West End bankers. In early December, one of the partners went to Messrs 
Coulthard & Wildman to gain power of attorneys to receive dividends on stocks and shares 
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and interest on mortgages on behalf of Lemon and/or Buller.79 It would seem from later 
correspondence that this firm of attorneys had been used by the two senior partners to 
handle their financial affairs in London prior to the establishment of their bank there. This 
would not be implausible, as they were an eminent firm known to have specialised in 
conveyancing and providing financial advice to the gentry and aristocracy.80 Despite 
Coulthard in particular enjoying a reputation as being able and honest, the relationship 
with these attorneys had clearly become fraught. By July 1772, there was hope that Buller 
might be able to forward the dispute with Coulthard.81 The difficulties stemmed from 
Coulthard being slow or reluctant to pass over money to the London bank: ‘for does he 
once get it [the money due to Lemon from a repaid mortgage] in his hands it will I am 
afraid be a very difficult matter to get it out again’.82 The attorney was uncooperative in 
providing information to the bank on where to collect interest on mortgages due to Mr 
Lemon.83 This exchange is interesting because it highlights the declining importance of 
attorneys in administering the finances of the gentry, but also shows how long their 
influence nonetheless lingered in this sphere. It would also indicate that the beneficiaries of 
this shift away from attorneys as financial intermediaries were not always West End 
bankers, as one might have anticipated. Yet one would not want to over-emphasise this 
latter point, as it may have simply been a favour to the partners of the bank that brought it 
this type of business. Finally one should note that certainly in the summer of 1772, Sir 
William Lemon was not the customer the bank might have hoped for. At this point the 
London partners were complaining to Willyams about the extent of the drawing on 
Lemon’s account, claiming that a man of Mr Lemon’s ‘consequence & situation in Life 
...[should] have something Handsome on his account which is customary even was he not a 
Partner’.84 
The more typical business consisted of three main activities, for which standard rates were 
given. Firstly the bank would receive remittals and accept drafts that customers wished to 
make on it, for which a commission of 0.33% was payable, and which was the most visible 
in the correspondence. Secondly the bank was willing to arrange the insurance needs of 
customers (0.25% commission); and finally it could negotiate foreign bills of behalf of the 
client (0.1% commission).85 Not all clients availed themselves of all three facilities and there 
was some flexibility over price. Thus the bank wrote to Christian Bramley in Leeds that the 
standard charge for paying drafts and acceptances was 0.33%, however if he had ‘not many 
foreign Bills to negotiate we will accept yr dr[a]fts for ¼ p.ct.’.86 This preferential rate 
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appears also to have been offered to Messrs Wormald & Fontaine and Mr James Rhodes, 
both also of Leeds.87 Lubbock’s association with Preston appears to have caused some 
difficulty at this early stage in relation to the insurance business. As Preston did not 
participate in the bank, he was keen to protect his insurance business from competition 
from the bank, and must have reached some sort of understanding with Lubbock on this 
matter. A letter to Messrs Grundy & Russell indicates the problem this caused: 
As Mr Preston has no concern in our Present undertaking [the bank] we would wish 
not to interfere in any Concerns with Lubbock & Preston, the matter now in 
question of negotiating of Bills is not an Object for you & them to differ About & 
which we hope will be Agreeably settled.88 
Clearly the business of Preston and Lubbock was purely related to the insurance, and it 
would seem that Lubbock probably approached some of the clients of this firm to join his 
new banking venture. Where this was so, Preston expected to continue to carry out the 
insurance business. In these instances the bank was determined not to do anything 
‘unhandsome’ by Mr Preston.89 
If the accounts of both Scott & Sons and Edward Penfold, of Arundel, are at all 
representative, then the key part of the bank’s business was in handling clients’remittals. 
Penfold’s correspondence was incredibly regular and was exclusively focused on drafts and 
remittals, no other business appearing.90 Scott’s account was more extensive. In the period 
from 29 October 1772 to 13 August 1773, Scott appears to have remitted £9,300 to the 
bank and drawn on it for about £9,100.91 Once again one finds that the vast majority of the 
business was focused on the remittals of cash and drafts on the London house. Some other 
services were provided, including a couple of instances where foreign drafts were 
negotiated and bills protested for non-payment, such as a remittance on Aron Goldsmid for 
£250, who stopped payment in January 1773.92 Toward the end of the period covered by 
the letter book, the bank also appears to have been sourcing specie for Scott and sending 
this to Norwich.93 
In contrast, lending was an area that the bank seemed determined to avoid. In most of the 
letters laying out the terms of business, it is clear that the bank charged 5% per annum on 
any money it lent to clients. However it also appeared to be extremely reluctant to do so. 
The London bank noted that: 
as it is not the Business of a Banker to accept without Effects we hope you’ll not be 
offended at our begging the favour that you will not expect we should accept 
farther than for the remittances you make us.94 
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It appears that the bank was not overly concerned about when these remittances were 
due, explaining that ‘should said remittances have a month or two to run, that would be no 
objection to us’.95 What the bank wished to avoid was to find itself in a situation where it 
was completely uncovered. If the customer ever did end up drawing for a sum greater than 
which he had remitted, then the bank reserved the right to charge interest on this 
overdraft.96 
If a customer consistently failed to provide adequate remittals, the bank could refuse to 
carry on its business with a firm. This situation arose with Anthony Rutherford, a customer 
located in Sunderland. The problems with this account emerged at the end of June, when 
the bank demanded that he send some bills as: 
the paper we have received from you is not altogether what we approve of and we 
desire you will not pay any farther drafts on us for as the paper you in general 
remit we have not a sufficient knowledge of to be thoroughly satisfy’d with, we 
would rather decline doing your Business.97   
Part of the problem with Rutherford’s business was that the bank was not acquainted with 
the people on whom Rutherford’s remittals were drawn. If they had been better 
acquainted, they may have been able to make a more subjective judgement on whether 
the paper would eventually be paid, even if this was not punctual at the time. However a 
continuous stream of remittances that were not paid or accepted over the next month 
convinced the bank that the business ‘gives us so much trouble & Occasion us so much 
more risk’ that they were right to ask for the account to be closed.98 The bank further 
wrote that  
we are much disappointed ... that there should have been any Occasion to Return 
yr drafts, but you cannot reasonably wonder at it when you consider yr 
Remitt[an]ces were refused Acceptance & some sent back with protest & others on 
those who did not pay their acceptances when due; we wish for your sake as well 
as our own that ye had been moore punctual in yr dealings with us.99  
Closing the account however did take some time: in November the balance was -£178 and 
by March 1773 had still not been paid off in full.100 One does wonder if economic 
conditions had been better whether Rutherford might have been afforded a little bit more 
time to sort his account than he was given. However it does indicate the focus of the 
management of the bank on avoiding unplanned lending and carrying out a business that 
was as safe as they could manage. 
Rutherford was not the only customer to leave the bank at this stage. Others also left of 
their own accord, much to the chagrin of the bank’s managers. In July 1772, the bank was 
                                                             
95
 KHAC, EK-U1979/B2, to Christian Routh, 7 July 1772. 
96
 Ibid., to Messrs Wormald & Fontaine, 29 August 1772. 
97
 Ibid., to Rutherford, 25 June 1772. 
98
 Ibid., to Rutherford, 17 July 1772. 
99
 Ibid., to Rutherford, 30 July 1772. 
100 Ibid., to Rutherford 13 November 1772, 29 March 1773. 
138 
 
reporting to Willyams that one Mr Pengree was leaving the bank ‘because we would not 
discount paper we by no means approved of’, but was more concerned by one Mr Kevill 
having drawn his exact balance on the bank, fearing he might be leaving.101 The departure 
of the latter was confirmed by the end of the month, when he switched his custom to 
Biddulph & Cox, which was ‘very disagreeable’.102 
The section above has sought to provide an insight into the operations of a newly 
established City bank, in terms of the type of business it undertook, the opportunities it 
saw, the difficulties it faced and the relationship between the London bank and its country 
counterpart. The absence of balance sheets or other accounts makes it impossible to form 
a precise view of the scale of the business at this early stage.103 The bank at its opening was 
obviously small: it is mentioned that the balance at the close of the first day was 
£6,362.12.11, although it is unclear how this was calculated.104 While tracing the bank’s 
development into a major agency house over the next twenty years is unfortunately not 
possible, the following part will focus on some of the information that is available for the 
later periods. 
Over the next 15 years, the bank saw extensive changes in its partners: John Buller 
probably retired in 1776, while Willyams was made a partner the following year.105 In 
February 1785, Sir William Lemon announced his retirement from the firm to its clients, 
ensuring them that ‘it is on the most amicable footing with my late Partners to convince 
you of which permit me to recommend the Continuance of your favours to them’. This 
correspondence also notified the client of the decision to enlarge the partnership through 
the appointment of William Bosanquet, the firm now becoming Furly, Lubbock, Bosanquet 
& Co. Again the continuing partners expressed their hope that the customers would 
continue their business with the firm.106 While potentially a mere formality, the document 
indicates the risk of client defections due to a change in the partners of the bank and the 
need to pre-empt these if possible. It is noticeable that a similar letter was printed later the 
same year when John Furly chose to retire and Edward Forster was to assume his 
position.107 
Both Edward Forster and William Bosanquet were typical of London banks drawing upon 
the City’s merchant classes to provide new bankers. Edward Forster was born in 1765 and 
thus was twenty when he became a partner in the bank. His father, also Edward, was the 
son of Dorothy Furly, who had married Thomas Forster of Walthamstow, and ‘completed 
his education in Holland in the house of his relation Mr Furley’. He was an important 
merchant in the City, becoming Governor of the Russia Company for 52 years.108 Edward 
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Forster’s entry to the bank was therefore presumably facilitated by the family connection, 
but the Forster family itself were clearly merchants of substance. Similarly the Bosanquets 
were of merchant stock: they were Turkey and Levant merchants of Huguenot extraction. 
Samuel Bosanquet had also been a Director of the Bank of England since 1774.109 William 
Bosanquet was of the other branch of the family, which was engaged in the Hamburg 
trade. His father, Jacob was had been active in that trade since the 1730s, and it appears 
that his son set out to become a banker after leaving Oxford university in 1778. The history 
of the family implies that he served as an apprentice with the bank before being offered a 
partnership.110 This is plausible given the absence of any family connection with the bank. 
In any event, the family name would have brought status and reputation to the bank, which 
was useful at this point of transition. 
The extensive changes when the bank became Messrs Forster, Lubbock, Bosanquet & Co 
probably occasioned a complete re-writing of the partnership agreement in 1785, copies of 
which have survived.111 The firm in 1785 was to have four partners: Forster, Lubbock, 
William Bosanquet (of Bloomsbury) and John Aldren Clarke. Only Clarke is described as a 
banker and he did not provide any initial capital to the bank. His position in the bank was 
however potentially lucrative: he was paid £100 p.a. as a salary and also had a claim on the 
profits of the firms. This part of the agreement confirmed the status Clarke had achieved in 
December 1780, when he accepted an offer to become a partner in the firm of Lemon, 
Furly, Lubbock and Willyams. The terms of service were clearly modified however, as he 
was initially to be paid £200 per annum, and did not share in the profit and loss of the firm. 
He was prohibited from taking on any business of consequence, but instead seems to be 
responsible for running the accepting and discounting of bills.112 Such junior partnerships 
did occur elsewhere, and tended to be rewards for loyal services by senior clerks. Thus 
Glyn, Mills & Co promoted Henry Parry to the position of nominal partner in 1796, having 
been special clerk from 1791. He was offered the choice of either a fixed salary or a share 
of the profits of the firm.113 The attraction of such a position to a clerk was presumably that 
one gained a share in a partnership without the need to find the money to purchase a 
share in the firm, which might be necessary if they wanted to join a new firm. 
Each of the principal partners (Lubbock, Bosanquet and Forster) was to provide £5,000 
towards the capital of the bank. The agreement also provided for the entry into the 
partnership of Samuel Bosanquet in 1789, when he would contribute another £5,000, 
meaning that by 1790 the firm’s capital would have been £20,000, with the potential for 
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further increases from retained profits.114 The partnership was to last for a fixed term of 
fourteen years, although any partner could leave by giving six months notice of his 
intention to do so. Fixing the length of a partnership was probably not unusual and served 
a useful purpose under a partnership system, allowing old partners to retire and new ones 
to be brought in. Smiths’ Bank used a similar arrangement of fixed length partnerships, 
which were consistently renewed. The attraction of this arrangement was probably that it 
allowed for the introduction of new partner, or the exit of those wishing to retire, and also 
provided a convenient point for the distribution of retained profits.115  
The most interesting aspect of the partnership is its stipulations on the allocation of profits. 
The first claim on the gross profits was the interest the partners received on their share of 
the capital, at 5% per annum. This was followed by the payment of taxes and rent on the 
house. The third item to be paid was Clarke’s fixed salary, as well as an allowance of £150 
per annum to John Lubbock.116 Once these expenses had been met, one sixth of the 
residual profits were set aside to be kept within the business to augment its capital. The 
habit of accumulating an internal reserve from the profits which was paid out as a lump 
sum was not unique to Messrs Forster, Lubbock & Co. It is known for example that the 
Smiths of Nottingham and London accumulated internal reserves that were not paid out to 
the partners for a number of years. When they were paid, this was done initially in the 
form of a promissory note, which would be redeemed by the transfer of government 
securities. While the reserves were used by the bank, they paid interest at 5% per annum 
through to 1793.117 However the Smiths seem to have not had as strict a formula for 
calculating the retained earnings as Messrs Forster, Lubbock & Co. The remainder of the 
profits were to be paid out: the three senior partners (four upon the accession of Samuel 
Bosanquet) received equal shares of seven eighths, while Clarke received one eighth. 
By the end of the century Forster, Lubbock & Co had created a substantial agency business. 
The 24 readily identifiable country correspondents of the bank at this stage fit into a very 
similar geographic pattern to the original customers (and partner connections) of the bank 
in 1772. The Truro bank obviously continued to feature, but was joined by two other 
Cornwall banks (in Penzance and St Austell). The broader South West continued to be an 
important source of clients, with 14 banks in Devon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, 
Worcestershire, Herefordshire and Shropshire. A further two were located in the 
connected region of South Wales. The five remaining banks were more widely dispersed, 
but were in locations where the bank had some other client business even at an early 
stage: one in Birmingham, one in Norwich, one in Stamford, one in Lymington and one in 
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Farnham.118 Notably there were no correspondent banks in the north of England, the 
traditional industrial heartland. In this respect, Forster, Lubbock & Co were apparently no 
different from other London agency banks, who appear to have concentrated their 
correspondent business where the partners had local connections. Glyn’s business agency 
business once it emerged was focused on Scotland (a focus for the bank since the 1760s), 
Northumberland (Carr connection), West Yorkshire (Mills and Mitton originated from 
here), Warwickshire (Mills family stronghold), Cornwall, Dorset (both Glyn) and Kent 
(Plumptres).119  
At this point Sir John Lubbock had also established himself as a prominent banker and MP, 
speaking in parliament on the Suspension of Cash payments. Shortly after their 
implementation, he believed they were no longer necessary, as he perceived there was ‘no 
real want of specie in the kingdom’. Instead he argued that the Bank should return to 
convertibility at an unpublicised date chosen by the Governor of the Bank and if it was 
perceived necessary, it should increase its capital by £3 million, which ‘would enable the 
Bank to discount to a much larger amount’ and accommodate the needs of the commercial 
world.120  
To end the story of Messrs Forster, Lubbock & Co. at the close of the eighteenth century, it 
is worth noting that in 1800, William Bosanquet died, after an accidental fall from a 
balcony.121 At about the same time, at the end of the 14 years of the partnership 
agreement, Samuel Bosanquet left this bank. He formed a new bank by joining Beachcroft 
and Reeves, who themselves had formerly been part of the bank Bowles & Co.122 The new 
firm, styled Bosanquet, Beachcroft & Reeves, also appears to have taken over the business 
of Samuel Smith & Son, which was the old London bank of the Smiths of Nottingham.123 
This firm continued until 1884, when it was merged into the Lloyds bank.124 The Forster and 
the Lubbock families would continue to run their bank independently until 1860, when it 
merged with Robarts, Curtis & Co. This firm was the last of the London private banks to 
maintain a seat in the London Clearing House.125 
The records of this important firm are not as complete as one might hope; however the 
information that has survived provides rich detail on the operations of a newly established 
bank. Many of the themes highlighted in the previous chapters are reinforced through this 
case study. The close connection between the banking and commercial world is readily 
apparent through Lubbock’s, Furly’s and Bosanquet’s participation in the bank. It is likely 
that they were responsible for much of the day-to-day management of the London house 
and provided many of the initial contacts that allowed the bank to be a success. The 
existence of a strong provincial connection also makes this an interesting case study. In 
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many ways the two houses, although separately managed, do appear to have been acting 
in concert, effectively acting as two branches of the same business. It shows how such a 
joint concern could be successfully managed, but also establishes the nature of the 
relationship between the two, with the provincial house acting as a source of funds which 
the London house could deploy in the London money markets. To establish how 
representative this bank was of other City establishments would require further detailed 
studies of other banks. 
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Chapter 6: West End banking 
 
The other part of London’s banking world was located in the West End. Thanks to brand 
names that have survived through the present day, West End bankers are the most 
recognisable of the eighteenth century banks. Although they were not numerous, they can 
be regarded as a core part of the English banking system for two reasons. Firstly, being 
amongst the earliest banking establishments, they were important in pioneering the 
financial techniques of deposit banking. Secondly, although often characterised as simply 
providing services for the upper echelons of society, in reality most West End banks had 
particular features or specialist abilities that meant they were not a completely 
homogenous group and continued to innovate. In serving the upper classes and receiving 
incomes from their landed estates, they also served as a conduit between the country and 
the metropolis that ran alongside the more obvious link of the country banker and his city 
agent. This chapter seeks to trace the development of West End banking from just after the 
Bubble to the Suspension. Although focusing predominantly on the development of West 
End bankers, some of the points made apply more broadly to City and provincial banks as 
well. 
London’s West End bankers of the eighteenth century have been the subject of a handful of 
articles, the two most important of which are by Joslin and Melton. Joslin’s ‘London’s 
Private bankers, 1725-1785’ is seminal.1 Melton’s article reveals a different aspect of West 
End banking by adding short considerations of Ewer’s and Drummond’s to compliment 
Joslin’s focus on Child, Hoare and Gosling.2 These two general articles have been 
supplemented by some further niche work. Iain Black looks predominantly at West End 
bank buildings and their geographic distribution within London, but does add some useful 
information on their operation.3 Hoare’s important archive has recently been used to 
produce a number of articles relating to that bank. Although interesting, it is difficult to 
estimate their wider applicability and they remained largely confined to the beginning of 
the eighteenth century.4 Finally the relative stability and longevity of these banks has 
generated a body of institutional histories of mixed merit.5 This chapter draws on these 
articles and company histories, as well as additional archival research on Drummond’s, 
                                                             
1 Joslin, ‘London private bankers, 1720-5’, especially pp. 172-79. His ‘London Bankers in Wartime’ is 
also relevant. 
2 Melton, ‘Deposit banking in London 1700-1790’, pp. 40-50. 
3 Black, ‘Private Banking in London’s West End’, pp. 29-59. 
4 The most important of these is Temin and Voth, ‘Banking as an emerging technology’, pp. 149-78; 
other examples include Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientèle for banks, pp. 565-86; idem, 
‘Women, banks and the securities market in early eighteenth century England’, in Laurence et al., 
Women and their Money 1700-1950: Essays on Women and Finance (London, 2009) pp. 46-58. 
5 A selection of the most important include: Hector Bolitho and Derek Peel, The Drummonds of 
Charing Cross (London, 1967); Edna Healey, Coutts & Co, 1692-1992, The  Portrait of a Private Bank 
(London, 1992); Victoria Hutchings, Messrs Hoare Bankers; A History of the Hoare Banking dynasty 
(London, 2005); Melton, ‘Robert and Sir Francis Gosling: Eighteenth-Century Bankers and Stationers’ 
in Robin Myers and Michael Harris (eds.), Economics of the British Booktrade 1605-1939 
(Cambridge/Alexandria, VA, 1985), pp 60-77. Sayers, Lloyds Bank, chapter 9, covers the West End 
constituents of Lloyds, including Cox’s and Herries’ banks. 
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Goslings and Child’s, to consider the growth of these banks in more detail and to assess 
their position within the broader financial system. 
By the time the South Sea Bubble had passed, banking had become a reasonably well 
established, but by no means common, occupation within London.6 In chapter 2 it was 
shown that with the exception of a brief period in the eighteenth century, West End 
bankers were fewer in number than their City counterparts. In 1725, 15 West End bankers 
are identifiable. Black’s article implies that numbers shrank thereafter, as he identifies only 
6 in 1745.7 This however appears to be incorrect: instead it seems that numbers remained 
steadily around 15 until the mid-1770s. The last quarter of the century did witness renewed 
expansion: by 1785 there were 18 West End banking firms and 26 by 1797.8 West End 
banks did become geographically more dispersed over the course of the century: at first 
they were concentrated around Fleet Street and the Strand, but over time shops were 
established on New Bond Street and St James/Pall Mall.9 Later establishments often had 
connections to old-established banks: thus Robert Herries’ London Exchange Banking 
Company was established after he had worked with Coutts, and was also closely connected 
to the Edinburgh private bank of Forbes. In this instance the formation of the new bank 
was the direct result of Coutts’ reluctance to embrace Herries’ idea for a type of travellers’ 
cheque.10 The long track record of a number of West End firms, such as Hoare’s or 
Drummond’s potentially indicates a degree of stability.However the numbers suggest that 
turnover amongst West End banks was actually not dissimilar to City banks.  
The business of the West End bankers is often portrayed as providing cash management 
and mortgages for the aristocracy and gentry. Sayers describes them as ‘sturdy firms, doing 
specialist business for an aristocratic clientele and rather looking down their noses at those 
mercantile fellows down in Lombard Street’.11 Joslin argues that the first half of the century 
witnessed the gradual demise of the traditional goldsmith type loans upon jewellery, and 
the loss of some of the early individual characteristics of a bank to produce an archetypal 
sound bank for land owners, with increasingly similar balance sheets. In general, their 
lending became ever more focused upon bond and mortgage to landowners and lawyers, 
while investments would be in securities such as Bank of England, East India and South Sea 
stock and tea warrants. Discounting was not significant, and reserve ratios could be 
reduced as clients demand for their money was more predictable than that of merchants.12 
Although these banks were becoming increasingly alike, they generally retained some 
particular identifiable mark, particularly in relation to their clientele. For example Child’s 
maintained a strong connection with the East India Company, while Wrights bank focused 
upon the Catholic gentry. Thus ‘personal friendship, family links, political colour or religious 
                                                             
6 Hoare’s, Martin’s, Child’s and Gosling’s at least are all thought to have completely abandoned their 
goldsmith businesses by 1720. Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, p. 172. 
7 Black, ‘Private Banking in London’s West End’, p. 32. 
8 Hilton Price, Handbook, pp. 187-6; Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, pp. 175-6, puts these numbers 
at 15 in 1785 and 22 in 1797.  
9
 Hilton Price, Handbook, pp. 212-3; Black, ‘Banking in London’s West End’, pp. 32-37. 
10
 Sayers, Lloyds Bank, pp.193-203. 
11
 Ibid., p. 203. 
12
 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, pp. 175-7. This assessment was based on assets and liabilities for 
Hoare’s, for which he has some figures, together with some evidence from Child’s. 
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persuasion’ influenced the precise make-up of the bank.13 This indicates that although they 
were similar, they were not completely homogenous – in many cases they had at their 
inception characteristics that distinguished them from their peers. For example the bank of 
Herries & Co specialisation in providing financial services for clients travelling throughout 
Europe set it apart from other West End banks.14 
This early individuality is particularly apparent in Melton’s work. He argues that although 
the mortgage was the cornerstone of the more solid banks by the end of the century, this 
situation took some time to achieve. Other West End banks, such as such as Drummond’s 
and Ewer’s, were ‘military banks’ and initially were little more than cash management 
businesses.15 Only after 1750 did Drummond’s move towards increasing the number 
landowning clients, an attractive business due to its greater stability and predictability. 
However in their totality West End banks’ client base remained diverse, and each group of 
clients had ‘its own peculiarities of deposits and withdrawal’, meaning that each bank 
needed to function in a slightly different manner.16 A few banks never fully specialised: 
Goslings combined a business focused around aristocrats and especially lawyers, with a 
business handling the accounts of India merchants. The identification of such profitable 
niches can be regarded as part of the broader specialisation of the banking system, which 
was reflected in the financial evolution of these banks. The West End banker was in some 
ways the creation of the eighteenth century, rather than something that existed as a 
constant throughout the period. 
The nature of the clients of West End banks is therefore important in understanding these 
banks and it is useful to consider briefly the end-users of these banks. The interest in banks’ 
clients has been spurred by a number of groups. Institutional histories of early private 
banks often highlight their more famous customers, often using the presence of nobility to 
highlight the importance of the particular bank under discussion.17 Client accounts and 
correspondence have also been a useful source of information to biographers who are 
interested in the personal finances of their subject.18 More recently gender historians have 
been interested in examining the extent of female access to financial services in the early 
modern period.19 The client focus is also due in part to the importance of client ledgers to 
the businesses, which have tended to survive more frequently than other bank records. 
The ‘visibility’ of the aristocratic and gentry clients, also facilitates this type of study, as 
records can often be traced from the client’s side. Although these banks are characterised 
as banks for the gentry, the reality is that many bank customers were of lesser rank. Anne 
Laurence’s argument that they became focused on ‘landed aristocrats and gentry (both 
male and female), MPs and office holders, charities and clergymen’, with business men 
usually absent, therefore better captures the nature of these banks’ clients.20 Temin and 
                                                             
13 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, pp. 177-9. 
14 Sayers, Lloyds Bank, pp. 193-203. 
15
 Melton, ‘Deposit banking in London’, pp. 42-4.  
16
 Ibid., pp. 48-9. 
17
 See for example Edna Healey, Coutts & Co, pp. 129-141. 
18
 Whyman, Sociability and Power, passim, provides a good example in her study of the Verneys. 
19
 This work is driven particularly by Anne Laurence. 
20 Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientèle for banks’, p. 565. 
146 
 
Voth’s analysis of the loans issued by Hoare’s discovered that many of them were 
undistinguished in terms of their background.21 Institutional histories also emphasise that 
by the middle of the eighteenth century, the leading businesses were trying to broaden 
their client-base, by the pursuit of customers from the artistic world for example.  
Another point often emphasised about the clients of these banks is the close connection 
between the earlier customers and the partners of a bank, be they familial, religious or 
political. In the case of the Hoare’s the original customer base appears to have been high 
churchmen.22 In its infancy Drummond’s tended to focus on Scottish residents in London, 
as did the forerunners of Coutts’ Bank.23 Yet over time the clientele of these banks did tend 
to broaden, becoming less dependent on factors of kin and religion. Once a connection to a 
bank was established, family loyalty to an institution does appear to have been significant, 
with sons and daughters maintaining links with their parents’ bankers. Marriage in the case 
of examples from Hoare’s bank however often led to the closure of the woman’s account at 
the bank.24 Anne Laurence therefore argues, in contrast to some other work published on 
the topic, in particular that of Carruthers, that the private banks of the period were 
essentially personal networks covered in an institutional cloak.25 The relationship between 
banker and client was not always easy. It required a successful balance between 
maintaining a certain indulgence of the customer, whilst at the same time imposing 
financial discipline, so that the relationship would not become injurious to the bank itself. 
Nor were banking relationships necessarily unique: Sir Charles Wyndham maintained 
overlapping accounts with Hoare’s, Child’s and Drummond’s in the 1740s.26 These instances 
show that bankers needed to maintain a close interest in managing their client 
relationships. While many clients established long-term relationships with their bankers, 
circumstances could force these relationships to be re-examined. Thus Jane Thornton 
requested the transfer of the balance of her account from Messrs Vere, Glyn and Halifax to 
Messrs Morris and Catlarence in 1761.27 In 1777 the Sun Fire Office decided to move its 
cash from Hankeys and to entrust the receipt of new funds to Messrs Mason, Currie, James 
and Yellowley.28 In 1795 Captain Peter Kemble requested of Messrs Gosling to ‘keep all 
moneys belonging to me in your hands’ and also to ‘receive from Messrs Cox & Co the 
remainder of my account’.29 This example is interesting because Cox & Co had traditionally 
possessed strong links with military personnel, suggesting that there was genuine 
competition amongst bankers for clients, even amongst the more specialist banks. 
The services offered to clients remained broad, but became increasingly purely financial 
compared to the seventeenth century. Early eighteenth century bankers might ‘issue notes, 
                                                             
21 Temin and Voth, ‘Private Borrowing during the Financial Revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its 
customers, 1702-1724’, EcHR 61.3 (2008), pp. 548-49. 
22 Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientèle for banks’, pp. 567-68. 
23 Bolitho and Peel, The Drummonds of Charing Cross, pp. 50-1.  
24 Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientèle for banks’, p. 568-75. 
25
 Ibid., p. 585. This corresponds with Lamoreaux’s interpretation of developments in North America. 
26
 WSRO, PHA 654, Bankers Book of Sir Charles Wyndham, 1745-1751. 
27
 RBSGA, Glyn Mills Currie & Co, Guard book, volume 1, p. 104. Jane Thornton to Messrs Vere, Glyn 
and Hallifax. 
28
 Ibid., p. 105.  Extract from the Sun Fire Office Minute book, 9 August 1777. 
29 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, Capt Peter Kemble to Messrs Gosling, 4 May 1795. 
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purchase lottery tickets and stock shares, discount bills and notes, accept valuables for 
safe-keeping and act, generally, as London agents for any other affairs their clients might 
request’.30 Much of the banking business was mundane. It often simply involved the 
provision of bank notes to a client, as will be seen in the Egremont correspondence. 
However this is not a unique example and at the end of the century bankers still received 
simple requests, such as dispatch of a twenty pound note to a customer.31 
Some bankers developed ‘stockbroking functions’, although this opportunity was slow to 
develop and turnover in the major investible stocks did not increase until after the 1749 
consolidation.32 The use of power of attorneys enabled bankers to act as brokers for their 
clients in the management of investments in government securities. Collecting dividends 
appears to have remained an important part of the services provided by bankers: Nathaniel 
Mortimer in the middle of the century requested of Messrs Glyn and Hallifax that they 
should collect the dividends on £1,400 of South Sea annuities and carry it to the account of 
Barrow & Edwards.33 They could also act in the transfer of stock, one Mendes making use 
of Glyn and Hallifax to transfer East India Bonds.34 West End banks provided their 
customers with access to the stock market, although it is not clear how common this was. 
Anne Laurence suggests that early in the century about 30% of Hoare’s customers availed 
themselves of this function. The purchases appear to have principally represented a search 
for income, although potential opportunities for capital gains were also pursued.35 This still 
implies that 70% of customers maintained their accounts purely for the deposit facilities 
provided. Power of attorneys could be used for the management of other financial services 
as well. For example in 1793 Glyn & Co received the power from the partners Jeffery, Oke 
and Blake to allow them to collect and receive ‘sallary, Wages, Tickets, Bounty Money, Prize 
money’. Presumably the partners were naval officers, but it is also striking that the main 
text of this power of attorney had been printed, rather than handwritten, suggesting that 
the use of such documents was ubiquitous by this point.36 
A relationship that is of particular interest at this point is that between London banks and 
their country clients. Although the bulk of the private bankers’ clients maintained London 
addresses, many will have also maintained estates in the country. The operation of the 
country estate might also be assisted to some degree through the use of a London banker, 
in terms of most obviously mortgage loans. However the business of the West End bankers 
was not all about the provision of loans. They were equally important in the provision of 
payment facilities for their customers, a relationship of significance to the wider interaction 
between metropolitan and rural economies. It has been shown that Hoare’s frequently 
                                                             
30 Melton, Sir Robert Clayton and the origins of English deposit banking, p. 68, based upon 
depositions by the bankers Thomas Snow and Thomas Martin. 
31 BGA, G&S, 0131/0999, James Dodsley to Goslings and Sharpe 25 August 1796. 
32 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, p. 171. 
33 RBSGA, Glyn Mills Currie & Co, Guard book, volume 1, p. 101, Mortimer to Glyn and Hallifax, 10 
May 1755. 
34
 RBSGA, Glyn Mills Currie & Co, Guard book, volume 1, p. 101, M Mendes to Glyn and Hallifax, 2 
March and 5 April 1757. 
35
 Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientèle for banks’, pp. 569-74. 
36
 RBSGA, Glyn Mills Currie & Co, Guard book, volume 1, p. 42, 14 Nov 1793. Earlier examples tended 
to be hand written. 
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sent money between Mr Milner in Leeds and themselves to fulfil the requirements of the 
female members of the Hastings family.37 The Earls of Egremont provide another example. 
They had a long standing connection with Drummond’s Bank, and accounts at Petworth 
House provide an insight into their interaction with this bank. 38 Lord Egremont maintained 
his own personal account with Drummond’s, however his steward at Petworth, James 
Upton Tripp, also had an account with the bank, which was presumably used for the 
purposes of managing the estate. In a letter to the bank, Tripp explained to the bank that 
they should enclose letters relating to either account in the same post, but mark those 
intended for Tripp himself with a cross in the corner, so that Lord Egremont need not be 
bothered by them.39 The same letter also highlights some of the difficulties of operating in 
a small village: Tripp explained to the bank that he could not reply by return of post as the 
post did not stay long enough in Petworth. 
Tripp required two main services of the bank in London: the first, unexpectedly, was the 
need to draw on the bank for making payments in London. However the second was the 
provision by Drummond’s of bank notes, of which Tripp received many. Sometimes both 
functions can be found in the same letter. Thus in April  1775, Tripp sent a letter to the 
bank enclosing a draft by Lord Egremont in Tripp’s favour, with the request that £500 be 
sent to him in small bank notes immediately, while the other £500 be held on account, to 
be drawn upon by Tripp as required.40 Tripp in general would regularly require of the bank 
between £500 and £1,000, money which was usually supplied in Bank Post Bills of £10, £20 
or £25 denomination. In 1776, Tripp drew upon Drummond’s for a total £4,515. Many of 
these transactions clearly relate to the management of the Petworth estate. In February, 
£200 was paid to William Hudson, the Head Gardener. Other recipients included 
Egremont’s groom and a servant. Some of these drafts were paid into other London banks, 
with Prescott, Grote & Co, Messrs Fuller Halford & Co and Messrs Hankeys all featuring in 
some of these drafts. In addition to the drafts, over the same period £8,850 of Bank Post 
bills were received from Drummond’s. Total drafts upon and bank notes received from 
Drummond’s in 1777 amounted to £18,456 (compared to £13,365 of the previous year).  
All this was ultimately paid for by Lord Egremont himself, as a number of letters refer to. A 
letter from October 1775 indicates that Egremont allowed Tripp to draw up to £5,800 on 
Drummond’s at that point, of which a balance of £914 was still available.41 Other letters are 
less specific, but do refer to the fact that Egremont was the ultimate source of funding for 
the account, claiming that he was ‘glad to hear his Lordship has so ample supplied me’ or 
that ‘am glad to hear his Lordship has been so liberal’.42  
                                                             
37 Laurence, ‘The emergence of a private clientèle for banks’, pp. 578-9. 
38 This section is based broadly on the reading of correspondence contained in WSRO, PHA 9273-
9277. 
39
 WSRO, PHA 9273, 8 Nov 1774, James Upton Tripp to Messrs Drummond and Lord Egremont. This 
presumably was designed to save on postage costs. 
40
 WSRO, PHA 9274, Tripp to Drummond, 16 April 1775. 
41
 WSRO, PHA 9274, Tripp to Drummond, 26 October 1775. 
42 WSRO, PHA 9275, Tripp to Drummond, 4 February 1776 and 10 June 1776. 
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Figure 15: Tripp's balance of account and turnover with Drummond’s Bank, April 1777 to November 1783 
(Source: WSCO, PHA 10641) 
It can be seen from Figure 15 that in general both the turnover and the balance of the 
account were maintained at a fairly consistent level, at around £5,000 and a small positive 
balance respectively. The attraction of such an account from the bank’s perspective are 
quite are therefore clear – it was well managed by Tripp, the volume of business was 
steady and in general the customer required very limited accommodation from the bank. 
When such accommodation was required, it was generally only for short periods. 
Another example of such a relationship was George Bowes, who held an account with 
Child’s between Feb 1727/8 and May 1732. In this time deposits of over £16,600 were 
made into his account with the bank.43 This was something of a middle sized account. It is 
likely that these were deposits made by the use of bills of exchange drawn on other people, 
the contents of which would be collected by the bankers, rather than by specie. Evidence 
exists in 1752, when Child’s acknowledged the receipt of two bills worth £1,161 2s 5d, 
‘which when paid will be placed to the credit of George Bowes’.44 From the surviving 
evidence, it is possible to suggest that for the period 1728-32, the account was usually used 
for everyday expenditure, what one might today describe as a current account. He was not 
using the account to borrow money from the bank – there is no evidence in the bank’s loan 
books to show this.45 This corroborates the fact that his own lists of debts make no mention 
of borrowings from any banker.46 Any reference to values credited to his account 
                                                             
43
 DCRO, D/St/C1/3/62, ff. 6-8. 
44
 DCRO, D/St/C1/3/23, John Fludd to George Bowes, London 8 Feb 1752, f. 2. 
45
 This point has been confirmed by Mr Winterbottom, archivist at the RBS. 
46 DCRO, D/ST/C1/3/118. 
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originating directly from the bank probably refers to dividends that were collected on his 
behalf.  
These examples indicate that although West End bankers were of obvious significance in 
the provision of London-based financial services, they also provided services for customers 
outside of London. The examples of the Petworth and Bowes accounts also show how 
important the London bank was in providing day-to-day services that facilitated the 
functioning of the rural economies. This would indicate that the flow of funds was not just 
remittances from the estates to London, a type of flow that is often acknowledged to have 
taken place, but could also have worked in the opposite direction. 
II 
While the management of client relationships was important to a bank, the ultimate 
success of a banking venture depended on the partners’ capacity to manage the bank’s 
capital and balance sheet effectively. They needed to generate an adequate profit to justify 
their investments in these businesses. The economic performance of the banks over the 
course of the century therefore forms the major focus for the remainder of this chapter. It 
is in this area that it is perhaps most possible to understand the changing performance and 
role of the banks over the century.  Temin and Voth have shown how an analysis of bank 
accounts can help to understand the problems and functions of a bank.47 However there 
are no examples of similar types of analysis for other West End banks. This chapter seeks to 
provide some ideas on how West End banks evolved over the course of the eighteenth 
century. 
By the eighteenth century Child’s was a well-established firm, reputedly the first 
completely to abandon the goldsmith business. Although it retained ties with the East India 
Company, it is believed to have become a ‘gentlemanly’ bank, in a similar manner to 
Hoare’s.48 This situation can be seen in its balance sheets for the period. By 1713, this bank 
held almost £60,000 worth of cash, while the ‘P account’ and loans and overdrafts 
amounted to £50,752.49 Child’s balance sheets for this period show an increasing degree of 
specialisation in banking. This can be seen in the declining levels of gold, plate and other 
jewels held upon the firm’s balance sheet. In 1704 this amounted to over £10,000, but by 
1713 had sunk to just over £1,000. As a proportion of assets, this equates to a move from 
7% to less than 1%, a clear and substantial reduction.50 The balance sheets do however also 
suggest that Child’s was struggling to achieve sustained growth (Table 7). 
Date Assets 
                                                             
47
 Temin and Voth, ‘Banking as an Emerging Technology’, pp. 149-78; idem, ‘Private Borrowing 
during the Financial Revolution’, pp. 541-64. 
48
 Joslin, ‘London private bankers’, p. 172. 
49
 RBSGA, CH 206/1, ff. 71-5. ‘P account’ derives from the pawn account, and represents the bank’s 
lending activities, see Quinn, ‘Tallies or Reserves?’, p. 41. 
50 RBSGA, CH 206/1. 
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1690 
1694 
1697 
1704 
1713 
£161,395 
£117,033 
£119,216 
£172,000 
£112,000 
Table 7: Child’s Bank balances, 1690-1713 (Source: RBSGA, CH/206/1) 
The firm continued to be run in a fairly consistent, conservative fashion. This can be seen in 
the management of the bank’s cash reserves. In 1713, the bank had cash reserves of just 
under £60,000. Liabilities at the same point were roughly £110,000, implying that the bank 
had a liquidity cushion well in excess of 60%. This would seem to follow a consistent policy 
by the bank that started in the 1680s.51 
While the first decade of the eighteenth century appears to have been a difficult period for 
the bank, as the eighteenth century progressed there was a sustained increase in the 
overall size of the bank, By the end of the century, the firm had increased roughly tenfold in 
size. Figure 16 shows the total assets of the bank at roughly five yearly intervals. It is 
noticeable that the growth of the bank was not particularly smooth. There was clearly a 
significant expansion of the business between 1713 and the mid 1720s, as total assets 
doubled, however the lack of records make it impossible to identify precisely when this 
change happened. The subsequent fifteen years show the firm expanding fairly steadily. 
This was followed by the period 1740-60 where growth was largely absent. A definite 
acceleration in the pace of expansion then occurs from 1760 onwards, although the 
American War of Independence and the French wars clearly caused the bank to retrench.   
 
Figure 16: Child & Co total assets, c. 1688-1797 (Source: RBSGA, CH206/1-3) 
The cash to assets ratio, as shown in Figure 17, provides a good indication of the liquidity of 
the bank. Over the century from 1685 to 1797 there is considerable volatility in this ratio, 
but in general one can identify a gradual downward trend. For the balance sheets that are 
available through to 1713, the average is 50%. Even in this early period, there was a trend 
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towards shrinking this value, as the seventeenth century balance sheets indicate an even 
higher ratio. The second quarter of the eighteenth century saw a further marginal decline 
in this figure, the average from 1727 to 1750 being 46%. However it is in the third quarter 
of the century where the real change becomes apparent. From 1754 to 1761 the average 
falls to 37%, and then falls again to 27% for 1762-1770. This indicates a growing ability of 
the partners to manage the bank more efficiently. The financial crisis in 1772 clearly had an 
impact on the behaviour of the partners, for by 1775 the ratio had returned to 37%. This 
return to a more liquid stance proved to be permanent for the last quarter of the century: 
the ratios were 40% in 1780; 53% in 1785; 43% in 1790; and 39% in 1795. On average 
across the period 1775-1797, the figure was 41%.52 The bank was once again behaving in a 
more risk averse manner – it is noticeable that the highest cash ratio is to be found in the 
1785, a year of peace and relative prosperity in Britain. 
 
Figure 17: Child & Co simplified asset composition, 1690-1797 (Source: RBSGA, CH206/1-3) 
 
The third quarter of the century was important for the bank. The data in Figure 16 
demonstrates that the bank, with the exception of the period around the 1745 rebellion, 
had been operating with about £0.5 million of assets since the mid 1730s. This then 
changed substantially, as indicated in Figure 18. It is probable that the first attempt at 
expansion began in the mid-1750s, but that the onset of the Seven Years War clearly 
curtailed any potential development. The end of the war however marked a period of 
consistent expansion, as assets moved from £0.5 million to over £0.8 million over a decade. 
What is equally apparent is a change in behaviour, with the reduced emphasis on liquidity, 
which fell steadily during the war and remained at this lower level after its end. 
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Figure 18: Child & Co assets and cash, 1754-1770 (Source: RBSGA, CH206/2) 
By the second half of the eighteenth century the firm was consistently profitable. After 
growing strongly during the decade from 1757, profits remained largely around £20,000 for 
the following twenty years, before again seeing rapid, if somewhat erratic growth (Figure 
19). The spike in profits in 1786 is not completely explained, however it probably reflects 
accumulated gains in investments in securities, as the accounts for that year include 
£47,909 credit from ‘sundry stock acct’.53 Similarly the reduced income paid to the partners 
in 1793 is related to losses on the stock account that were taken that year and totalled 
£20,083.54 It is notable that the impact of the stock account seems to be booked around 
times of significant change in the partnership. Thus the loss in 1793 coincided with the 
death of Mrs Sarah Child, who had been running the bank, while in 1786 there also 
appeared to have been changes in the partnership.  
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Figure 19: Child & Co Income and profitability, 1757-1797 (Source: RBSGA, CH203/1-6) 
The growing scale of these banks required a commensurate increase in costs, of which staff 
formed one important part. The records of Child’s, Drummond’s and Goslings all provide a 
limited insight into the actual staffing of these firms during the period.  
 
 
Figure 20: Child & Co House expenses, 1757-1797 (Source: RBSGA, CH203/1-6) 
Child’s saw a general increase in the cost of running its business over the second half of the 
century. ‘House expenses’ roughly quadrupled from just over £500 to almost £2,000. It 
should be noted that much of this increase does seem to reflect the growing scale of 
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business being conducted, as the ratio of costs to income stayed within a general range of 
normally 5 to 7% (Figure 20). From 1758 to 1761 the bank appeared to be employing five 
clerks, each earning £30 p.a. This was then increased to seven in 1762.55 This still seems to 
have been the situation through the 1770s, although in some years there were 8 clerks 
(1772). In 1780 there was a substantial change, as the clerks are moved into different pay 
bands, with three continuing to earn £30, two earning £50 and 3 earning £60.56 
One can see in this development the gradual emergence within banking of a structured 
career progression. At this stage no formal training system or professional body for bankers 
existed, for which reason the emergence of banking as a profession has been seen as a 
feature of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Instead, entry to a banking house was 
dependent on an apprenticeship scheme that was similar to that for entry into a merchant 
house. Associations of bankers were rare: although there were Associations of Country 
Bankers, these appear to have been temporary or focused upon addressing issues such as 
forgery and theft.57 As such, bankers’ ‘professional’ development has been neglected in 
comparison to other parts of the service industry, such as lawyers or doctors, which have 
had detailed studies of their development.58 Some historical analysis of the pay and 
capabilities of bankers in the earlier stages of their development is emerging.59 
Aside from staff costs, other significant operational costs included postage, which cost the 
bank £288 in 1786 or 18% of total house expenses in that year.60 This was an expense that 
all bankers were aware of and sought to minimise. The easiest way to do this was through 
having an MP as a member of the bank, as they had the right to frank the mail, a saving 
that has been suggested could be worth £1,300 per year.61 Thus the early letters of Forster, 
Lubbock & Co constantly beseeched their clients to address all their correspondence to 
John Buller at Abchurch Lane, as Buller’s position as an MP allowed them to save on 
postage costs.62 Ryton wrote of the Western Bank of Exeter that this bank’s arrangements 
for the appointment of a London agent included ‘the curious proviso that one of the 
partners of the London bank should be a member of the House of Commons’.63 In the 
context of the desire to minimise expenditure on postage, and the advantages afforded by 
an M.P. in doing so, this stipulation does not appear as curious as Ryton suggests, but was 
rather a sensible business decision. 
                                                             
55 RBSGA, CH201/1/1-2, f. 8, 12, 16 and 20. 
56 RBSGA, CH203/3, the data for 1780 is on f. 48. 
57 Edwin Green, Debtors to their Profession, A History of the Institute of Bankers 1879-1979 
(Methuen London, 1979), p. xviii and chapters 1 and 2. 
58 See Prest, Professions in Early Modern England, passim. 
59 Anne Murphy, ‘Learning the business of banking: The management of the Bank of England’s first 
tellers’, Business History 52.1, (2010) pp. 150–68; H.M. Boot, ‘Salaries and Career Earnings in the 
Bank of Scotland, 1730-1880’, EcHR 44.4 (1991), pp. 629-53.  
60 RBSGA, CH203/5, f. 4. 
61
 Dawes and Ward Perkins, vol. 1, p. 37. The figure of £1,300 is cited from Ellis’s work on the 
eighteenth century post office and probably refers to total savings to the MP, rather than to the 
bank. 
62
 As an example of this see KHAC, EK-1979/B2, Messrs Lemon & Co to Mr Thomas Douglas, 27 July 
1773. 
63 John Ryton, Banks and Banknotes of Exeter 1769-1906 (Exeter, 1984), pp. 67-8.  
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While the example of Child’s Bank shows the development of a well-established bank, 
Messrs Drummond & Co’s development provides something of a contrast, being a later 
foundation. Drummond’s Bank was created by Andrew Drummond in 1712 or 1713 in 
Charing Cross, London. As a former silversmith, his background was like many of London’s 
other private bankers of the period who originated from the precious metal trades. Andrew 
Drummond originated from Edinburgh, and the business he established maintained strong 
Scottish connections throughout the eighteenth century, one of the most important 
customers being the Duke of Chandos. Some of the Scottish clients are known to have had 
Jacobite sympathies.64 Other Scottish aristocratic customers included Lord Glenorchie, the 
Duchess of Hamilton, Earl Lowtherdale and Lords Charles and James Murray.65 Equally 
important in developing the bank prior to 1725 were its connections to the military, 
specifically through Andrew’s relation John Drummond, which allowed the bank to profit 
from some of the army reforms undertaken by George I.66 This military connection was not 
unique among London’s bankers, although it was a new type of business distinct from that 
carried out in the seventeenth century. Melton also identified the bank of John Ewer, for 
whom information is sparse, but who was certainly operating a ‘military’ bank between 
1731 and 1734. The most famous example is that of Messrs Cox & Co, which developed 
after Lord Ligonier made his secretary Cox agent for the 1st Foot Guards in 1758. The 
secretary in time accumulated the agency work of most regiments of the British army.67  
In the first year of operation, from November 1717 to January 1718/19, the firm lent out 
just over £4,600. Most of this would appear to have been for short durations – within the 
same period, just over £4,000 was repaid by customers, implying outstanding loans of only 
£605.68 Across this period, 32 ‘client’ accounts were operational, which includes four that 
belonged to various members of the Drummond family. This yielded a profit from interest 
earned of £54 15s. However this does not give an entirely representative view of 
Drummond’s banking business, for he was also carrying on a financial relationship with 
John Gordon, which constituted the bulk of the banking transactions. It has been suggested 
that Gordon provided the original working capital for Drummond’s banking business.69 This 
business was more profitable – earning almost £440 worth of income in its first year, set 
against a commission payable to him of £113 (i.e. a net profit of £326).70 After a few years 
the banking business obviously grew to some extent, but the relative importance of the 
different functions barely changed – interest income by 1720-21 had risen to £137, with 
profit from business with Gordon amounting to £386, with a total loan issuance of £3,290, 
                                                             
64 Hector Bolitho and Derek Peel, The Drummonds of Charing Cross (London, 1967), pp. 17-26. 
65 RBSGA, DR427/1, customer ledgers 1717-22. 
66 Melton, ‘Deposit banking in London’, pp. 44-5; Boltiho and Peel, The Drummonds, p. 29, 55-58. 
The army agency business would remain important through to at least mid-century. The goldsmith 
ledgers run until 1737, but the bank clearly was involved in the sale of plate and jewellery in the 
1740s.  
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 For Ewers, see Melton, ‘Deposit banking in London’, pp. 42-4, 49; for a short overview of Messrs 
Cox, see Sayers, Lloyds Bank, pp. 190-3. 
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 RBSGA, DR 427/1. Drummond’s full balance sheets for this period, and the rest of the eighteenth 
century have been lost, or never existed. 
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 Melton, ‘Deposit banking in London’, p. 44. 
70 RBSGA, DR 427/1. 
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of which most was again repaid within the year.71 Much of the bank’s growth therefore 
occurred after the collapse of the South Sea Bubble. 
In 1718, at the end of its first full operational year, the scope of Drummond’s operations 
was limited. Across this period the bank made a profit of just over £315, which was all 
attributable to Andrew Drummond himself.72 During the 1720s and 1730s, Drummond’s 
experienced remarkably quick growth, after which it settled to a more sedate pace. One 
way this can be seen is in the bank’s discounting of bills (Figure 21).  
Year 
Total Bills discounted (include those carried 
over from previous year) 
1735/6 
1740/1 
1744/5 
1750/1 
£12,476 
£29,415 
£25,817 
£36,133 
Figure 21: Drummond’s discounting activity, 1735-1750 (Source: RBSGA, DR427/1-154) 
Although turnover of the bank did increase significantly, profit figures were not as 
encouraging. In 1743/44 for example, profit was only £719 13s 9.75d. However this is not a 
bad performance in terms of total income, which was £3,835, representing a profit margin 
of almost 19%. The profit was set towards a category called ‘stock in hand’, which after the 
year’s injection stood at -£356.73  
Given the bank was in a developmental stage, Drummond’s remained involved in the 
goldsmith business through to 1737. Even after this date they still regularly accepted 
jewellery and plate as security for the loans they made. Records show for example the 
Duchess of Atholl using a ring to attempt to raise the sum of £60 to overcome cashflow 
problems caused by her family and ill-health. The problem with such a process of course 
was attributing an acceptable value to the collateral. In this case, although she initially 
valued the ring at £60, it was subsequently only allowed at £40.74 Other instances can be 
found where the bank was involved in jewellery related transactions in 1746.75 Lord 
Viscount Malpas borrowed £1,500 from the bank in February 1731, on security of 5,873oz 
of plate. This had supposed to be for a nine month period, but it would appear that the 
money was not repaid, for in March 1745, 4,917oz of plate was sold raising £1,286 towards 
the settlement of this debt.76  
The military connection was maintained through Henry Drummond, who, in 1765, went 
into partnership with Richard Cox, previously a client of Drummond’s Bank. This connection 
generated a substantial increase in business with the Treasury for the bank.77 The 
involvement with military personnel also meant that the bank also engaged in overseas 
                                                             
71 Note these figures may understate year slightly, as dates for these figures appear to run from May 
1720 to Jan 1720/21, although reason for starting in May unclear. 
72 RBSGA, DR427/1. 
73
 RBSGA, DR427/1. 
74
 RBSGA, DR/402, Duchess of Atholl to Drummonds, 18 Sept and 17 Oct 1741. Interestingly, she 
addresses Drummond as a ‘bankier’, not a goldsmith by this point. 
75
 RBSGA, DR/398, 24 Oct 1746, 3 April 1746. 
76
 RBSGA, DR/402, 11 Feb 1731. 
77 Bolitho and Peel, The Drummonds, pp. 55-8. 
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transactions. For example, a few bills have survived that suggest that the bank was involved 
in financing the British army in Senegal in the 1760s. One Major James Money appears to 
have been a client of Drummond’s, for he was the beneficiary of two bills totalling £400 
that were designed to reimburse him for money spent by the Royal Artillery in that country, 
which in both instances he made payable to Drummond’s.78 
Although full balance sheets for the firm are not available, data for the bank’s lending and 
discounting activities are. The lending activities of the bank were relatively limited in the 
first half of the century. Indeed, Melton argues that it was only by the 1740s that the bank 
managed to really move beyond simple cash-keeping operations, dominated by 
discounting, to assume the functions of a genuine bank with extensive lending 
operations.79 The second half of the century provided a period of sustained growth, with 
total lending surpassing £0.6 million by 1795 (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22: Drummond’s lending activity, 1735-1795 (Source: RBSGA, DR427/1-154) 
If the pattern of loan growth between 1749 and 1770 is any indication, then the increase in 
the firm’s balance sheets was a fairly gradual process (Figure 23). The Seven Years War led 
to a reduction in the firm’s lending activities, however this was relatively gradual. It also 
appears to have been driven by a severe decline in the issuance of new loans, indicating 
that customers were perhaps slower to repay existing outstanding loans than had been the 
case in peace time. 
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 RBSGA, DR/398, 23 June 1760. 
79 Melton, ‘Deposit banking in London’, p. 45. 
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Figure 23: Drummond’s lending activity, 1749-1770 (Source: RBSGA, DR427/1-154) 
 
The growing volume of business also generated a growing income stream for the bank 
(Figure 24). However it is noteworthy that this increased income did not immediately 
translate into an improved headline profit. Only after 1766 was there an increase in the 
bank’s overall profitability to match the growing revenues. 
 
Figure 24: Drummond & Co Total income and profits, 1749-1770 (Source: RBSGA, DR427/1-154) 
 
The growth of the bank continued unabated over the last thirty years of the century (Figure 
25), although the French Revolutionary Wars did cause a slight setback. 
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Figure 25: Drummond’s Bank profitability, 1770-1795 (Source: RBSGA, DR427/1-154) 
This expansion is visible in all the activities the bank undertook. The value of bills the bank 
discounted totalled over £130,000 in 1797.80 Interest income in the same year from the 
main interest account alone totalled just under £24,000, supplemented by another £4,000 
and £800 from two ‘old’ Interest accounts. All of this was disbursed amongst the partners 
of the bank as profit.81 The development of Drummond’s Bank is possibly typical of a new 
bank established in the relatively difficult economic climate of the first half of the 
eighteenth century. There was a dependence on a handful of key accounts, while the 
transition to a genuine banking business was slow. However once the conditions improved 
the bank fully participated in the faster development of the second half of the century. 
While Drummond’s and Child’s possessed a client base and operational model most 
commonly associated with West End banks, not all West End banks are quite so easily 
classified. Some banks pursued what has been described as a more ‘flexible policy’, of 
which a key example is Goslings.82 This bank benefited from the diversity of its partners 
after Gosling purchased the business. Gosling himself was originally a bookseller and 
printer, with substantial legal connections, while his partner Samuel Bennett was a retired 
East India trader. This meant that it developed a more regular ‘West End’ business with its 
literary and legal clients (as well as aristocrats and gentry), but also had a strong merchant 
connection with the Indian nabobs, such as Clive. By the end of the century the business 
had developed into a large bank with over 1,000 clients, issuing mortgages and loans upon 
stock, but with the addition of a substantial discount business and agencies for six country 
banks.83 Thus although this bank is treated from a ‘West End’ perspective, it had 
commonalities with City bankers. 
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The general outline of the development of Goslings Bank is relatively well documented. 
Goslings possessed one of the most widely diversified banking businesses in London at this 
point of time in terms of its client base. Given this situation, the bank remains relatively 
under-researched, especially given the fact that the surviving records of this bank are 
relatively extensive. Melton’s article focuses on the transition period of the 1720s-1750s, 
while the story of the international side of Goslings’ business has not been told at all.84 This 
section will touch on the international business, but its main contribution lies with the 
domestic business from 1760 to 1800.  
Sir Francis Gosling himself originated from one of the less common backgrounds for 
bankers, being a stationer or bookseller until the 1740s, when he sold his interest in that 
profession in order to concentrate upon his new business. The bank has been described as 
the first bank in London to emerge from a commercial source.85 This statement is 
misleading, for his entry into banking was facilitated through the purchase of a bank 
previously owned by the goldsmiths Abraham Fowler, James Rocke and John Simpson in 
1742. The origins of this business have been traced back to the goldsmith William Pinckney 
in the 1650s, and as such were not that unusual.86 The reasons for Gosling’s career change 
from publishing to banking are unclear. The methodical disposal of his publishing stock 
three years after his father Robert’s death in 1741 has led to suggestions that it was a 
considered choice, perhaps due to his publishing business being less successful than he 
wished.87 During the early parts of the 1710s, it is noteworthy that Robert Gosling’s 
publishing career is described as modest. It only developed significantly after 1717, when 
he gained patents for legal printing. Francis Gosling had probably gained some experience 
of finance, as it is known that his father’s firm performed some financial intermediation as 
early as 1713, holding clients’ deposits and putting them out at interest.88 Melton argues 
that while there is no way to determine the size of Robert Gosling’s financial dealings, or 
their relative importance to his publishing business, the evidence however does show his 
function as cashier, broker, mortgage arranger, and deposit taker, lender (on a small-scale) 
and discounter of bills of exchange from 1713 through to the 1730s.89 
The only surviving method on which to assess the size and strength of the bank that Gosling 
had purchased was its profitability at this stage. In the Fowler era, costs were relatively 
stable and profit tended to be a function of two main sources of income: interest earned 
on notes and bonds (loans) and the ‘Gains on sundry Acct in the Stock Book’, referring to 
the investments made by the bank in stocks and shares.90 The overall picture of the 
profitability of the bank under its goldsmith owners is shown in Figure 26. 
 
                                                             
84 Melton, ‘Robert and Sir Francis Gosling’, p. 75. 
85 Ibid., p. 60. 
86
 Ibid., p. 60 and p.73. 
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 Ibid., pp. 72-3. 
88
 Ibid., pp. 61-5. Gosling benefited from the growth of the legal profession and the printing of the 
Statutes at large. 
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 Ibid., pp. 70-2. The deposit taking is shown by two banker’s notes that survive for the 1730s. 
90 See for example BGA, G&S, 0130/0663, March 1727/8, f.7. 
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 Year Profit Interest (loan) 
contribution 
March 1727/8 
March 1728/9 
Sept 1729 
Sept 1730 
Sept 1731 
Sept 1732 
Sept 1733 
Sept 1734 
Sept 1735 
Sept 1736 
Sept 1737 
£1,320 
£671 
£655 
£1,624 
£952 
£1,220 
-£705 
0 
£618 
£942 
0 
£251 
£582 
£305 
£514 
£415 
£523 
£371 
£407 
£354 
£272 
£101 
Figure 26: Goslings (Fowler, Rorke and Simpson) Profit and Loss in the 1720-30s (Source: BGA, 0130/0663) 
The bank was recapitalised in September 1734, when Fowler and Simpson each injected 
£148 13s 2d (Rorke would no longer appear to be a partner). This presumably related to 
the loss incurred the year before, the difference between the new capital and the loss 
being covered by the profits of 1734.91 Equally one should note that in 1737, although 
there was technically no profit, in practice John Simpson paid himself £701 18s 2.5d, while 
Fowler was not mentioned at all, suggesting that the bank was not loss making in this year. 
92 Yet one still gets the impression that the 1730s were a time of difficulty for the bank. 
Although in some years it might yield an apparently healthy profit, this was volatile. 
Potentially as concerning is the apparent continual decline from 1732 onwards in the 
income derived from interest on standard loans. This should have been the core earnings 
driver of the bank. Yet for reasons that cannot be established without access to the actual 
books, they do not appear to have been able to maintain this business, let alone grow it. 
This gives an indication why Gosling might have been able to buy the bank in 1743. One 
gets the impression of an averagely successful business at best. 
Sir Francis Gosling’s partners in the new endeavour were John Ward and Samuel Bennett. 
Gosling’s purchase of another banking firm, with all previous partners departing, has 
significance in its own right, representing probably the first known bank takeover. The 
continuation of accounting practices of the bank suggests that Gosling in this area 
maintained some consistency with the previous business. Francis Gosling achieved a 
remarkable, quick increase in the scale of the bank, growing its clientele to 480 persons in 
1751-54 from 187 in 1719-1722, whilst largely maintaining the accounts of the old 
customers.93  
Alongside a more general West End banking business, Goslings ran an international 
business based upon his connection to Bennett. Records are incomplete, yet surviving 
correspondence from the early to mid 1780s does provide an insight into the needs of the 
clients and the operation of the financial markets at this time. It is well-known that the 
connection with Samuel Bennett provided an influx of clients related to the East India 
company/merchants. These were for the large part working in India, but in the expectation 
of eventually returning to England. One of their major concerns therefore was the 
                                                             
91
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0663, ff. 77, 87. 
92
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0663, f. 106. 
93 Melton, ‘Robert and Sir Francis Gosling’, p. 74. 
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remittance of the fortunes they were creating to England, and it was in this way that 
Goslings could assist their clients. These letters indicate that Goslings actively managed the 
financial affairs of some their clients whilst they were abroad. A common request in letters 
to the bank is that they dispose of diamonds that have been shipped to London. The funds 
raised through the sale would then be placed to the benefit of the sellers’ account. Thus 
William Popham in March 1783 requested that Goslings consign a shipment of diamonds to 
the Queen’s jeweller, Mr John Duval. Furthermore, he provides instructions that the 
resulting money should be invested in the Funds on his behalf. This implies that the bank 
needed a strong connection to diamond merchants in London. It would also indicate that it 
was one of the easier ways of moving money out of the country. Alongside the 
consignment of diamonds, there was the more standard banking business of dealing in 
bills: the letter mentions bills for the benefit of Popham from Madras for £2,721 and from 
China for £2,326 that had been remitted to the bankers.94  
 
 
Figure 27: Goslings Bank profits, 1737 to 1799 (Source: BGA, G&S, 0130/664-670) 
It was not only customer numbers that grew, but also profitability and turnover. Melton 
provides some information on this, showing that loans and interest jumped from £2,164 for 
1730-34, to £4,113 for 1744-9. Turnover in the stock accounts increased 3.3 times from the 
figure of £3,516 in 1730-4. In the first year under Gosling’s ownership, the bank produced a 
                                                             
94 BGA, G&S, 0130/1074, William Popham to Messrs Gosling, Patna 24 March 1783. 
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profit of £474.95 Net profits grew five time by the 1760s compared to the preceding 
goldsmith era, earning the partners £11,552 in their first five years (despite a loss of £1,388 
in 1747-8), growing to £26,795 between 1758 and 1762.96 The real growth and 
development of the bank however happened in the period after 1762 (Figure 27).97 Total 
profits really started to rise from about 1752. However in those ten years this was driven by 
profits from the stock book, which were very volatile, as seen in the period 1758 to 1763. 
What distinguished the period of about 1762 to the late 1770s is that the bank managed to 
consistently grow its profits from the loan book, which were much steadier. Although the 
profits from this source fell back slightly from their peak, for the last two decades of the 
century it rarely fell below £5,000 per annum. Total profits were complimented by a more 
volatile, but usually positive, contribution from the stock book. 
It is necessary to address how this profit was generated. The balance books of Goslings are 
only available from December 1786 onward, when they were calculated twice annually, in 
June and December. Measured in terms of its assets, the company had registered limited 
growth in the years between 1786, when assets stood at about £484,000 and Dec 1799, 
when they stood at £558,000. The picture of a bank which had stagnated however would 
be misleading. During the period from 1786 to the end of 1791, the bank had actually 
achieved some considerable growth, with assets reaching £700,000 (Figure 28). It would 
appear that the run-up to the French Revolutionary wars led to a rapid fall in the firm’s size. 
Assets stabilised around the £500,000 mark, before the pressures prior to the crisis of 1797 
led to another decline, from which the bank recovered more swiftly. 
 
Figure 28: Goslings Bank total assets/liabilities 1786 to 1800 (Source: BGA, G&S – 0130/0716 and 0130/0725) 
                                                             
95
 Melton, ‘Robert and Sir Francis Gosling’, p. 73. 
96
 Ibid., pp. 74-5, states turnover was £11,739. This figure actually represents repayments for stock 
purchases made for their clients. 
97
 Unfortunately the stock books and loan books that might have been able to explain these figures 
in greater detail are no longer available. 
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Table 8 provides an illustrative balance sheet for the bank in the middle of this period, in 
June 1794, when total assets and liabilities were £475,859 11s 11d.98 It highlights some 
general points that were valid throughout this period, especially with regards to the bank’s 
liabilities. Deposits, over which the bank had limited control, were the main liability of the 
bank, with ‘creditors in ledger’ accounting for 93% of the total on average from 1786 to 
1798. Changes in the size of the deposit base drove the changes shown in Figure 28. Note 
issuance, as with most London banks was of minor consequence by this stage. The bank 
usually had access to funds from the country banks for which it was an agent, however 
these were relatively small in terms of the bank’s total liabilities. It is not completely clear 
what the money owed to the partners represents, but it is likely that it refers to either 
retained earnings or part of the capital paid in by the partners. Finally on the asset side, it is 
worth noting that the cash at hand and the balance labelled Bank, presumably the bank’s 
reserve at the Bank of England, are fairly representative of the sort of ratio that the bank 
maintained throughout this period. 
Assets 
 
Liabilities 
Public Funds £37,592 
 
Creditors in Ledger £442,964 
Lent at interest £174,279 
 
Bearer Notes £3,692 
Debtors in ledger £21,946 
 
Other Banks £11,314 
Notes discounted £139,504 
 
Partners £17,683 
Cash £18,955 
 
Other £199 
Bank £83,582 
   Total £475,858 
  
£475,851 
Table 8: Goslings balance sheet, 28 June 1794 (Source: BGA, G&S, 0130/0716) 
What is also immediately apparent is that in 1794 investments in the public funds were 
extremely low, with the principal investment being £22,119 in East India Bonds (60% of the 
total). One suspects that the reason for the maintenance of this position was the bank’s 
close connection to the East India trade. Another £4,000 of this total was accounted for by 
property in Fleet Street, which is of course not a traded security and one suspects 
represent the premises of the bank.99 In a more normal year, investments in the public 
funds were more wide-ranging. In December 1786, Goslings’ most substantial investments 
were in Bank 3% Consols (£30,250), followed by Navy Bills (£24,935), East India Company 
Bonds (£15,638) and Exchequer Bills (£15,519). Together these accounted for just over 80% 
of total investment. However these were supplemented by a mixture of slightly more 
unusual investments, including Mercer Company bonds (£9,870), various life annuities and 
City Bonds.100 
 
                                                             
98
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0716, cash balances 28 June 1794. 
99
 Mercer Company bonds were the other substantial investment, amounting to 17% of the total. 
There are no investments in Bank stock or Consols. 
100 BGA, G&S, 0130/0716, 30 December 1786.  
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Figure 29: Goslings Bank asset composition, 1786-1800 (Source: BGA, G&S 0130/0716, 0130/0725) 
The change in the bank’s asset composition is illustrated in Figure 29. The key variables in 
Goslings’ balance sheet were the relative balance between lending at interest and 
discounting, with the proportion of assets devoted to the public funds also showing some 
volatility. It can be seen from examining figure 28 in conjunction with figure 29 that the key 
variable in where customer’s deposits were invested was the firm’s discounting activities. 
As the firm’s balance sheet expanded from 1786 to 1791, the proportion of total assets 
accounted for by discounting also expanded. The shrinking of the firm from 1792 to 1796 
saw the proportion of assets devoted to discounting fall. The firm was shrinking its 
discounts, but still gradually increasing its lending at interest. As the balance sheet began to 
expand again in 1797, these new deposits appear to have been used for significant 
investment in the public funds, which grew from less than 10% of all assets to over 45% by 
1800. This probably reflected a common pattern amongst bankers of investing heavily in 
government securities while they were at reduced prices during the war, hoping to benefit 
from capital gains when the war ended.101 
As well as providing an insight into the operation of the bank, this balance sheet data 
allows us to make some judgements on the profit figures that were shown above. Using the 
average of the June and December balance each year, it is possible to calculate an annual 
return on assets and capital (Table 9). The returns on capital were quite astounding; 
however these figures need to be treated with a degree of care. A note following the 
                                                             
101 Joslin, ‘London bankers in wartime’, pp. 156-77. 
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account of December 1786, indicating that a new partnership had been formed at that 
point between Robert, Francis and William Gosling, is useful in demonstrating how bankers 
thought about the bank’s capital. The articles of partnership stated that the bank ought to 
have a capital of £16,000, of which Robert Gosling was to contribute £9,000, Francis 
Gosling £5,000 and William Gosling £2,000. This figure however did not appear on the 
balance sheet, for which an explanation is offered in the ledgers: 
whereas there is no present occasion or Necessity for our advancing of the said 
sum for the purposes aforesaid, now we do hereby declare that we have neither of 
us brought in the said sums, which declaration of ours is intended to obviate any 
demand that might be made by the Executors or Administrators of either of us first 
departing this life, during the continuance of the said partnership.102 
This of course implies that the partners did not need to pay in any capital to cover its day-
to-day operations, but was rather a liability to be made available at need. A similar 
statement is made after the balance sheet of December 1794, at which point the nominal 
capital of the bank was £48,000, but this was not paid in.103 Such a situation would be 
unthinkable today, but worked under a system of unlimited liability, because all the 
partners’ wealth was pledged to the bank anyway. This statement by the partners confirms 
the opinion of Price that the actual size of the capital of the bank was largely irrelevant.104 
The situation was not unique either: at its initial establishment, the firm of Smith & Payne 
had no capital stock either. If capital was considered necessary at a later stage, it would be 
subscribed in the same proportion as which the profits were shared. This would be in the 
form of a loan which paid interest at 4%.105 Paid-in capital was then only necessary for 
newly formed banks, as it provided a source of ‘till money’, or in the case of provincial 
banks, a balance to lodge with the London agent.106 
  
                                                             
102
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0716, 30 Dec 1786. 
103
 BGA, G&S, 0130/0725, 28 Dec 1794. Francis and William Gosling were both liable for £22,000, 
Benjamin Sharpe for £4,000. 
104
 Price, Capital and Credit, p. 80. 
105
 Leighton-Boyce, Smiths the Bankers, pp. 69-70. 
106 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 225-29. 
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Year Assets 
Return 
on 
Assets Capital 
Return 
on 
Capital 
1786 £484,016 3.7% £16,000 112% 
1787 £562,479 3.3% £16,000 117% 
1788 £561,246 2.2% £16,000 76% 
1789 £645,653 2.8% £16,000 113% 
1790 £638,896 2.9% £16,000 115% 
1791 £677,330 3.2% £16,000 134% 
1792 £665,309 3.2% £16,000 133% 
1793 £517,386 2.3% £16,000 75% 
1794 £502,463 3.5% £48,000 36.6% 
1795 £514,065 3.3% £48,000 35.7% 
1796 £446,662 3.5% £48,000 32.7% 
1797 £400,643 2.7% £48,000 22.9% 
1798 £472,753 2.9% £48,000 28.3% 
     Average £545,300 3.0% £28,308 79% 
Table 9: Returns of Goslings Bank, 1786-1798 (Source: BGA, G&S, 0130/0668-670) 
The bank managed to maintain a relatively stable return on assets, averaging 3% over this 
period, with a standard deviation of 40 basis points, while the return on capital from 1794 
onwards is in the region of what Price found for a sample of banks at the time. By way of 
comparison, profits for Hoare’s bank are shown in Figure 30. There is a noteable dip in 
absolute profits around the period of 1757, however in general the bank was making 
similar profits to Child’s. The growth trajectory is also remarkably similar from that point 
onwards. Profits peaked at just over £25,000 in the mid 1760s, slightly higher than those 
achieved by Child’s. They then remained in the region of £20-25,000 through to the mid-
1780s, equivalent in general terms with Child’s performance over the period. 
 
Figure 30: Hoare & Co annual profits, 1720-1785 (Source: C.G.A. Clay, ‘Henry Hoare, banker, his family and 
the Stourhead estate’, pp. 136-38) 
In many ways, Child’s business was similar to Hoare’s at this point, and would remain so 
throughout the eighteenth century. In 1702, 38% of Hoare’s balance sheet still related to its 
goldsmith business, with customers often inclined to use the firm as both banker and 
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jeweller. Clients expected the bank to make investments in government securities and 
collect money owing to them in the capital, as well as providing certain non-financial 
functions, such as watch repairs or purchases of tea.107 At that stage it was unclear if the 
firm was destined to be a bank, as Richard Hoare had aspirations of breaking into the 
diamond trade. These ambitions floundered through a combination of factors, including 
insufficient proficiency in the Dutch language and overpricing of diamonds. At Richard’s 
death in 1719, the bank still carried £24,800 of diamonds on its balance sheets, or about 
one third of assets.108 The period of 1700-1720 was not an easy one for the bank despite 
the rapid growth of customer numbers, with about 100 added each year in the first decade 
alone. An attempt to set up a son (also Richard) led to bad debt of £36,822, which had to 
be written off against his future inheritance in 1712. During the second decade Hoare’s did 
achieve a better business focus, as they  removed small accounts that were unprofitable 
and began to focus on ‘prominent, well-heeled clientele with large and regular borrowing 
requirements’. By 1719, most of the bank’s lending was to a core twenty customers. 
However earnings for the partners remained limited throughout this period.109 
The analysis of these firms’ balance sheets and profit data has indicated that as a group 
they were not at all homogenous, although Child’s and Hoare’s did have some elements in 
common. Goslings is the most interesting of the banks discussed. It appears to have been 
very diversified and flexible in the way it used its resources. For most of the banks, it is also 
apparent that the third quarter of the century was a good time to be in banking, as asset 
size and profit levels appear to have increased. In general this ties in with the issues raised 
at the beginning of the chapter. It would be easy to caricature all West End banks as 
lenders to the aristocracy. This was a clearly not the case. Equally while many of these 
banks display a sense of caution, they also demonstrated adaptability. While it may not 
have been the most dynamic part of the English banking system in terms of overall 
numbers, it was not static either. Most of the firms saw substantial growth, and by the end 
of the century were probably on average larger than City banks. Nor were West End banks 
completely separated from the economy. Indeed there were significant flows between 
West End bankers and the country that was undoubtedly useful in facilitating rural life. 
                                                             
107
 Hutchings, Messrs Hoare’s Bankers, pp. 17-20, 26-28. 
108
 Ibid., pp. 21-22, 30-1. 
109
 Ibid., pp. 24-5, 30-1. The author claims the partners would have made a better return investing 
their money in government securities. 
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Chapter 7: The regional growth of provincial banking, 1700-17961 
 
Having discussed the significance of London to the development of provincial banking, it is 
necessary to consider provincial banking itself. Every discussion of country banking is 
influenced by Pressnell’s work on the subject. 2 However there are still areas which can be 
further explored. This chapter provides a quantitative analysis of the growth in the number 
of banking firms during the eighteenth century. As well as highlighting the acknowledged 
importance of this period in the growth of country banking, it also seeks to examine the 
distribution of the banks across regions and counties. The latter is a topic that has been 
explored very little. As well as being of interest in its own right, in conjunction with other 
data sources it can be useful in helping to develop our understanding of why provincial 
banks emerged and understanding their role in the economy. For the regional analysis, the 
country is split into 9 regions. Finding historically meaningful regions for this period is not 
straightforward. Clive Lee’s regional study, starting in 1841, used the regions as defined in 
1974/5, which corresponded with the end period of his study. However for this study they 
did not seem relevant, particularly as it included regions like Humberside, which only 
emerged at a much later point. 3 The regions ultimately chosen are based on the 
Government Office regions established in 1994.4 While clearly not perfect, they are 
sufficient for they key purpose of this analysis, which was to gain a broad-level overview of 
banks’ distribution. 
The data for this analysis is drawn from Dawes and Ward-Perkins’ Country Banks of England 
and Wales.5 Compiled in 2000, this thoroughly researched work is the most comprehensive 
guide to country banks available, although as its authors acknowledge, it is not problem 
free. Difficulties included instances where people are described as bankers whose business 
may have been more one of money-lending, or where the continuity of a bank between 
different partnerships was not completely clear.6 This reflects the well documented 
problems of the loss of Country banks records.7 Even for some relatively well known banks, 
the precise year of establishment can remain unclear even when information has survived. 
The Bewdley bank in Worcester, whose start date is usually given as 1782, has multiple 
partnerships with confusing terminology. One could also consider if the date when first 
deed of partnership was signed or when the bank first opened its doors is the true start 
date of the bank.8 
                                                             
1 All data for this chapter is based on an end date of 1796 unless otherwise stated. 
2 Pressnell, Country Banking, passim.  
3 Clive Lee, British regional employment statistics 1841-1971 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 39-40. 
4 These correspond with NUTS 1 statistical regions of England. 
5 Margaret Dawes and C.N. Ward-Perkins, Country Banks of England and Wales, Private and 
Provincial Banks and Bankers, 1688-1953, vol. 1 and 2 (Suffolk, 2000). 
6
 Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, pp. ix-x. 
7
 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 2-3. 
8
 Edwin Green, ‘Archives of the Founder: Examples from the HSBC group’ in Kostas P. Kostis (ed.), 
The Creators and the Creation of Banking Enterprises in Europe from the 18th to the 20th Century 
(Athens, 2002) pp. 130-3. 
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Furthermore there are issues with other source materials underpinning the list of country 
bankers for this period. For the 1790s, the universal business directories represent a 
principal source and are essential for identifying some of the banks that had relatively short 
existences. However they do not allow the precise date of the formation of the bank to be 
established. Thus as the directories become more comprehensive, bank numbers might 
seem to increase, although in reality they are simply being better recorded. Thus a number 
of banks supposedly established around the early 1790s in particular may have been in 
existence before that point. Bankruptcy records can also shed some light on bankers, but if 
there are no other records of their business, this is of limited use. Nonetheless as Pressnell 
said of his own overview of the banking statistics, while the numbers might not be 
absolutely accurate, for the purpose of identifying major long-term trends they are 
adequate.9 
One final caveat should be made before proceeding with this analysis. Although it is 
possible to track the changes in the number of firms, this obviously makes no allowance for 
the changes in their size. It is fairly clear that the leading firms were substantially larger by 
the end of the century than they had been at its beginning. Although the limit on the 
number of partners could to some extent act as a brake on the size of the firms, differences 
in size between firms remained substantial. Ideally one could wish for a dataset providing 
the total assets of each bank; however the loss of the underlying evidence prevents this. 
Given the impossibility of providing a statistical analysis of relative size, it becomes 
necessary to use a qualitative analysis of the surviving evidence to shed light on this point. 
I 
The general trend for the emergence of provincial banks in England is well known. Burke 
famously asserted that before 1750 only about twelve banking shops existed outside of 
London, but by 1795 they were ‘in almost every market town’.10 Other contemporaries had 
a similar view. Sir Francis Baring claimed in 1797 that the ‘establishment of Country Banks 
is of modern date and within my recollection’, but that by 1793 they ‘had been established 
in almost every town, and even in villages, throughout the country’.11 Modern studies have 
reinforced this overall picture. Cameron’s standard text on the period suggests that 
numbers rose from 12 in 1750 to 100 in 1775 and 370 in 1800.12 Dawes and Ward-Perkins’ 
limited analysis of their own research paints a similar picture. They suggest that prior to the 
1720s, provincial bankers were so rare as to make an analysis of the topic practically 
impossible and even by 1750 there had been very little growth. It is only at the onset of the 
1750s that the first significant acceleration of bank formations occurs. By 1800 they believe 
there was a total of 415.13 The Suspension in 1797 is believed to have had a significant 
                                                             
9 Pressnell, Country Banking, p. 10. See also the appendix for further comments on this point. 
10 E.J. Payne (ed.), Letters on a Regicide Peace, Letter 1, On the Overtures of Peace, 1st published 
1795 (Indianapolis, 1990), pp. 59-60. This statement is cited for example in Pressnell, Country 
Banking, p. 4, and in Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of industrialization, p. 23.  
11
 Anderson and Cottrell, Money and banking in England, pp. 194-5. Baring lived from 1740 to 1810, 
meaning that the growth of country banking would coincide with Burke’s estimate. 
12
 Cameron, Banking in the early stages of industrialization, p. 24, 33. Cameron’s work was heavily 
based on Pressnell’s, who also stated 370 in 1800, see Country Banking, p. 11. 
13 Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 1, pp. 6-7, 11-12. 
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impact in driving the growth in the number of banks therefter. Ending this analysis in 1796 
is therefore useful in gaining a more undisturbed picture: at that point 374 banks were in 
existence. 
 
Figure 31: Growth of Country Banks in England and Wales, 1700-1800 (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, 
Country Banks, vol. 2, passim)  
Figure 31 shows the rise of country banks in England and Wales, incorporating banks from 
Dawes and Ward-Perkins’ study when both an indicative start and end-date are known. 
There are a further 88 banks for which one of these dates is unknown (in 53 instances the 
end-date). This could obviously have a substantial impact on the overall totals if they came 
into existence at a similar sort of time. On the other hand, the fact that these banks 
generally left such little trace would tend to indicate that they were ephemeral actors in 
banking during this period and it is unlikely that many achieved scale. The growth in 
country banking was exponential in this period. As is well documented, country banking 
only really emerged after 1750. The initial growth rate was gradual, but thereafter 
accelerated at regular intervals, noticeably in the late 1760s, then again around 1780, with 
a final sharp pick-up in the growth rate in the late 1780s, which was barely interrupted by 
the French Revolutionary Wars.  
Dissenting opinions on the overall size of country banking in 1800 are rare. One 
contemporary estimate did however suggest that the numbers were considerably lower: 
John Henry Tritton stated that there were only 230 in 1797.14 This corresponds with the 
numbers provided to a Lords’ Committee of Secrecy in 1797 by George Ellison, secretary to 
an association ‘of great part of the Country Banks’. He argued that Country Bank numbers 
had peaked prior to March 1793, and by 1797 were only 230.15 These estimates appear 
implausibly low compared to the total established in this analysis, and while bank numbers 
                                                             
14
 Cited in King, The London Discount Market, p. 8. 
15
 BPP 1810 (17) Report to the Lords’ Committee of Secrecy. Order of council 26
th
 February 1797 
relating to the Bank, pp. 51-2. This association apparently included about 90-100 banks at this point, 
and was designed to address forgeries and frauds. 
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may have fallen back slightly after 1793 they do appear to have recovered more strongly 
than suggested by Ellison. The figures also look low compared to other contemporary 
sources, as Pressnell has shown that the 1797 Universal Business Directory contained 
entries for 301 banks, while Thornton estimated 332 for that year.16 In terms of the timing 
of that growth, Pressnell identified two stages, with rapid growth between 1750 and 1784, 
followed by a significant acceleration over the next ten years to 1793, trebling the number 
of banks over that time. The period 1793-7 was subdued, but the Suspension then led to 
another period of rapid expansion.17 Dawes and Ward-Perkins’ analysis suggests a 
significant growth spurt in the 1770s, meaning there were some 265 country banks in 
existence by 1788-90. The extraordinary conditions of the 1790s would witness a second 
spurt, leading to a doubling in the number of firms.18 Other authors have placed the major 
growth spurt slightly earlier: Bisschop believed there were 150 banks in 1776 and 350 in 
1790.19 In general terms during the second half of the century, provincial bank numbers on 
average rose around 8% per annum as can be seen in Figure 32. Easier monetary 
conditions, prevalent in the early 1750s, 1765-6, 1770-1 and 1789-93 were generally 
regarded as favourable to bank growth, the last being particularly visible in the chart 
below.20 While it is possible to highlight different periods, the unavoidable fact is that the 
period 1770-1790 as a whole was incredibly important in the formation of the provincial 
banking sector. 
 
Figure 32: Percentage year-on-year change in country bank numbers, 1751-1800 (Source: Dawes and Ward-
Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
Given the low base from which banking emerged, it is not really plausible to link the growth 
of banking and the growth of the overall population. The net result of the exceptional 
                                                             
16 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 6-7, 11. Pressnell also cites Chalmers’ estimate of 400 country 
banks in 1793, a number in line with the data presented here. 
17
 Ibid, p. 7. 
18
 Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 1, pp. 6-7. In the text, they state 200 banks for 1788-
90, but this is likely to be a mistake, and the figure given here for 1790 comes from the table on p. 
11-12.  
19
 Cited in King, The London Discount Market, p. 8.  
20 Pressnell, Country Banking, p. 8. 
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growth in country banking however was that on a per capita basis, England and Wales were 
becoming more densely banked, as can be seen in Figure 33.   
 
Figure 33: Banking density in England and Wales, 1756-1801 (Source: Wrigley, p. 64; Dawes and Ward-
Perkins) 
So far, only the net formation of banks has been discussed. Clearly over the course of the 
half century, there was a degree of turnover in the banking industry, some firms lasting but 
a handful of years. The comparison of bank formations and exits can be seen in Figure 34. 
The term exit is used deliberately for the numbers provided included firms that chose to 
end their business voluntarily, for example on the death of a partner, as well as the outright 
business failures. An idea of the difference between the two can be seen from Preston’s 
study of banking in East Anglia, which identified 52 banks in total for this period. Of these, 
eleven are known to have left the industry by 1802, implying an exit rate of 21%. However 
of these exits, 4 were related to deaths or retirements. Thus the failure rate was actually 
around 13%.21 For the country as a whole, from the 1780s there were constant entries, but 
also a smaller number of exits each year. Bank exits or failures have been of considerable 
historical interest.22 However it is noticeable that of the banking crises identified by 
Clapham in 1753, 1763, 1772-3, 1783, 1793 and 1797, only really those of the 1790s are 
visible in bank exit statistics.23 The major crisis of 1772/3 was of commercial origin and the 
first occasion on which the banking system was perceived to have developed to a point 
where crises could be transferred between regions, yet its impact barely registers in this 
data, in contrast to the experience of the London bankers.24   
 
                                                             
21
 Harold Preston, Early East Anglian Banks and Bankers (Thetford, 1994). 
22
 Pressnell, chapter 8. 
23
 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 224. See also Hoppit, ‘Financial crises’, p. 44. 
24 Hoppit, ‘Financial crises’, pp. 52-4. 
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Figure 34: Country bank formations and exits, 1750-1797 (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, 
vol. 2, passim) 
Bank failures have contributed to the view that the English private banking system was 
volatile and vulnerable to shocks and as such has been a source of criticism. Clapham 
argues that within the eighteenth century economy, there was a ‘tendency for confidence 
leading to over-confidence and then disappointment and perhaps disaster to recur at fairly 
regular intervals in commercial societies’.25 It has been suggested that banks were often 
conduits for these broader problems when they occurred, rather than the root cause of the 
problems themselves.26 Bank failures were however relatively visible, with notices 
surrounding bankruptcies for example common in publications such as the Times after 
1785.27 Contemporary opinion was not always supportive of the banks’ performance, the 
Times of 1793 claimed that they should be ‘purged’.28 Some banks certainly left themselves 
more exposed than others. Sir Francis Baring was critical specifically of the banks of 
Newcastle for having initiated the crisis of 1793 by refusing payment, in contrast to those in 
Exeter where the partners in the banks continued to pay out. Newcastle banks differed 
from those in Exeter, where bank owners were less wealthy, did not invest so heavily in 
illiquid assets and could therefore continue making payments.29 Baring had strong 
connections to the Exeter bankers, and was therefore well-informed as to their business 
practices. Ultimately this situation was to repeat itself again in 1797, when farmers at the 
farmers’ market in Newcastle on Saturday 18 February panicked upon a rumour, sold their 
cattle in a crashing market, and went straight to banks to retrieve their gold. This led to the 
                                                             
25
 Clapham, Bank of England, pp. 225-6. 
26
 Hoppit, ‘Financial crises’, pp. 54-7. 
27
 The Times Digital Archive, 1785-2008. As an example, see John Tyson Reade, reported as bankrupt 
in Issue 271, 7 Nov 1785, or Thomas Garrard, issue 333, 18 Jun 1786. 
28
 Cited in Banham, Backhouses, p. 6. 
29 Cited in Anderson and Cottrell, Money and banking in England, p. 196. 
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situation where on the Monday the bankers stopped payment.30 In other words, these 
banks did not have adequate levels of liquid assets. There is likely to have been significant 
variation in local practices. Hartley claims that in Yorkshire, banks were by 1792 ‘sound 
concerns, some with fifteen to twenty years of service and experience behind them’, while 
newer enterprises supposedly had the backing of partners of significant wealth and 
position.31 
A recent article by J.A. James has attempted to trace the likelihood of survival within the 
banking industry. To do this, he relied solely on banks from the North East as identified in 
Phillips’ work on that region, and he considered all banks, both private and joint-stock, 
through to 1894. He concluded from this research that banks founded prior to 1800 were 
the most robust. 32 Figure 35 shows the results of a similar exercise performed on country 
banks founded prior to 1800 for all of England. For the purpose of this analysis, only banks 
where both start date and end-date are known have been included. 
 
Figure 35: Bank survival rates, grouped by foundation period (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country 
Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
In common with James’ data for the North East, the older banks have better survival rates 
than those that were established later in the century. That the banks established in the 
‘frothier’ times of the late 1790s should have been slightly more prone to failure could 
perhaps have been anticipated. The significantly improved longevity of earliest established 
banks is more surprising. There is a possibility that the numbers are skewed by smaller, less 
successful establishments from earlier in the century having been completely lost from 
historical record. On the other hand, it might also be a reflection that earlier banks had a 
better reputation, had already accrued the best business in the locality, and were 
                                                             
30
 W.C.E. Hartley, Banking in Yorkshire (Clapham, North Yorkshire, 1975), pp. 15-6. The problems 
relate to France attempting to put its currency on a gold standard, which it was feared would drain 
gold out of Britain. 
31
 Ibid., p. 13. 
32 James, ‘English Banking and Payments before 1826’, pp. 120-4. 
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consequently by their nature more likely to survive than newer foundations that perhaps 
had greater speculative influences. 
It is also possible to provide a comparison with contemporaneous developments in banking 
in Scotland (Figure 36). Although in institutional form the Scottish provincial banks were 
distinct from English country banks, the chart tends to show similar growth patterns in the 
number of banking firms in Scotland to that seen for the English Country banks. The key 
difference is that the development of banking in Scotland appears to have happened about 
ten to twenty years earlier than in England. England on the other hand was witnessing a 
much greater growth in numbers for the last fifteen years or so of the century. It is possible 
that early development in Scotland was a result of the greater competition between the 
Edinburgh banks, which drove them to seek to expand their influence into the provinces.  
 
 
Figure 36: The growth of Scottish banking, 1700-1800 (Source C.W. Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking 
Companies; English data from Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, passim) 
The data also suggests that it is extremely hard to argue that the English banking system of 
the eighteenth century was any weaker than the Scottish one. Although bank exits were 
lower in absolute numbers in Scotland, as a proportion of the firms in existence, there was 
no real difference between the two countries (Figure 37). Nor can it be suggested that the 
failures in Scotland were less severe on a qualitative basis, for the failure of the Ayr bank 
was potentially the worst bank failure of the century.33 These points are very important. 
That English bank failures feature more prominently than Scottish ones an absolute basis is 
not surprising, given that it had a larger number of banks in total. English banks do appear 
to have suffered more in the latter stages of the American War, however Scotland saw a 
problem in 1787 that was not witnessed in England. In the major crises it could be argued 
from this data that English banks were more robust than those of Scotland. In summary the 
growth and failure patterns for banking in Scotland and England appear to have actually 
                                                             
33 Munn, Scottish Provincial Banking, pp. 29-33. 
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been quite similar, suggesting that the importance of the institutional forms they adopted 
is maybe overstated. 
 
Figure 37: Comparison of English and Scottish bank exit rates, 1770-1800 (Source C.W. Munn, The Scottish 
Provincial Banking Companies; English data from Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, passim) 
II 
While trends at a national level are important, they are not by themselves sufficient to 
understand the growth of provincial banking. Analysing the distribution of the provincial 
banks throughout the country offers the opportunity to better comprehend the 
relationship between banking and other factors, including population size, wealth, and the 
nature of the local economy. It is an area on which remarkably little research has been 
carried out. Pressnell himself made no firm conclusion, while Dawes and Ward-Perkins’ 
analysis of their own data was limited.34 Table 10 and Figure 38 provide a breakdown of the 
number of banks by county, highlighting the exponential changes taking place in England 
over the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Some counties gained their first banking 
businesses, whilst others saw significant growth in banking coverage. The growth in places 
such as Kent, Gloucestershire and Shropshire is particularly noticeable, as they ended the 
century amongst the counties with the highest number of banks in the country, having had 
virtually no banking houses as late as 1780. 
  
                                                             
34 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 4-11. 
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County 1780 1800 Variance 
Yorkshire 13 44 +31 
Somerset 13 32 +19 
Kent 2 19 +17 
Devon 3 18 +15 
Gloucestershire 1 18 +17 
Staffordshire 3 18 +15 
Shropshire 1 17 +16 
Warwickshire 4 17 +13 
Lancashire 9 15 +6 
Lincolnshire 2 14 +12 
Hampshire 1 13 +12 
Norfolk 4 12 +8 
Wiltshire 2 12 +10 
Wales 2 11 +9 
Worcestershire 3 11 +8 
Berkshire 1 10 +9 
Oxfordshire 1 10 +9 
Suffolk 3 10 +7 
Cornwall 3 9 +6 
Durham 6 9 +3 
Sussex 0 9 +9 
Derbyshire 7 8 +1 
Dorset 0 8 +8 
Leicestershire 2 7 +5 
Cumberland 0 6 +6 
Northamptonshire 0 6 +6 
Essex 1 5 +4 
Herefordshire 0 5 +5 
Northumberland 3 5 +2 
Buckinghamshire 0 4 +4 
Cambridgeshire 2 4 +2 
Isle of Wight 1 4 +3 
Nottinghamshire 2 4 +2 
Surrey 1 4 +3 
Bedfordshire 0 2 +2 
Cheshire 0 2 +2 
Huntingdonshire 0 2 +2 
Middlesex 0 2 +2 
Westmorland 0 2 +2 
Hertfordshire 0 1 +1 
Rutland 0 1 +1 
Total 96 410 +314 
Table 10: Number of banks by county, 1780 and 1800 (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 
1 pp. 11-2) 
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Figure 38: Change in bank numbers by county, 1780-1800 (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, 
vol. 1, pp. 11-2) 
In contrast, three counties stand out in the above analysis for the relatively conservative 
growth in the number of bankers: Derbyshire, Durham and Lancashire. Each county had by 
1780 already seen a relatively substantial number of banks emerge and although they did 
add to these numbers over the course of next two decades, the increase is much less 
marked than in other counties. One explanation might be that the established incumbent 
banks could have reduced the incentive for new entrants to establish more speculative 
ventures in these regions. 
Grouping the banks by regions makes it possible to highlight a number of key trends, 
although providing explanations in the regional variations is not always straightforward. In 
terms of the chronological changes, the most striking aspect of Figure 39 is that the South 
West of the country seems to have been very important in the overall growth of banking in 
England. Not only did this region provide the largest number of banks of any region in the 
country by 1800, but they also emerged earlier here compared with elsewhere in the 
country, driven by bank formations during the period from 1768 to 1788.  
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Figure 39: Country bank numbers by region, 1750-1800 (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, 
vol. 2, passim) 
 
By 1796, the South West region accounted for about a quarter of all banks in the country. 
The South East and West Midlands were the next most important regions, accounting for 
18% and 15% of the total respectively. East Anglia and Yorkshire both provided another 
10%. The relatively late emergence of banks in Wales was expected, as the existing 
literature tends to date the emergence of the early Welsh banking industry to the 1770s.35 
On the other hand it is possible to show that the Green’s argument that West Wales 
possessed no genuine banking firms by the end of the century is incorrect.36 The themes 
seen in Figure 39 are not fundamentally altered by analysing the location of banks where 
either start or end-date is unknown (which are not included in the chart). A quarter of 
these banks were located in the South West, while the proportion in the West Midlands is 
also similar to that from the analysis of banks where start and end-dates are known in 
1796. However the East Midlands and North West appear overrepresented on this basis, 
being 10 and 7 percentage points above their expected level respectively.  
                                                             
35
 Roberts ‘Banks and the economic Development of South Wales’, p. 66. 
36 Green, ‘Early Banks in West Wales’, pp. 129-64. 
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Figure 40: Distribution of Country Banks by region in 1796 (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, 
vol. 2, passim) 
Some allowance needs to be made for the fact that these regions were not of uniform size 
or population. After excluding Middlesex from the population figures for the South East, to 
remove the population of London, the region of the South West was the largest throughout 
the century, although its share of the total population for England and Wales was shrinking. 
Importantly, its share of the country’s banks was always well in excess of its share of the 
population (Figure 41). The East Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire and the North West 
were all of similar population size, with banks in the North West appearing to be 
consistently underrepresented. The North East and the South East are more interesting: in 
1781, in the South East  there were few banks relative to the overall population size, but 
this situation changed over the next fifteen years. The late emergence of banks here may 
be attributed to the impact of the proximity to London. In the North East, the situation was 
exactly reversed, as banking appears to have emerged early, but then its position 
normalised by the end of the century. 
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Figure 41: Regional share of provincial banks relative to regional share of total population (Source: 
population statistics from Deane & Cole; Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
 
The variations between population size and bank provision is also apparent at county level 
(Table 11).37 Relatively rural counties feature prominently at the top of this list, sorted by 
banking density in 1796. The figures for some of these counties are influenced by the 
impact of one relatively important, but not very populous town. For example Hull exerts a 
significant influence on the numbers for the East Riding, while Bristol has an equal impact 
on the position of Gloucestershire. This data also indicates how fast banking emerged in 
some counties, most notably Oxfordshire and Dorset, while industrial counties such as 
Staffordshire or the West Riding fall back quite far relative to other parts of the country. 
  
                                                             
37
 These are based upon Deane and Cole’s population figures. Undertaking the same exercise using 
Mitchell’s population figures for 1800 gives a similar outcome and. 
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  People per bank 
 
Rank 
 
 
  1781 1796 
 
1781 1796 Variation 
 
Worcestershire  32486 10270 
 
4 1 3 
 
Gloucestershire  25812 10784 
 
3 2 1 
 
Oxfordshire  102144 11312 
 
23 3 20 
 
East Riding  21442 12701 
 
2 4 -2 
 
Dorset  102633 13222 
 
24 5 19 
 
Warwickshire  44425 14322 
 
9 6 3 
 
North Riding  52582 14843 
 
14 7 7 
 
Somerset  36119 14868 
 
6 8 -2 
 
Monmouthshire    15679 
 
 9 
 
 
Berkshire  108696 16100 
 
25 10 15 
 
Durham  20062 16548 
 
1 11 -10 
 
Suffolk  62994 16704 
 
18 12 6 
 
Shropshire    17299 
 
 13 
 
 
Wiltshire  92307 17365 
 
21 14 7 
 
Hampshire  174513 17436 
 
27 15 12 
 
Kent    17636 
 
 16 
 
 
Herefordshire    18408 
 
 17 
 
 
Cambridgeshire  40889 18440 
 
8 18 -10 
 
Leicestershire  36524 19176 
 
7 19 -12 
 
Huntingdonshire    19384 
 
 20 
 
 
Lincolnshire  97539 19565 
 
22 21 1 
 
Sussex    20550 
 
 22 
 
 
Devon  72990 20820 
 
19 23 -4 
 
Westmoreland    21473 
 
 24 
 
 
Norfolk  51216 21700 
 
13 25 -12 
 
Cornwall  78737 24285 
 
20 26 
 
 
Yorkshire (whole)  54046 24620 
 
16 27 -11 
 
Staffordshire  47516 25239 
 
11 28 -17 
 
Northamptonshire    27192 
 
 29 -29 
 
West Riding  57385 30701 
 
17 30 -13 
 
Wales  164414 31046 
 
26 31 -5 
 
Cumbria    32380 
 
 32 
 
 
Northumberland  49189 32423 
 
12 33 -21 
 
Derbyshire  33549 33257 
 
5 34 -29 
 
Buckinghamshire    36958 
 
 35 
 
 
Lancashire  46781 46280 
 
10 36 -26 
 
Essex  207739 46733 
 
29 37 -8 
 
Nottinghamshire  52824 48276 
 
15 38 -23 
 
Surrey  199062 69408 
 
28 39 -11 
 
Cheshire    98936 
 
 40 
 
 
Hertfordshire    100691 
 
 41 
 Table 11: People per bank in 1781 and 1796 (Sources: Population data from Deane & Cole, British Economic 
Growth; bank numbers from Dawes and Ward-Perkins. Bedfordshire and Rutland had no banks in 1796 and 
are excluded) 
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While one would expect population size to have some bearing on the number of banks in a 
county, other factors might also be expected to be significant, such as wealth. The data 
shown in the following charts draws on Buckatzsch’s work on the long-term trends of 
wealth in English counties.38 This work is limited by the author’s inability to find any usable 
data for the period between 1693 and 1803, when the wealth distribution within England 
possibly changed substantially. However a comparison of the 1803 wealth rankings with 
the banking numbers for 1800 is still possible (Figure 42). 
 
Figure 42: Wealth rankings versus number of banks per county rankings around 1800 (Sources: Buckatzsch, p. 
187; Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
The reasoning behind this analysis is that one could expect a richer county to contain more 
banks, for it is generally true that wealthier, more sophisticated economies would have 
more scope for specialisation and development in finance. However the picture from this 
initial data would suggest that this relationship did not hold in eighteenth century England, 
especially for the richer counties. The relationship is particularly poor for Leicestershire, 
Worcestershire, Hertfordshire and Cheshire. As one moves toward the less wealthy 
counties, the relationship does appear to improve, for example in Cambridgeshire and 
Westmoreland. The failure to find a relationship between wealth and banking could 
possibly be explained by an insufficient wealth differentiation between the counties, as it is 
based on a ranking system. Another potential issue with the analysis is that it does not take 
into take into account a county’s geographical or population size. The effect can be seen in 
the case of Yorkshire, which scores well on number of banks by virtue of being the largest 
county, but is only average in terms of wealth. 
                                                             
38
 E. J. Buckatzsch, ‘The Geographical Distribution of Wealth in England, 1086-1843: An Experimental 
Study of Certain Tax Assessments’, EcHR 3:2 (1950), pp. 180-202. 
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Figure 43: Ranking of number of banks per head versus wealth of county (Source: Buckatzsch, ‘The 
Geographical Distribution of Wealth’, p. 187; Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
However Figure 43 shows that even if one adjusts the number of banks to account for the 
overall size of the population of a county, there is still no real correlation between the 
wealth of a county and bank provision within it. The discrepancy can be explained in certain 
instances: for example banking requirements for Surrey may have been covered from 
London. A similar argument could be made in relation to Essex and Buckinghamshire. 
Equally, Lancashire was notoriously underbanked, and this probably impacted upon 
Cheshire as well. However, even excluding these obvious discrepancies, the relationship 
between banking and wealth is inconclusive. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that a 
town’s wealth was not a good indicator of the likelihood of a bank emerging there. Thus for 
example the first bank in Suffolk developed in Needham Market, which has been described 
as a poor town at the time the ironmonger and Quaker Samuel Alexander established the 
bank there. This bank then established a branch in Ipswich in the 1767, which became the 
head office of the bank around 1800. In contrast, the comparatively wealthy town of 
Halesworth developed two banks in the eighteenth century, but the first of these, Gurney 
& Turner, was only established in 1782. Equally the small, ‘dirty’ town of Clare had 
developed a bank by 1801, while the more substantial town of Lowestoft did not develop 
any banks until the 1820s.39 Overall, the author of this article believes that banking in 
Suffolk developed better in the inland, agricultural towns than in those on the coast, 
although there is no evidence that this was true throughout the country as a whole 
Another potential approach to understanding the distribution of banks is to analyse how 
bank numbers related to the underlying nature of the local economy. Table 12 shows the 
distribution of country banks in terms of the level of industrialisation of the county they 
were based in.  To avoid subjectivity in the categorisation of counties, the number of steam 
engines found in a county in 1780 and 1800 was used as a proxy for its level of 
industrialisation. While obviously a crude method, it was felt that the use of steam engines 
in mining, textiles and metalworking, together with the presence of 300 engines (or 14% of 
                                                             
39 A.G.E. Jones, ‘Early Banking in Suffolk’, Notes and Queries (1955), pp. 28, 170-172. 
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the total) in other areas of industry, meant that it could serve as a useful proxy.40 It also 
had the merit that the relatively substantial costs of these machines implied a degree of 
capital expenditure for which a bank offering finance might have been of benefit.41 For the 
purpose of this analysis, any county which was in the top quartile as determined by the 
number of steam engines located there has been categorised as ‘industrial’. In 1800 this 
meant they had over 38 steam engines. Mixed counties were those having between 10 and 
38 engines.42 Once this analysis had been undertaken, the number of banks in each type of 
county in 1780 and 1796 was counted to give the final totals. 
 County Type 
Banks 
in 1780 
% of 
total 
Banks 
in 1796 
% of 
total 
Population 
in 1801 
People per bank 
(1796) 
‘Rural’ Counties 33 35% 176 47% 3,638,000 20,670  
‘Mixed’ Counties 8 9% 54 14% 823,000  15,241  
‘Industrial’ 
Counties 53 56% 144 39% 4,366,000  30,319  
Total 94  374  8,827,000 23,602 
Table 12: Distribution of banks by county economic characteristics I (Sources: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, 
Country Banks, vol. 2, passim; population data from Mitchell, Historical Statistics; county types defined in 
text) 
The results of this analysis are interesting. Firstly, it shows that in 1780, banks were 
predominantly located in industrial areas. It should perhaps be noted that at this point 25% 
of industrial banks were in Yorkshire, where only the West Riding was truly industrial, 
which might be distorting the overall data slightly. Over the next twenty years, there was a 
shift and by the turn of the eighteenth century, rural counties were better banked, 
certainly in terms of the number of banking houses. One can also tell that relative to their 
population size, banking density was greater in rural counties relative to their industrial 
counterparts in 1800. If one accepts that ‘rural’ areas were more likely to be deposit 
gathering areas, then this might tentatively suggest that bank formation was being driven 
by the need for a safe place for people’s money, rather than being driven by a demand for 
finance. It would also tend to suggest that looking at the banking system predominantly in 
terms of industrial finance is not entirely appropriate. The other key point is that within the 
‘industrial’ counties, many banks will have been financing commercial activity underpinning 
the local industry, rather than industry directly, as most banks were found in the 
commercial centres. Finally, although ‘mixed’ counties formed only a small proportion of all 
banks, it is noticeable that relative to their population size they were densely banked areas. 
To provide a check on these results, it is possible to perform a similar analysis using Deane 
and Cole’s definitions of rural, mixed and industrial counties. These were based on 
occupational splits given in the 1811 census, where rural counties were those where over 
                                                             
40 Kanefsky and Robey, 'Steam Engines in 18th-Century Britain’, p. 179-80.  
41 Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914, pp. 20-1, states that only largest firms could afford a 
Boulton and Watt engine. In 1797, a 16 horse power engine cost £1,000. 
42
 Kanefsky and Robey, 'Steam Engines in 18th-Century Britain’, pp. 175, 178, used 10 engines as 
their benchmark for ‘industrial’ in 1800, a total reached by less than half the counties. For my 
analysis of 1780, the top quartile, (industrial counties) implies the presence of 12 engines. Given the 
proximity to the level of 10 used for ‘mixed’ counties in 1800, the lower bound for ‘mixed’ counties 
in 1780 was reduced to 5. 
188 
 
50% drew their main income from agriculture, whilst mixed counties were those where this 
proportion was between 36% (the national average) and 50%.43 The results are presented 
in Table 13. 
 
1781 1796 
County Type Banks % of total People/Bank Banks % of total People/Bank 
Agricultural 20 20% 116635 109 29% 23899 
Mixed 35 36% 68063 146 39% 19586 
Industrial/Commercial 43 44% 50914 117 31% 25226 
Total 98 
 
70451 372 
 
22624 
Table 13: Distribution of banks by county economic characteristics II (Sources: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, 
Country Banks, vol. 2, passim; for county types and population, see Deane & Cole, British Economic Growth, 
p. 108) 
What is immediately apparent is that Deane and Cole’s estimates significantly increases the 
number of banks in mixed counties. This is largely at the expense of the agricultural 
counties, although the industrial numbers also fall slightly. However it also confirms much 
of the previous results. It is clear that the mixed counties were the most densely banked 
(relative to their population size) at the end of the century. Equally in both cases, despite a 
large share of total provincial banks been concentrated in industrial counties (especially in 
1780/1), relative to the population size of these counties they were the least well banked 
at the end of the century. One should also note that in Deane and Cole’s analysis, a number 
of the counties that fall into the industrial category are not what one might normally define 
as industrial, including Gloucestershire, Kent and Surrey. As such, it is arguable that the 
analysis based on steam engines is more robust in identifying genuinely industrial counties. 
So far, the impact of wealth, population size and industrialisation levels have been 
considered as potential drivers of banking provision within a county. One final approach 
can be to look at banking as a service industry that needs to be provided within an 
economy. If this is so, one can expect it to emerge in locations where other services are to 
be found. To measure this, one can compare the number of people per bank with the 
number of attorneys per person in each county. The comparison with attorneys has two 
advantages. Firstly it is a common profession, so they were spread throughout the country. 
Secondly, there is an established connection between attorneys and the provision of 
financial services in the eighteenth century economy, so one might expect to find both in 
the same place. Figure 44 shows the ranking by county of the number of people per 
attorney and per bank at the end of the century. The relationship is noticeably more 
significant than the relationship between banking and wealth and population size. 
                                                             
43 Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 104. 
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Figure 44: Bank and attorney provision by county; rank 1 equals fewest banks/attorneys per person (Source: 
Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 2 passim; Phillip Aylett, ‘A Profession in the Market Place: The 
Distribution of Attorneys in England and Wales 1730-1800’, Law and History Review) 
Counties with the highest number of attorneys, in relation to the size of the population, 
also tended to be those with the highest banking densities. The overall correlation between 
the two sets of data is relatively strong at 70%. There are very few counties where this 
relationship completely breaks down and where it does do so, it can be explained to some 
extent. Cheshire was a substantial legal centre, while it is known that the North-West was 
relatively poorly endowed with formal financial institutions, so that mismatch is not 
surprising. Another key feature of the distribution of attorneys was that changes were 
relatively limited over the period 1730-1800.44 The analysis once again highlights the key 
importance of the South West as a banking sector for England and Wales, but also as a 
broader service centre. A key conclusion is that banking should be considered in the 
context of its function as a service industry and that it emerged in areas which were already 
well established as service centres. Wealth and population size in comparison were of 
lesser significance.  
Aside from examining the formation of banks at a regional and county level, it is also 
possible to comment on how they were distributed across towns. By 1800, banks had been 
formed in 288 towns in England.45 150 towns, or 52% of the total, only had one bank. 
Another 26% of these towns saw the establishment of two banks; 3 banks were launched in 
10%; and 4 banks in 5%. 5 or more banks opened in 6% of towns. Thus regional banking 
clusters were rare and it worth considering where they tended to emerge. Bristol was the 
largest banking centre outside of London, with 13 institutions created there. Norwich, 
another old commercial town, came second with 9. Other commercial ports also feature 
prominently: Liverpool and Exeter both numbered 8 banks; Hull, Newcastle and Whitby 
                                                             
44
 Phillip Aylett, ‘A Profession in the Market Place: The Distribution of Attorneys in England and 
Wales 1730-1800’, Law and History Review 5.1 (1987), pp. 13-17. 
45
 Note that all figures in this paragraph include banks that had failed by 1800. In 1800 the number 
of towns with a bank was actually slightly less than 288. 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
W
o
rc
es
te
rs
h
ir
e 
G
lo
s.
 
O
xo
n
 
D
o
rs
et
 
W
ar
. 
So
m
er
se
t 
M
o
n
. 
B
er
ks
h
ir
e 
D
u
rh
am
 
Su
ff
o
lk
 
Sh
ro
p
s.
 
W
ilt
s 
H
an
ts
 
K
en
t 
H
er
ef
o
rd
. 
C
am
b
ri
d
ge
sh
ir
e 
Le
ic
es
te
rs
h
ir
e 
H
u
n
ts
. 
Li
n
co
ln
sh
ir
e 
C
u
m
b
ri
a 
Su
ss
ex
 
D
ev
o
n
 
W
es
tm
o
r.
 
N
o
rf
o
lk
 
St
af
fs
 
C
o
rn
w
al
l 
Yo
rk
s 
N
o
rt
h
an
ts
 
W
al
es
 
N
o
rt
h
u
m
b
er
la
n
d
 
D
er
b
ys
h
ir
e 
B
u
ck
s.
 
La
n
cs
 
Es
se
x 
N
o
tt
s 
Su
rr
ey
 
C
h
es
h
ir
e 
H
er
ts
 
Bank rank 1796 Attorney rank in 1800 
190 
 
each created 6. Industrial towns feature less prominently, but included Birmingham, Derby, 
Sheffield and Coventry. 
The importance of commercial towns in driving bank formations is consistent at given 
points in time. In 1780, only eight towns had more than two banks: of these, half were 
clearly commercial (Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle and Norwich). Bath stands alongside 
Bristol as the most important banking city, while Birmingham provides an industrial 
component.46 A similar picture emerges at the end of the century in 1796 (Table 14). The 
374 banks in existence in that year were spread across 231 towns. Of these 231 towns, the 
majority (62%) possessed only 1 bank. Equally commercial cities dominate the list of most 
heavily banked towns: Bristol and Norwich again head the list with 8 and 7 banks 
respectively. Exeter, Liverpool, Hull, Newcastle, Whitby and Boston all figure in the top 13 
towns by number of banks, each with 4 or more banks. A number of the leading provincial 
banking centres feature in the list of the ten leading ports in 1788, as measured by tonnage 
owned.47 Exeter was no longer a top 10 port in 1788, but had been in 1702. Boston is the 
exception in this list, in that it did not feature as a significant port in terms of volume of 
shipping. Leading ports that did not develop into banking centres at this point were 
Sunderland, Whitehaven, Scarborough and Yarmouth.48   
Bristol 8 
Norwich 7 
Worcester 6 
Birmingham 5 
Exeter 5 
Boston 4 
Bury St Edmunds 4 
Carlisle 4 
Gloucester 4 
Hull 4 
Liverpool 4 
Newcastle-on-Tyne 4 
Whitby 4 
Table 14: Leading provincial banking towns in 1796, with number of banks (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, 
Country Banks, vol. 2, passim) 
On the basis of the 1801 census data, Bristol had a bank for every 7,625 people. This was a 
much denser provision than in other cities: Manchester had only 3 banks for a population 
75,000 (25,000 people per bank). Birmingham had 14,200 people per bank, Liverpool 
20,500 per bank. The only other comparable figures are to be found in Cameron’s work. 
These suggest that banking density in 1801 was highest in Birmingham, at one office per 
12,000 inhabitants, compared to a national average of some 21,000 inhabitants per bank. 
                                                             
46
 The other two towns are Derby and Darlington. 
47
 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century 
(Newton Abbott, 1972), p. 35; Chapman, Merchant Capitalism, pp. 40-1. These are Bristol, 
Newcastle, Liverpool, Hull, Whitby. 
48
 Sunderland had only 1 bank in 1796, the other three towns had 2 each. Both Sunderland and 
Yarmouth had additionally experienced one bank failure by this point. 
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Lancashire and Cheshire were at the opposite end of the spectrum, with 48,000 inhabitants 
per bank.49 To explain this it is necessary to point to the strength and size of these banks, 
alongside the local aversion to note-issuing banks. In particular Lancashire is known to have 
operated slightly differently to other regions: banks there generally did not issue their own 
notes, but used Bank of England notes or bills of exchange. It should also be noted that the 
numbers are such that one extra bank materially changes the banking density, so that one 
would be reluctant to overemphasise this point. 
What one can clearly identify from the above analysis is a strong link between commerce 
and banking in the provinces. This link between trade and banking can also be seen at a 
national level. Specifically one can compare the growth in the number of banks with the 
current value of English exports (Figure 45). The point remains suggestive, however the 
shape of the developments in both cases is remarkably similar, with the growth of banking 
slightly preceding the rapid growth in exports.  
 
Figure 45: English Country Bank growth and English exports (Source: McCusker, 'The Current Value of English 
Exports, 1697 to 1800'; Country bank dataset) 
Other evidence also points towards the important connection between trade and banking.  
It has already been shown that London’s City banks were geared towards supporting the 
commercial activities of London. The Royal Bank of Scotland branch in Glasgow, which 
served a mercantile clientele, is thought to have become the busiest bank office outside of 
London.50 Provincial banking studies have also highlighted commercial influence in these 
organisations. Banks in commercial towns featured strong merchant participation, but of 
course also had other representatives of other interests. These themes can be clearly 
illustrated in the case of bankers in the North East of England. Newcastle was one of the 
first major provincial towns where banking emerged as a standalone business.51 All four 
                                                             
49
 Cameron, Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation, pp. 26-7. 
50
 Munn, Scottish Provincial Banking Companies, pp. 48-9. 
51 Phillips, History of Banks, Bankers and Banking, p. 174-5.  
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partners of the Newcastle ‘Old Bank’ are described as merchants.52  Banham has estimated 
that of 28 known bank partners in Newcastle, 13 were merchants, 7 manufacturers, three 
lawyers and five landed gentry.53 In Sunderland, there was a strong link between the 
banking industry and shipping, with one banking partner being a local coal and ship owner, 
and another a London trader with that port.54 Obviously some prominent bankers did 
emerge from manufacturing backgrounds: the Backhouses for example were linen and flax 
manufacturers and dealers in yarn, as well as becoming the agents of the Royal Exchange 
Assurance in Darlington in 1759.55 Equally, while commercial towns were important in bank 
formations, the experience of bank development in these towns was not uniform. 
Newcastle, with five banks by 1793, fits the idea of a commercial town with a longstanding 
banking heritage. Liverpool also developed a sizeable business in banking by the end of 
eighteenth century, however the trajectory reflects the later emergence of this city 
compared to some of the more established commercial ports, such as Bristol or Newcastle. 
The first directory of Liverpool in 1766 does not list any bankers and that of 1774 only one 
(Caldwell & Co).56  
III 
Three distinct points emerge from this chapter. Firstly England as a whole, and most 
regions within the county, followed a similar standardised pattern of exponential growth in 
bank numbers across the course of the century. This pattern corresponds roughly to the 
‘typical’ expectations of the growth of a banking system that has been highlighted by 
Grossman.57 The precise shape of the curve is said to depend on the demand for banking 
services from the economy and the regulation of the banking industry. Notably the analysis 
presented here suggests that the shape of this curve does not depend on the ownership 
structure withinthe banking industry; it is the same as one would expect with commercial 
joint-stock banks. This point is confirmed through the comparison to the Scottish banking 
system that has been made, but also in comparison to other countries, such as the USA, 
Denmark or Norway.58 Within England, the region of the South West stands out for having 
been ahead of other provincial regions in developing a banking industry. This could reflect 
the combined impact of the legacy of Bristol’s importance as a commercial centre and a 
generally wealthy hinterland with important towns. 
Secondly, the analysis of the provincial bank failures should make one hesitant to argue 
that provincial banks were structurally less sound than other ownership structures, such as 
contemporary joint-stock banks in Scotland. Indeed, if anything, the oldest provincial 
private banks demonstrated exceptional longevity. When failures arose, they were more 
                                                             
52 J. Banham, Backhouses’ Bank of Darlington 1774-1836 (NEEHI Papers in North-Eastern History 9, 
1999), p. 6. 
53 John Banham, ‘A very great public conveniency: The origins of banking in County Durham’, 
Durham County Local History Society Bulletin 52 (1994), p. 22. 
54
 Ibid., pp. 30-1. 
55
 Banham, Backhouses’ Bank of Darlington, p. 9. 
56
 J. Hughes, Liverpool Banks and Bankers 1760-1837 (London, 1906), p. 2.  
57
 Grossman, Unsettled Account, pp. 16-18. 
58 Ibid., pp. 19-25. 
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likely to occur amongst companies established, perhaps more speculatively, during frothier 
economic periods (especially the 1790s). 
Finally, it has been argued that the distribution of banks by county can help us understand 
the banking industry that was emerging in the provinces. While growth was ubiquitous, 
patterns of development were not uniform, and it is possible to some degree to account for 
these variations. There is no obvious relationship between bank development and a 
county’s wealth or population size at the time. In terms of the nature of the underlying 
economy, at a county level it can be tentatively suggested that banks were more likely to 
emerge in agricultural areas, while mixed economies were best served by banks relative to 
their population size. It also appears that banks emerged in greatest numbers in areas that 
already had significant service economy, as measured in this instance by the number of 
attorneys located there. When looking at the distribution of banks across towns, it appears 
that commercial cities were the most important banking centres in the country, in terms of 
the number of banks located there. These two points are not mutually exclusive, for it can 
be argued that commercial towns were also often important service centres. These 
conclusions have important potential implications in terms of the role of banks within the 
economy, suggesting that banks should be studied more in the context of commerce and 
the service economy than they have been in the past, a point that will be explored further 
in the following chapter.
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Chapter 8: Provincial banking, industrial finance and economic growth: an 
historical argument reconsidered 
 
In the introduction to this work, it was argued that the historiography of early English 
banking as its stands has been driven by an interest in the links between economic, 
especially industrial, growth and the emergence of a banking system. The shape of this 
argument was formed from an overwhelming interest in industry in the provinces from 
1780 to 1830, and a contemporaneous explosion in country bank numbers. Remarkably 
despite the tendency since the 1980s to de-emphasise certain aspects of the traditional 
interpretation of the English Industrial Revolution, the narrative with regards to English 
banking has remained essentially static, or alternatively banking is simply ignored. It is 
consequently appropriate to give some consideration to both this broad historical 
argument and the more detailed work on the actual links between banking and industry. It 
will be possible to underline the key problems with this approach, partly by elaborating on 
some of the issues that were touched upon in Chapter 7. Thus while that chapter set the 
growth of provincial banking in the eighteenth century within the context of population, 
income levels and geographical distribution of economic activity, this chapter will seek to 
further explore some of the points raised from the latter point in particular. As with any 
discussion of country banking, this analysis relies to a degree on Pressnell’s pioneering 
Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution. 
I 
The value of early English banking to the English economy has generally been measured 
against its ability to provide finance for the new industries of the industrial revolution. This 
is not to claim that banking could not serve other purposes, but ultimately its relevance and 
success has been measured on an industrial yardstick. This can be seen in the work of L.S. 
Pressnell for example. When examining the impact of country bankers, he devoted 22 
pages to the finance of industry and 35 pages on the finance of the related spheres of local 
authorities and utilities. In contrast there are 12 pages on the finance of agriculture and the 
finance of trade received but 10 pages.1 This balance of interest was understandable in an 
era where the staple industries and transport were believed to be driving truly exceptional 
English economic growth. It is also not surprising in this light that it was the banks in the 
industrial regions that were accorded the greatest significance.  
On the point of bank numbers and bank capital, the circumstantial evidence was equally 
encouraging. The emergence of large numbers of country banks coinciding with the period 
of industrialisation from 1780 onwards was seen as a potential link between the two. Fixed 
capital formation was central to many early arguments about Britain’s growth. Feinstein’s 
work on the 1790s suggested that 14% of all national income was devoted to fixed capital 
formation: industrial and commercial fixed asset formation rose from £0.77 million p.a. in 
                                                             
1
 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 322-400. From this it can be seen that although industry was a core 
part of Pressnell’s interest, he clearly had a broader view of the scope of bank activities, but this has 
been lost in some of the later literature that has built upon his work. 
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the 1760s to £5 million p.a. in the 1810s.2 Measures of bank capital provided a similarly 
promising link as a source for this extra capital, as capital devoted to banking increased 
rapidly, from £1,000,000 in 1775 to £3,700,000 in 1800.3  
The analysis undertaken suggested that the link was far from conclusive. This is partly a 
reflection of the paucity of the surviving records of the ‘industrial’ banks themselves, which 
led Pressnell to declare his conclusions to be ‘impressionistic’.4 Another limitation derived 
from the fact that his evidence for industrial finance was based largely on banks located in 
industrial regions. The few uncovered instances of direct lending to industry by other banks 
were based on familial links between a bank and an industrial customer.5 Equally most of 
the examples provided fall within the period 1800-1820, rather than for the eighteenth 
century itself. Within these limitations, the strongest links with industry were found 
between banks and the metal trades, particularly extractive industries. Five Cornish banks 
were clearly involved in the finance of the local copper industry, including most notably 
Preads Bank. The Bristol Copper Company received about one third of its borrowings of 
£70,000 from five Bristol banks in the 1760s. In December 1782, Pread’s called in loans for 
almost £30,000, split amongst 24 customers, most of who were in the copper industry. 
Other instances of overdrafts for the copper industry can be found for the 1780s and 
1790s.6 In the North East of England, there is evidence that the younger banks (Davison-
Bland & Co. and Surtees, Burdon & Co.) helped to finance some of the minor extractive 
industries of the region, such as lead and alum.7 The absence of finance for the coal 
industry is noteworthy. Other aspects of the metal industry, especially processing, was 
financed by more short-term lending on discount or by overdraft, as seen by banks in 
Manchester, Birmingham and Staffordshire.8  
In textiles the picture is if anything even less clear. In the older textile regions, banks 
emerged that appear to have moved away from their industrial heritage and financed 
merchanting ventures, including the Gurneys and Barings. Ultimately some of this capital 
could find its way back into textile businesses in other regions, but this was not a given, and 
ultimately risky, as the fate of the Bath bank of Cross & Co demonstrates. Indeed the chief 
impression from this section is that the majority of banks with strong textile links were 
often incredibly unstable.9 For other industries a verdict on the role of banks remains 
elusive due to a lack of evidence, although the building industry appears to be one instance 
where banks wisely stayed clear.10 Finally one can note that the evidence from Leyland, 
Bullins & Co. suggests the possibilities available for industrial finance to a large bank in an 
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5 Ibid., pp. 342-3. 
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important industrial centre. However much of the evidence is derived from ledgers in the 
1810s.11 Perhaps the most striking point therefore of Pressnell’s analysis is that the 
evidence is against banks providing finance to new firms other than their own.12 Banks 
could be important sources of working capital through short-term advances during difficult 
economic times, but were unlikely to finance new industrial ventures.  
Cottrell’s work drew similar conclusions on the links between industry and banking. His 
early work has pointed to some of the difficulties in establishing the link between banking 
and industrial growth. Cottrell noted that the industrialists and attorneys were important in 
the formation of country banks, but that ‘industrial bankers’ often failed through over-
lending to support their industrial businesses.13 On an industry specific basis, the links 
between banks were varied. The Midlands cotton industry had substantial access to bank 
funding, with 30% of all Smiths of Nottingham’s advances being made to fifteen spinning 
firms in 1792.14 For the cotton industry as a whole, ‘bank finance, in the form of either a 
discount account or an overdraft, became increasingly important during the 1790s’.15 
However in other industries, including coal, woollens and iron, bank activity was much 
more limited according to this account. In coal, the chief bank involvement was in the 
relatively less important fields of Barnsley. In iron the chief source of finance was merchant 
capital from Bristol and London, although over time ‘banks became increasingly important 
sources of loan capital and as in cotton, ironmasters frequently became bankers’.16 
Although banks were then clearly linked to some parts of the industrial economy, this was 
highly localised and industry specific. The main impression one gets from this work is the 
difficulty of making any generalisations on links between bank finance and industrial 
growth in this period. 
The ‘traditional’ interpretation of the Industrial Revolution has of course been revised since 
the work of Cameron and Pressnell in particular has been published. Two key points are 
relevant to this analysis. Firstly, the revision of the growth rates achieved by the English 
economy has meant that the period from 1780 to 1830 is now viewed as being less 
significant. Secondly, more detailed analysis of capital formation shows that the capital 
requirements of the new industries were limited and could be met from more traditional 
sources, especially families. The exact amount of fixed capital formation in the English 
economy became subject to debate. Deane & Cole suggested that by the 1780s, only 5% of 
national income went to this source, rather than the 14% suggested by Feinstein.17 Thus 
the capital requirements of the economy, while not necessarily enormous, were 
undoubtedly increasing.  
However although this view has become popular, more recent historians have again 
started to question some of the elements of this approach, especially with regards to the 
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capital and credit requirements of business. From an industrial perspective, such criticism 
can be seen in the work of Pat Hudson. She bemoans the decline in emphasis on the study 
of the finance of the firms, believing that ‘the fragmented nature of the capital market, 
different capital requirements of major sectors, different trade and credit arrangements, 
and regional variations in capital availability’ caused difficulties that caused many individual 
firms to fail through lack of capital and credit.18 Although other sources of capital and credit 
were important, banks were by the later eighteenth century significant in the provision 
both of short-term credit and longer-term capital, even if the latter was a ‘rather unwilling’ 
role.19 From a financial history perspective, Larry Neal has also been critical of what he 
described as the ‘Postan-Pollard-Pressnell’ story of the finance of business, where the 
financial and industrial revolutions had nothing to do with one another.20 
The British Industrial Revolution has been described as the ‘Holy Grail of economic history’ 
and new interpretations provide a continuous flow of new works.21 Remarkably all the 
revisions to the historical interpretations of the Industrial Revolution and industrial 
organisation appear to have had limited impact on the approach to integrating finance into 
the analysis. Thus the role of early English banking is still addressed in a similar manner as it 
was in the 1960s. The most recent publications on the English economy have tended to 
emphasise the role of technological changes in the British economy in textiles, iron and 
coal mining and highlighted both the cost structure and institutional/cultural framework 
within Britain that facilitated their adoption: ‘the profitability of innovative effort in the 
eighteenth century’.22 Their treatment of the banking industry is revealing. Allen barely 
mentions the topic at all. Indeed his focus on the invention process as the key to 
understanding the Industrial Revolution meant that his main interest in finance was in the 
modern concept of venture capital, where he highlights banks supporting the rise of 
Boulton-Watt engines.23 In other instances banks were unhelpful, Arkwright for example 
being unable to gain finance from two Nottingham banks in 1769, as they doubted the 
invention’s viability. Instead he received loans from relatives (a pub landlord and a 
merchant), Samuel Need, a wealthy hosier, and Jedediah Strutt, a projector who had 
financed improvements to the knitting frame.24 This gives the impression that banking was 
of limited importance to the Revolution, although the incomplete discussion of the finance 
of invention prevents a firm conclusion on this point. Similarly the recent overview of the 
British Industrial Revolution by Emma Griffin barely mentions the role of finance (or credit) 
as an explanatory factor. Banks are only really referenced in relation to their necessity in 
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encouraging industrialisation in other European countries, which serves only to highlight 
their low-key contribution in England.25 
Mokyr’s work is more comprehensive than Allen’s, his approach allowing non-industrial 
sectors of the economy to be discussed more fully. Two chapters are dedicated to the 
service sector, of which roughly a quarter is allocated to the discussion of finance. The 
thoughts on London’s bankers, which are covered in one paragraph, are at best confused, 
at worst incorrect.26 It is once again the provincial bankers that are considered of greatest 
importance and to which the bulk of the analysis is devoted. Mokyr believes that finance in 
this period has been underrated, both as ‘a manifestation of the belief in progress’ and 
because its role as a lubricant means that GNP figures do not capture the sectors real 
impact.27 Having said this, he identifies the key strength of the system as providing a 
circulating medium and working capital, and of facilitating transactions between local 
manufacturers and merchants. Bankers’ role in ‘facilitating the transition to industrial 
capitalism is more problematic’, although he cautiously suggests that they were less risk 
averse than in later periods and were willing to act as venture capitalists to a limited 
degree.28  
In summary, it can be argued that despite a significant debate on the links between 
provincial banking and industry, our understanding of the significance of banking to the 
industrial revolution, or indeed economic growth more generally, has not progressed since 
the 1960s. This is partly because the evidence that was used in these discussions was itself 
ambiguous or inconclusive. Yet it is also the result of a sterile approach to incorporating 
banking into the debate on the overall industrial revolution, which is arguably too narrowly 
focused on industry, particularly as the significance of the industrial complex has been 
diminished in the historical literature. The following sections seek to revisit the question of 
the links between provincial banking and industry, to see if more recent research on 
banking studies has changed the overall verdicts on this link. It will then proceed to the 
question of the most appropriate way of linking the development of provincial banking and 
broader economic change, suggesting a number of more fruitful ways in which this could 
perhaps be pursued. 
II 
While top-down analyses of banks’ impact on the overall economy have delivered mixed 
verdicts, the results of studies focused more narrowly on banks have tended to suggest a 
stronger link between industry and banking. In South Wales direct lending to business was 
supposed to be more common than was normal at the time. However the evidence then 
provided show only three known examples for the 1790s, one to a forge, one to a colliery 
and one to a canal.29 The Brecon Old Bank had a relationship with some industrialists in the 
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eighteenth century, acting in particular for the Dowlais Iron Company, by discounting its 
notes. It had an obscure relationship with the Hirwaun Furnace, to which it may have lent 
money, and it did lend money to transport companies, including the Glamorganshire Canal 
in the 1790s.30 However the majority of its business at this time was agricultural, consisting 
of making advances on the promissory notes of drovers for two to three months.31 
Some banks made substantial investment in industrial enterprises, to such an extent that it 
has been argued that they in many ways came to perform a task more akin to modern 
venture capitalist firms. In particular Brunt highlights the activity of Praed & Co in Cornwall 
in lending to the local copper industry.32 Pat Hudson’s study of the links between banks and 
industry in the West Riding textile trades indicate a close connection between the two. Of 
64 bank partners in the West Riding of Yorkshire between 1758 and 1820, 41% were clearly 
connected with textiles, indicating a close-knit group of ‘mutual trading and credit 
extension’.33 If anything banks tended to over-lend to textiles firms, leaving them with 
insufficient liquidity, which may not have been surprising given the close industrial ties of 
the partners of these banks. This illiquidity and local investment can be seen in the example 
of Swaine & Co, which when it failed in 1807 had the majority of £523,000 invested in the 
locality, with £204,000 of this tied up in the drafts of the firm W.S. & J. Crossley.34 
This situation was not unique. An earlier example of a bank failure due to industrial lending 
can be seen from the collapse of Hargreaves Livesey, calico printers of Blackburn. This firm 
benefitted from the services of the Manchester Bank of William Allen and their London 
agents Lowe, Vere & Co. In February 1782, the London bank was making £33,500 available 
to the Blackburn firm, an amount which made them decidedly uncomfortable and which 
they wished to see reduced. The caution of the London house was justified in this instance. 
Allen maintained his exposure to Hargreaves and when the firm failed due to overtrading in 
1788, it caused the collapse of the Manchester Bank within 48 hours.35 Other Manchester 
banks maintained more successful links with their industrial customers. In the same year 
that Allen failed, the Heywoods, bankers at Liverpool, made their second attempt to open a 
bank in Manchester, the first attempt in 1784 having failed.36 The bank developed an 
industrial clientele: Richard Arkwright had deposits of £13,862 at his death in 1792, while 
the machinists McKonnel and Kennedy were also customers by 1791.37 However this raises 
two points: firstly the credit balances show that successful industrialists were potentially a 
source of funds for banks. Secondly it is also clear that the most important customers in 
terms of account turnover were all merchants in the early 1790s: the cotton merchant 
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Thomas Norris was turning over almost £46,000 through to the six months to December 
1791, while in the same period for 1792, the sum was over £90,000. At the same time he 
had a substantial overdraft with the bank. Other important accounts were those of Edensor 
and Benjamin Luke Winter & Co, wine merchants.38 
Even in less industrial areas, some firms lent extensively to industrial companies. Thus the 
Smiths’ banking partnership in Nottingham provided substantial financing to the Sheffield 
ironmasters Roebuck & Sons. Leighton-Boyce argues that Roebuck’s were the Nottingham 
bank’s most important customer at mid-century and by 1789 Smiths’ had advanced the 
ironmasters £10,500 on security of the Carron ironworks. The real importance however 
was in the turnover of the accounts, with bills of exchange for £18,238 passing through the 
account in the twelve months to August 1750, and £21,238 during the following 12 months. 
Roebuck’s paid for imported raw materials via Smiths’ agent in London, who were re-
imbursed by the Nottingham bank through bills ‘sent for collection through the bank’s 
London agents’.39  
Banks could also undertake financial activities that were indirectly beneficial to industry, 
particularly in the area of infrastructure. The detailed work undertaken by J.R. Ward on the 
finance of canals led him to conclude that the involvement of bankers in these schemes 
was ‘modest’. They might frequently subscribe to shares in newly promoted canals, 
‘sometimes for substantial amounts’, but they were never more than a small minority of 
investors.  The only exception to this was the Salisbury and Southampton Canal, the failure 
of which brought the Bath City Bank down with it. The opportunity for a banker lay instead 
in the position of Company Treasurer, which from the 1780s was usually filled by a banker 
and allowed the company to maintain an overdraft, usually short-term to cover a delay in 
the payment of capital calls by shareholders. More frequently it provided a positive cash 
balance for the bank.40 Overdrafts of anything up to £6,000 appear to have been common, 
while the Grand Junction canal had an outstanding balance in excess of £20,000 in May and 
October 1801.41 Part of the problem for bank finance was a question of timing: much of the 
canal network was built in the 1790s, when banks were reluctant to extend new loans, and 
were indeed more likely to request repayment of outstanding ones. However when a 
treasurer-banker could not meet the company’s most urgent cash requirements, he was 
likely to be stripped of his office.42 Overall it appears that investments in canals had a 
similar appeal to investments in breweries: once constructed they promised reliable cash 
flows which the banker could use to his advantage. 
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There are reasons even to be sceptical of conclusions drawn from industry-specific 
analyses, however. Firstly, they are looking for finance of industrial firms, so not 
surprisingly they find some examples thereof. Other ‘industrial’ activities/regions however 
clearly did not depend particularly on bank finance. Mokyr points to the scarcity of banks in 
the key industrialising region of Lancashire, highlighting it as one of the greatest difficulties 
of linking banking with economic/industrial growth.43 Clothiers in the West of England did 
not appear to depend on advances from Country Bankers, although their requirements or 
capital may have been limited given that large mills did not emerge until after 1800 and the 
1790s were highly profitable. In 1793, John Anstie of Devizes was brought down by the 
failure of his banker; however he was an exception and had been in financial difficulties 
since 1789.44  
Even within many industrial towns, the banks were generally not related to industrial 
enterprises to the extent that Hudson found in the West Riding. For example in Sheffield 
the banks are largely thought to have grown out of the factors or middlemen, rather from 
the industrial producers.45 This town was also notable for its difficulties in generating 
lasting banking houses in this period: its first two banks lasted eight and eleven years 
respectively, while a third lasted but two years from its foundation in 1783.The two 
surviving banks at the end of the century were Shores (established in 1774) and Messrs 
Walkers & Co. (1792). Only Messrs Walkers can be said to have industrial origins, their 
ironworks being the greatest manufacturing concern in the district.46 In Leeds it appears 
that merchants featured most prominently in the formation of banking establishments. 
Wilson argues that in that city there had been a longstanding connection between the 
merchants and gentry, with merchants accepting deposits and negotiating mortgages. 
Banking was a ‘systematisation of existing monetary transactions’.47 Beckett’s bank, 
perhaps the most famous of Leeds banks, was established as Lodge & Arthington around 
1750, John Arthington being a Quaker linen-draper and Thomas Lodge the nephew of an 
eminent London merchant. Beckett himself was woollen merchant, who also imported 
wine from Portugal, while another partner, Thomas Broadbent was a wholesale grocer. The 
New Bank (Wickham, Field, Cleaver and Eamonson Junior; est. 1777) and the Commercial 
Bank (Fenton Scott, Binns, Nicholson & Smith; 1793) were both dominated by commercial 
families. Wilson concluded that capital accrued in the cloth trade was ‘diverted into, and 
occasionally fast dissipated in, banking activities’, diverting commercial fortunes away from 
large-scale manufacturing. They tended to provide loans and overdrafts to larger, more 
established houses, which were ‘in the last resort least needing them’.48 
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III 
The previous chapter argued that geographically most banks were not located in industrial 
areas but originated in rural or mixed economies. This means that a new approach to the 
analysis of banking is required, part of which should focus on the importance of English 
towns as urban service centres. That England was becoming increasingly urbanised is 
beyond dispute. While London was the principal beneficiary of urbanisation in the 
seventeenth century, in the eighteenth century provincial towns also participated in this 
growth.49 The first half of the eighteenth century is also understood to have seen rising 
numbers of craftsmen and professionals in these towns.50 Peter Borsay has argued that the 
urban renaissance that took place in the period 1680-1760 was driven partly by economic 
change, but ‘by aiding the development of a competitive society, also contributed to future 
economic change’.51 The economic forces driving this change are important in the context 
of banking, as it is indicative of a growing service economy emerging in provincial towns. A 
fundamental part of this argument is that towns were becoming less centres of 
manufacture of ‘essentials’ and more orientated towards the production of luxuries and 
the provision of services. The towns Borsay mentions in this respect include Warwick, 
Worcester and Preston.52 That the urban middling-sort grew from about 170,000 in 1700 to 
475,000 in 1800 (excluding London) was important.53 They, alongside the gentry, generated 
‘surplus wealth’ that could utilise these services. Towns could draw wealth from their 
surrounding hinterlands and also generate further wealth.54  
Although these authors do not explicitly address the growth of banking within these towns, 
it is arguable that it did form part of the same process whereby new trades and services 
emerged. An example where this analysis might be applicable would be Bath. With no 
obvious commercial or industrial purpose, this was a town developed for leisure. Yet it was 
also a popular location for the formation of banks. Although there were only three going 
concerns in 1796, through the period to 1800, 7 banks were established there. Even with 
three banks, the town’s banking density was greater than that of many industrial cities. The 
utility of banks in tourist towns is quite clear, given generally wealthy visitors who needed 
access to their money. A similar type of tourist-orientated business was carried out by the 
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Margate Bank as that town developed as a tourist centre.55 The Margate bank of Cobb & 
Son is of wider interest. It is classified by Pressnell as a bank that arose from a shipping 
interest.56 While the Cobbs did indeed have an interest in shipping, this was relatively 
recent and in fact their principal business interest was their brewery.57 Established in 1785, 
the bank was at best a mid-sized concern and the economy it served did not have one 
dominant industry. Instead it provided services for a broad range of different clients with 
different needs. It provided a store for deposits of the local pseudo-gentry, professionals 
and charities. These were invested inside the region, in transport infrastructure, shipping, 
the brewery, agriculture and by lending to townsmen including rope-makers, clerks, house 
agents, school master or the customs house officer, as well as through the London money 
market.58 The implication is that many banks were not highly concentrated in one project 
or economic sector, but instead were responding to a requirement for financial services 
from a broad range of areas. 
The other key issue raised in the previous chapter was the issue of banking in the 
commercial towns, and associated with this, the role of banks in financing commercial 
activity. Pressnell believed that the finance of trade was an essential feature of provincial 
banks claiming that the ‘finance of trade, both internal and external, was an outstanding 
feature’ of their activity, yet the evidence he presents to justify this position is limited 
largely to the early nineteenth century and confined to ten pages of his book.59 The 
significance of banking for the nation’s commerce has been taken up by some of the more 
general overviews of the English economy in this period. Mokyr claims that the ‘significance 
of country and London banks to the commercial sector is obvious and immediate; without 
it long- and medium-distance trade would have been all but impossible’.60 However the 
importance of the trading interest has been lost in much of the later literature, and even 
within remittances the role of tax-remitters has generally received greater attention.61 
In the main trading centres, ‘bankers commonly originated from trade’, particularly from 
wholesale traders, such as clothiers, iron merchants, tea and wine importers, drapers, 
mercers, general merchants and overseas traders, whose large remittance activities made 
them suitable for this role.62 Ten of Liverpool’s fourteen important banks originated from 
trading houses, while half of Newcastle’s banks had partners concerned in trade and almost 
all of Bristol’s banks had partners engaged in overseas trade.63 In the lesser ports, such as 
Whitby, Sunderland, Boston or Dover, shipowners featured prominently as bank founders. 
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Even in inland cities, commercial interests were an important source of bank founders, 
including Jones Loyd in Manchester and Twining’s in Colchester.64 What all these partners 
would have had in common was extensive experience in long-term credit transactions from 
their original business. Within the commercial establishments drapers and mercers 
featured prominently. Examples included Joseph Berwick’s bank in Worcester, Stevenson & 
Co. in Stafford, Mortlock’s in Cambridge, the Banbury Bank and the Oxford bank of Fletcher 
and Parsons. These banks tended to be stronger and longer-lived than those emerging from 
many other trades.65 Pressnell provided no statistics to support this point. However Ward-
Perkin’s analysis of the first 50 bank partners shows that they were distributed across 26 
banks, of which seven were linked to the textile trades (mercers, drapers and 
woolstaplers). Of all provincial bank founders, including nineteenth century foundations, 
almost 17% of founding partners originated in the textile trades, the largest group after the 
gentry (21%). 66 Their ubiquity reflects the importance of the cloth trade to the eighteenth 
century economy. After drapery, the other forms of common trading banks were derived 
from ironmongery (5%), coal dealing (3.2%) and corn merchanting (2.1%).67  
For more in-depth information on the growth of banking in a commercial environment one 
can look to developments in Bristol, which, as noted in the previous chapter, was the most 
heavily banked city outside of London. By the eighteenth century the process of national 
integration, dominated by a London price-setting market, had not run its course and some 
provincial centres managed to maintain substantial regional significance, including Bristol.  
Bristol’s banking history was first charted by Cave at the end of the nineteenth century and 
some further studies have subsequently been published, although as is often the case, the 
main focus is on the nineteenth century. Of the 13 banks established in Bristol in this 
period, five banks were of longer-term significance: the Old Bank; Ames, Cave & Co; Miles’ 
Bank; the Harford Bank; the Bristol City Bank (Table 15).68 Bristol served as an entrepôt not 
only for the South West, but also South Wales and the West Midlands, with equally 
extensive colonial connections. The city was important in financing industrial ventures in 
both Wales and the Midlands, most famously perhaps the Coalbrookdale ironworks. These 
banks were therefore operating in a diversified area and were part of a financial centre for 
their hinterland. Early banks in South Wales for example maintained an ability to draw on 
Bristol bankers into the nineteenth century.69 
 
                                                             
64 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
65 Ibid., pp. 51-3. 
66 Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, vol. 1, pp. 38-43. One should note in their analysis that 
the groups do not appear to be mutually exclusive.  
67 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 53-4. The figures in brackets give again Dawes and Ward-Perkins’ 
data for the share of founders from these firms. 
68
 P. Ollerenshaw, ‘The Development of Banking in the Bristol Region’, in Charles Harvey and Jon 
Press, Studies in the Business History of Bristol (Bristol, 1988), p. 72. These five banks are now all part 
of the RBS Group. Stuckey’s, another famous bank of the region, opened a Bristol office in 1806. 
69
 Minchinton, Bristol: ‘Metropolis of the West in the Eighteenth Century’, pp. 83-6; Ollerenshaw, 
‘Development of Banking in the Bristol Region’, pp. 55-6; T.M. Hodges, ‘Early Banking in Cardiff’, 
EcHR 18.1/2 (1948), pp. 84-5 
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Bank name 
Year of 
formation 
End 
Date Exit 
Old Bank 1750 1891 Merger - Prescotts (NatWest) 
Miles Bank 1752 1877 Merger - Bristol Old Bank 
Exchange Bank 1764 1826 Ceased 
Harford Bank 1769 1820 Merger - Miles Bank 
Peach & Co 1774 1781 Dissolved 
Davis & Sons 1781 1801 Ceased 
Benjamin Loscombe 1781 1783 Bankruptcy 
Ames, Cave & Co 1786 1826 Merger - Bristol Old Bank 
Joseph Gregory Harris 1786 1828 Closed 
Thomas Wigan 1790 1793 Stopped payment 
Bristol City Bank 1794 1834 Merger - Northern and Central Bank of England 
Bicknell, Sutton & Gillam ? 1784 Bankruptcy 
Thomas Wigan Junior ? 1785 Bankruptcy 
Table 15: Eighteenth century banks of Bristol (Source: Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks) 
Cave noted the potential existence of goldsmith-bankers in Bristol prior to the 
establishment of formal banks. Goldsmiths had until the mid-seventeenth century acted as 
money changers and after 1645 started lending money, and paying and charging interest. 
Notable instances included three goldsmiths named Coursley, bankers to the town 
Corporation in the seventeenth century.  Thomas Wall, described as a bookseller and son of 
the goldsmith Richard Wall, was involved as a banker from 1677 until his death in 1715, 
after which his wife continued the business until 1763.70 Cave argues John Vaughan’s 
dealings with the Corporation make him “the Father of Bristol Banking”.71 However an 
emphasis on the significance of goldsmiths can be misleading. Firstly, Vaughan himself was 
only a junior partner in the second bank of that city. Equally only one other goldsmith 
managed any sort of transition to being a banker: Thomas Wigan, who was bankrupted in 
1785 as a goldsmith and banker, and the venture under the same name, presumably 
related, established around 1790 which failed in 1793.72  
In reality, banking in Bristol originated from mercantile activity.73 According to both Price 
and Ollerenshaw, it was the town’s international trade that encouraged the formation of 
banks there and in other West coast ports. This formed part of what Price calls ‘a miniature 
banking revolution in the ports, foretelling the greater inland banking explosion after 
1783’.74 The desire of merchant houses to engage in banking has been attributed to the 
extra capital it could provide to finance the core trading business. The Gurney’s financial 
business existed for the benefit of the merchanting business and was a direct result of the 
pressures that the extension of credit placed upon it. For example in 1767, the financial 
                                                             
70 Cave, Banking in Bristol, pp. 1- 5. 
71 Ibid., p. 7.  
72 See Dawes and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, p. 103, for brief comments on this banker. 
73
 For an overview of merchant activity in England, see W.E. Minchinton, ‘The Merchants in England 
in the Eighteenth Century’, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 10.2 (1957), pp. 62-71; Kenneth 
Morgan, ‘Bristol West India Merchants in the Eighteenth Century’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, Sixth Series, vol. 3 (1993), pp. 185-208. 
74
 Ollerenshaw, ‘Development of Banking in the Bristol Region’, p. 56; Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 
67-9. 
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part of the company had surplus cash of £20,000. This largely matched the £20,000 capital 
short-fall in the merchanting business.75 Price believed that this situation was not unique to 
the Gurney business and that in the third quarter of the eighteenth century:  
export merchants and their allies among the big wholesalers (who also had to sell 
on long credit) took the lead in forming banks that mobilized the wealth of the 
agricultural sector ... and the savings of lesser traders, prosperous artisans, and 
professionals in town in order to advance credit to substantial merchants (including 
the partners in the bank).76 
That country banks, especially those in larger towns, were generally aimed at local 
businesses at this point is also argued by Sayers in relation to both Lloyds at Birmingham 
and an early Southampton bank, for which about two thirds of the customers were 
‘craftsmen-tradesmen’.77 
As with the country in general, it should be noted that Bristol bank partners were generally 
part of a civic elite and had diverse interests, including in local industrial activities, but 
merchanting features most prominently.78 The Old Bank in particular had a commercial 
hue: Onesiphorous Tyndall was a West India merchant and drysalter, while Isaac Elton was 
the Master of the Merchant Venturers. In the case of the Exchange Bank, a strong 
participation by lawyers was supported by Swymmer, who was a West India merchant. The 
Miles Bank was formed by Richard Champion, Michael Miller, James Reed, John Vaughan, 
Thomas Goldney and Morgan Smith, described collectively at the time as ‘wealthy and 
reputable merchants’. Champion and Goldney’s main interest were as merchants, as was 
James Reed, although he was less well-known. Michael Miller was of a family of grocers 
and had privateering interests, while Morgan Smith was a sugar refiner. The only partner 
without a merchant related background was therefore John Vaughan, the aforementioned 
goldsmith.79 Nor was this dominance of the commercial interest confined to the banks of 
Bristol itself. Stuckey’s bank was established in Langport in 1772, and the Stuckey family, 
active in the coasting trade in partnership with the Bagehots, dominated the commercial 
life of that town. Offices in Bridport and Bristol followed in 1806, styled as the Bristol and 
Somersetshire Banking Company.80  
Of the 50 leading sugar merchants, Bristol’s most important trade, eight became partners 
in one of the banks of the City.81 Other links between banking and commerce could be seen 
in the tobacco trade, from which trade both Thomas Knox and Edward Harford emanated. 
The Bristol banks provided some credit, although the principal source of credit were the 
warehousemen, such as Fisher, Baker & Griffin, who were operating on capital of £36,000 
                                                             
75 Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 66-7. 
76 Ibid., pp. 67-9. 
77 Sayers, Lloyds Bank, pp. 89-90. 
78
 Ollerenshaw, ‘The Development of Banking in the Bristol Region’, pp. 56-7. 
79
 Ibid., p. 57; Stembridge, The Goldney Family, pp. 61, 67-8. 
80
 Ollerenshaw, ‘Development of Banking in the Bristol Region’, pp. 58-9. Even after conversion to 
joint-stock status, the bank remained firmly rooted in Somerset, both in terms of branches and 
shareholders. 
81 Morgan, ‘Bristol West India Merchants’, p. 201. 
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in 1754.82 The wider commercial significance of the banks can also be seen in the activities 
of the Merchant Venturers, from whom an initial proposal for a bank in Bristol had 
emerged in 1713, although this was not created. In 1774, they drew attention to a bill that 
was designed to stop persons engaged in any other trade also being concerned in a banking 
house. This was protested because:  
Banks of this City are of great Utility to the Trade, being incorporated into the Plan 
of Trade carried on her ... We consider the Plan as an attempt to establish a 
Monopoly which is destructive of all Trade...83 
It is also clear from these records that Ames, Cave & Co. and Tyndall, Elton & Co at the end 
of the century both lent money to the Society, which faced liquidity problems. Much of the 
Society’s expenditure appears to have gone towards improvements of the port, which the 
banks were therefore indirectly helping to finance.84  
Few details of the financial performance of these banks are available. An exception can be 
found in the case of the Bristol Old Bank, for which Price provides some information, 
particularly around the years 1772-5. In terms of liabilities, the Bristol Old Bank’s note issue 
was not insubstantial at around £48,000; however the bank was overwhelmingly funded by 
the deposits it could gather, which totalled 60-70% of liabilities (Table 16). The growth in 
the deposits between 1773 and 1775 probably reflects the return of confidence to the 
economy over that period.  
  
                                                             
82
 Kenneth Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic trade in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 1-
2, 161-2, 186. 
83
 Cited in Patrick McGrath, The Merchant Venturers of Bristol (Bristol, 1975), pp. 224-5. 
84 McGrath, The Merchant Venturers of Bristol, p. 118-123. 
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Bristol Old Bank, 1772-5 
 
1772/3 1775 
Capital £27,000 £27,000 
Note issue £47,878 £47,878 
Interest deposits £46,128 £68,972 
Current deposits £100,000 £130,000 
Other liabilities* £13,380 £16,610 
Total liabilities £221,006 £273,850 
 Bills discounted £102,251 £168,149 
Cash £42,100 £43,430 
London Agent £70,000 £45,460 
Other assets £20,035 £33,421 
Total Assets £234,386 £290,460 
   Total profits (1772/3) £5,382 £5,382 
Return on Assets 2.30% 1.85% 
 
*Other liabilities is a balancing figure to make assets 
and liabilities match 
Table 16: Balance sheet and returns of the Bristol Old Bank, 1772-75 (Source: Price, Capital and Credit, p. 79, 
82, 87, 89) 
It is however the asset structure that is perhaps most interesting in this analysis. The firm 
maintained a very high degree of liquidity (48% and 31% of assets in each year 
respectively). Unsurprisingly, the firm’s liquidity was greater in the depression year of 
1772/3. From this evidence, the management of the firm’s liquid resources took place 
entirely through the London agent. ‘Till money’ was reasonably constant, but the balance 
with the London agent fell from almost £70,000 in 1773 to £45,460 by 1775. Productive 
assets were overwhelmingly orientated towards the discounting of bills, which accounted 
for 44% and 58% of assets respectively. Other forms of lending accounted for only roughly 
10% of the balance sheet. The bank was apparently already being run according to 
principles elucidated by Vincent Stuckey in 1837: long-term loans should be avoided 
(including permanently overdrawn accounts, which when they arose should be converted 
into long-term loans and further overdrafts prohibited).85 Capital management was flexible: 
it stood at £27,000 in 1772-5, which then shrunk back to £24,000 in 1777-80 and £18,000 in 
1781-2. This has been attributed to changes in the partnership over that period. 86 
There was some variation in terms of size between these banks. The Exchange Bank had 
assets of about £80,000 in January 1778; of these 76% are given as cash, which presumably 
included all liquid forms of lending, including discounts and any investments, but again 
highlighting the importance of liquidity to these banks.87 These banks also seem to have 
                                                             
85
 Ollerenshaw, ‘The Development of Banking in the Bristol Region’, pp. 60-1. 
86
 Price, Capital and Credit, p. 79. 
87
 Pressnell, Country Banking, p. 520. Some caution with these numbers is needed, as the data 
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provided attractive returns to their owners. In 1772-3, the bank paid out £5,382 to its 
partners, or a return of about 20% on its capital. This equates to a return of 2.3% on its 
assets.  By comparison, the Miles Bank had a capital of £12,000 and from the day book of 
Samuel Goldney, it can be established that the average return on the equity in this bank 
over 1754-1767 was about 15% (the lowest return was 9% in 1758, while in 1766 and 1767 
the bank generated a return of over 25%).88 
This chapter has focused principally on the banks of Bristol as a case study in how banks in 
commercial towns were related to the merchant or trading community and in how they 
operated. Similar experiences can be found in other commercial towns. Hughes argues that 
in the case of the Liverpool, an early banker was either ‘a merchant, or a larger trader, who 
grafted the business of banking on to his own affairs’, who over time aggregated the 
payments of smaller merchants. Prominent merchants of the town, such as Charles 
Caldwell or Arthur Heywood, had previously been successful merchants.89 Similarly in Hull 
and the East Riding, banks enjoyed significant merchant participation, including Thomas 
Bridges, Joseph Sill and Thomas Thompson, or Sir Christopher Sykes.90 These banks 
provided an easy source of credit to merchants, who regularly overdrew and some of the 
larger merchant houses maintained almost permanent overdrafts. Other merchants 
brought deposits to the bank, often in the region of £1,000-£5,000. Some of the Hull banks 
managed to access local agricultural deposits, which were a useful source of funds.91 The 
precise nature of commercial lending of provincial banks depended upon the size and 
location of the trading bank: inland and port banks acted slightly differently. As with 
‘industrial banks’, they were always likely to make funds available to the commercial 
businesses of the partners. The banks would also tend to lend to the local merchants, and 
of the identifiable debit balances with these banks, most belonged to merchant houses. 
Finally, through remittance activities, country banks could finance international trade from 
the ports they were located in, by discounting international bills through the London 
agents.92  
Overall it does seem that there was a very strong link between banking and commerce. It is 
apparent from this analysis that many merchants were either directly engaged in banking 
or benefitted from the services of a banker. Burke valued banks as ‘machines of domestick 
credit’ for their value to foreign and domestic trade, relating them to an ‘astonishing 
encrease of private confidence, of general circulation, and of internal commerce; an 
encrease out of all proportion to the growth of the foreign trade.’93 Jackson argues that the 
commercial expansion that took place in Hull would not have been possible without the 
emergence of these new banking houses.94 The bankers’ contribution was not just about 
the direct provision of financial services, but the injection of confidence, for by discounting 
                                                             
88 Stembridge, The Goldney Family, pp. 70, 147. This assumes that the capital of the bank remained 
constant; there is no evidence amongst the Goldney papers that it was increased. 
89 Hughes, Liverpool Banks and Bankers, pp. 36-9, 84-7 and 91. 
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 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 211-3 
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 Ibid., pp. 255-232 
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 Pressnell, Country Banking, pp. 356-365 
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 E.J. Payne (ed.), Letters on a Regicide Peace, Letter 1, On the Overtures of Peace, 1st published 
1795 (Indianapolis, 1990), pp. 59-60. 
94 Jackson, Hull in the Eighteenth Century, p. 209 
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and allowing merchants to draw upon him, he was declaring both the transaction and the 
parties sound.95 There were of course limitations to the role banks could play. Jacob Price 
believed these banks were deposit gathering institutions and ‘could meet only a small 
fraction of the merchants’ credit needs’.96 Judging the impact of these commercial banks 
on economic growth more generally depends partly on one’s opinion of trade in the 
process of economic growth. Merchants are accepted to been a very ‘dynamic element’ in 
English economic life, and for some are thought to have been responsible for generating 
the nation’s wealth. It is argued that the number of eminent merchants grew across the 
century, from 2,000 in 1700, to 2,900 in 1750 and 3,500 in 1812.97 This being so, it does 
appear that the relationship between commerce, banking and economic growth is, at the 
very least, an avenue worthy of further exploration. 
 
IV 
This chapter has sought to address an issue raised by Bowen and Cottrell, who write that 
‘banking in Britain ought not to be examined in chronological contexts that arise, 
somewhat teleologically, solely with the emergence of the first industrial nation in mind’. 
To those authors, banking formed part of a gentlemanly order that regarded industry only 
as part of a broad interrelated series of economic activities.98 However the mainstream 
economic literature continues to try to incorporate banking into the historical narrative 
through the perspective of its role in industrial finance. This would not be such a problem if 
the evidence presented seemed likely to generate more firm conclusions. The anecdotal 
evidence that has been collated does seem to suggest that banks could be useful sources 
for the capital and credit that industrial firms required in the eighteenth century. However 
in the absence of a full systematic analysis of the topic through loans books or a large 
sample of industrial firms, these conclusions are always likely to be tentative. 
Even if a more conclusive answer could be found, it would be questionable if such a narrow 
focus on industrial finance is appropriate. It is anachronistic and may lead other important 
aspects of the role of banking to be neglected.  Other frameworks offer the possibility of 
fresh insights on the link between finance and economic growth. Capie for example has 
tried to look at the potential significance of changes in the monetary sophistication, of 
which banking clearly formed a part, but his conclusions are problematic.99 These two 
chapters offer another alternative approach by placing the analysis of banks within the 
context of the service economy and the growing sophistication and specialisation of the 
                                                             
95 Pressnell, Country Banking, p. 363. 
96 Price, Capital and Credit, pp. 94-5. 
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economy that can be seen particularly in the growth of towns during this period. This 
approach recognises the fact that many banks had diverse client bases with differing 
financial requirements, meaning that focusing on only one section can be misleading.  
On the other hand it seems equally clear that there has been a considerable neglect of 
relationship between banking and commerce in the provinces, which mirrors in many ways 
the historiography of banking in London. The neglect is surprising in some ways because 
the numbers are clear that the largest banking centres were in commercial towns, including 
London. Furthermore, many of the trading banks were large, prominent concerns, such as 
Heywood’s in Liverpool or the Smiths and the Peases in Hull. By focusing more closely on 
the commercial element one can begin to integrate developments in London and the 
provinces more closely, rather than treating them as two distinct sets of banks. In both 
London and the provinces, there was significant integration of bankers, merchants and 
wholesalers as owners and customers of banks. From an operational perspective, with the 
exception of the agency business, they probably faced similar challenges and in both 
instances, an overriding concern was to maintain liquid balance sheets.
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Conclusion 
 
The English banking system was transformed during the eighteenth century. From just a 
few dozen banks in London, a genuine banking system that encompassed the whole 
country emerged. The financial crises of the 1790s served to highlight just how important 
this banking system had become, as can be seen by the response of local communities in 
support of their banks that did come under pressure.1 This transformation was achieved in 
an environment of relatively limited government control, for restraints on private banking 
were modest. English banking did benefit from the series of improvements in state finance 
that commenced at the end of seventeenth century, particularly through the development 
of liquid assets that they could purchase. Clapham may be right to argue that, despite the 
state having no obvious interest in banking proper, the banking system is ‘so closely 
associated with public borrowing’ that the development of a national banking system 
would have been ‘unlikely’ without the establishment of the Bank of England and the 
changes in the public debt that derived from this.2 The cap on rates imposed by the usuary 
laws also meant that credit rationing as a form of lending control did occur, as risk could 
not be properly priced.3 However Grossman’s argument that the evolution of England’s 
banking system was driven by the needs of the state is exaggerated.4 If banks did not 
threaten the activity of the state, there was significant scope for autonomy within the legal 
constraints of the Bank’s charter.5 Indeed, if anything it is noticeable how little impact the 
formation of the Bank of England originally had. The limit on the number of partners a bank 
might have may have placed a cap on banks’ size, but the restriction does not appear to 
have been a problem for most in this period. Its influence may have been no more than to 
encourage banks to specialise, as they were not able individually to grasp all the 
opportunities available.  
While the growth of banking in this period has been readily acknowledged, much of the 
existing literature fails to approach the topic as a coherent whole. An excessive focus on 
the role of banking in industrial growth has been particularly unhelpful in this respect. A 
coherent approach to studying the whole system also of course requires a better 
understanding of the underlying parts. The thesis has begun to address gaps in our 
knowledge of some of these parts, especially amongst the banks located in the City of 
London. The business conducted by City bankers was complex and substantial, integrating 
domestic and international trade, as well as supporting much of the country’s payment 
system through the Clearing House by the fourth quarter of the century. As with other 
parts of the banking system, the third quarter of the century seems to have been a 
particularly important period for City banking, as new banks emerged and new functions 
                                                             
1 For Liverpool’s response to these crises, see Hughes, Liverpool Banks and Bankers, pp. 14-5. 
Methods of local support for a region’s banks also emerged in the North East and Suffolk, see 
Banham, ‘A very great public conveniency’, pp. 27-30 and Jones, ‘Early Banking in Suffolk’, p. 400. 
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 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 2. 
3
 Temin and Voth, ‘Private borrowing during the financial revolution’, pp. 553-60. 
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 Grossman, Unsettled Account, p. 195-6. 
5 Bowen and Cottrell, ‘Banking and the evolution of the British economy’, pp. 95-6. 
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were developed. This is an area where further study would be beneficial. However the 
material discovered on Forster Lubbock’s provides a rare insight into the early emergence 
of the banking houses of this period. From a practical perspective, the records emphasise 
the centrality of the London banker in providing direction and control oversight to the 
regional correspondents. It also provides an indication of how the system was able to 
mobilise provincial capital and put it to use in the London money markets. 
What then of the system as whole? This thesis has shown that such a coherent, integrated 
approach to analysing banking in this period is viable. The system itself was dependent on 
an extensive network of actors, each of whom had varying skill sets, which in itself speaks 
to the financialisation of the economy discussed in the introduction. Having said this, one 
group that does feature particularly prominently across different parts of the system is the 
merchant community. While important bankers of merchant heritage have clearly been 
acknowledged in the existing literature, this thesis suggests that their broader role in 
driving this financial specialisation, and their impact on the banking space in particular, has 
not been given sufficient emphasis. This is true not just of banks in London, but also within 
provincial banking, where they were very much within the pioneering group. A proper 
acknowledgement of their role is necessary for not only is it important in helping to answer 
why banking emerged in the manner it did in this period, but also to address the question 
of what the main function of these early banks actually was, and consequently banking’s 
significance within the broader economy. Indeed the move from a goldsmith-led banking 
system to one that was led by merchants suggests a change in emphasis within banking, 
both in terms of what people needed banks for (credit versus safe-keeping of cash) and 
consequently also the skill-set required to manage the business.  
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Appendix 
 
The data on country banks presented in chapter 7 is based upon an analysis of the data 
collected by Dawes and Ward-Perkins. A few other sources are available to analyse the 
regional development of banks and can be use to compare and corroborate the numbers 
provided. The analysis of the counties of Northumberland and Durham ties in well with the 
estimates of Banham, who identified 10 banks in Durham and 5 in Newcastle in the 1790s.1 
For East Anglia, Harold Preston has created a list of bankers, or tradesmen with banking 
interests, that can be used to provide an overview of the growth of banking in the second 
half of the eighteenth century (Figure 46).2 The graph shows that the overall pattern of 
development in both lists roughly correspond, although Preston seems to date the rise of 
these banks a few years earlier that Dawes and Ward-Perkins. Prior to roughly 1750, 
banking was a very niche activity, which began to grow at a moderate pace from that point 
through to around 1773. After this point there is a very noticeable acceleration in the rate 
of growth, despite of the impact of the American Wars.  
 
 
Figure 46: East Anglian banks, 1744-1800 (Sources: Harold Preston, East Anglian Banks and Bankers; Dawes 
and Ward-Perkins, Country Banks, passim) 
                                                             
1
 Banham, ‘A very great public conveniency’, p. 21. The close proximity of these numbers is not that 
surprising given both sources are heavily dependent on Phillip’s work as their source. 
2
 It should be noted that the graph excludes 4 banks for which the starting date is not known. For 
those where the initial starting date is not precisely known, I have used a date that is in the correct 
ballpark figure.  
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A similar cross-check can be performed for the South West of the country. The Baring 
family was closely involved in banking in the South West: Charles Baring was a partner of 
banks in Exeter and Plymouth, with Francis acting as their agent. It was therefore necessary 
for them to maintain an interest in banking in that region, which is reflected in some of the 
documents in the Baring’s archive. A document exists that illustrates the situation in Devon 
in 1793. This lists the circulation of deposit notes in that county and shows that in March 
1793 there were at least 14 firms carrying out such business.3 This is slightly less than the 
eighteen Dawes and Ward-Perkins identified in that county in this period. However the 
difference may be explained in part by the focus on note-issuance in the Baring analysis. 
Given that we cannot establish exactly on which basis Baring’s list was established, these 
estimates are close enough. 
  
                                                             
3 Baring, Northbrook Papers, NP1A 22.6, f. 4. 
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